Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-13075 No. 6916
12-30-2020
SCOTT A. WALKER, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Emily Jura, Assistant Public Defender, Anchorage, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v . State , 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002). Trial Court No. 3AN-13-08176 CI
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge. Appearances: Emily Jura, Assistant Public Defender, Anchorage, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges. Judge HARBISON.
In 1982, Scott A. Walker was convicted of two counts of kidnapping, one count of robbery, one count of burglary, and two counts of theft, for which he was sentenced to a composite 89 years' imprisonment. We affirmed Walker's convictions and sentence on direct appeal.
Walker v. State, 674 P.2d 825, 827 (Alaska App. 1983).
Id.
After serving over 32 years of his composite sentence, Walker applied for discretionary parole in 2012. His application included letters describing his history of mentoring other inmates, pursuing a college education, and volunteering for programs. Prior to Walker's discretionary parole hearing, his parole officer submitted a parole packet, in which the officer concluded that Walker fell into the second lowest of four risk categories for reoffending. The parole officer described Walker's institutional record as one of "[e]xceptional institutional program achievement." Walker's parole officer recommended discretionary parole, but only if Walker first obtained a substance abuse evaluation and completed treatment, participated in a prerelease transitional program, and resided in transitional housing.
After conducting the hearing, the Alaska Parole Board denied Walker's request for discretionary parole at that time and deferred Walker's parole application until 2022. As preconditions for his release on parole, the Board ordered Walker to complete substance abuse treatment, an intensive prerelease program, and a victim impact program. Additionally, the Board strongly recommended that Walker obtain a psychological evaluation.
Walker quickly obtained the recommended psychological evaluation and then asked the Board to reconsider its decision not to grant immediate parole. The Board partially granted Walker's request and permitted him to reapply for parole in the spring of 2020, rather than 2022. But the Board again denied Walker's request for immediate release.
In 2013, Walker filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing that the parole board had failed to provide a sufficiently detailed basis for the denial. The State conceded error, and the superior court remanded Walker's case to the parole board for a more detailed explanation.
See AS 33.16.130(c) (requiring the parole board to explain its reasons for denying discretionary parole).
The Board issued a more detailed decision in January 2014. The Board emphasized the seriousness of Walker's offenses — which the sentencing court described as "extremely aggravated" and resulting in the "highly foreseeable" deaths of the two people Walker kidnapped — as well as the impact of those deaths on the victims' families.
See Walker, 674 P.2d at 827, 833-34 (noting that Walker was also charged with, and acquitted of, two counts of first-degree murder).
Following this decision, Walker again sought post-conviction relief. The State filed a motion for summary disposition, which the superior court granted.
On appeal, Walker renews two of the claims he raised in the trial court: (1) that the Board's January 2014 decision again failed to provide a sufficient basis for denying discretionary parole, and (2) that the Board was clearly mistaken in its understanding of his proposed release plan. For the reasons explained in this opinion, these claims are now moot, and, in any event, Walker has not established that the superior court erred by dismissing his application for post-conviction relief.
In the superior court, Walker requested relief in the form of a renewed opportunity to apply for discretionary parole. Likewise, in Walker's opening brief, he asked this Court to "order the parole Board to either reconsider its decision denying Walker discretionary parole or order the parole board to grant him a new hearing regarding release on discretionary parole." But as the State notes, Walker became eligible for such a hearing in March 2020 — prior to the conclusion of briefing in this case. Thus, even if the parole board's January 2014 decision lacked sufficient detail or was based on a misunderstanding of Walker's release plan, Walker would not be entitled to any further relief than he has already received in the form of the renewed chance to apply for discretionary parole. We therefore dismiss Walker's appeal as moot.
Alternatively, Walker requested that the superior court grant him immediate release on discretionary parole. But Walker was not entitled to have the superior court make a de novo assessment of his suitability for discretionary parole. See Newell v. State, 620 P.2d 680, 683 (Alaska 1980) (recognizing that appellate courts have "only limited power to review Parole Board decisions, and cannot usurp the authority of the Board"); Covington v. State, 938 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Alaska App. 1997) ("Absent a denial of a constitutional right, . . . the actions of a parole board are afforded only limited review in court."); see also, e.g., Ingles v. State, 2017 WL 4857408, at *3 (Alaska App. Oct. 25, 2017) (unpublished) (holding that a parolee "was not entitled to have the superior court make a de novo assessment of the proper sentence for his parole violations"). On appeal, Walker does not renew his request for immediate release.
See O'Callaghan v. State, 920 P.2d 1387, 1388 (Alaska 1996) ("A case is moot if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if they prevail." (internal citations omitted)).
In any event, we find no error in the superior court's denial of Walker's application for post-conviction relief. First, we reject Walker's claim that the Board's decision did not provide an adequate basis for denying him discretionary parole. In the Board's letter describing the reasons that it denied Walker's request, it noted the aggravated nature of Walker's crimes and the significant impact Walker's conduct had on his victims and their families. The Board also expressed concern that releasing Walker on discretionary parole at that time would "diminish the seriousness" of his underlying offenses. At the same time, the Board acknowledged a variety of factors that "weigh[ed] in [Walker's] favor," including Walker's positive institutional conduct and his good relationship with the staff at each facility in which he had been housed. These details were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of AS 33.16.130(c) — i.e., the explanation was specific enough both to allow for meaningful judicial review and to allow Walker to prepare more satisfactory future applications for parole.
See AS 33.16.100(a)(4) (requiring the parole board to consider whether releasing an offender on discretionary parole would "diminish the seriousness of the crime"); 22 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 20.165(c)(10) (allowing the parole board to consider, among other factors, relevant information from a victim or victims).
As we mentioned above, when Walker obtained the psychological evaluation that the Board requested, it responded by reducing the time before Walker could again be considered for discretionary parole from ten years to eight years.
See Frank v. State, 97 P.3d 86, 90 (Alaska App. 2004).
We also reject Walker's second claim — that the parole board relied on a factual error. According to Walker, the parole board incorrectly asserted that Walker's release plan "at the time of the parole hearing" was to reside with his father in close proximity to the victims' family. Walker notes that he changed this plan two weeks before the hearing, and he claims that the Board failed to acknowledge this.
We disagree. In its letter explaining the reason for its denial of Walker's request, the Board recognized that Walker's release plan had changed, but it stated that it nevertheless had deep concern about his initial plan for release on parole. Contrary to Walker's assertion, this was not a "clear factual error."
Accordingly, even if Walker's claim were not moot, we would have affirmed the judgment of the superior court.
We DISMISS Walker's claim as moot.