Opinion
May 20, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Gerald Esposito, J.).
The action should be dismissed insofar as based upon defendants' negligence in prosecuting causes of action that belonged to Silver Eagle Aircraft Corporation in the underlying action, as to which plaintiff lacks standing to sue in his individual capacity ( see, Quatrochi v. Citibank, 210 A.D.2d 53; Smerling Enters. v. Goldstein, 184 A.D.2d 480), and, insofar as he purports to sue derivatively on behalf of Silver Eagle, has failed to plead with particularity his efforts to secure board action or the reasons why such efforts would have been futile (Business Corporation Law § 626[c]). Insofar as the action is based upon defendants' negligence in prosecuting the underlying causes of action that belonged to plaintiff personally, he has failed to demonstrate that "but for" defendants' malpractice he would have prevailed on those claims ( see, Davis v. Klein, 88 N.Y.2d 1008), and does not show any other viable claims that could have been brought. The cause of action alleging a conflict of interest is without merit since defendants did not represent plaintiff's co-shareholder simply by reason of their representation of Silver Eagle, and there is no evidence that they affirmatively assumed the duty of representing her ( see, Kushner v. Herman, 215 A.D.2d 633). However, the balance of action insofar as based upon breach of the retainer agreements between plaintiff and defendants and their predecessors is not subject to summary dismissal since there is evidence that each time a predecessor firm dissolved by operation of law, the successor firm expressly agreed to continue the representation of plaintiff and to fulfill the retainer. It should be noted that the damages recoverable on this theory must be limited to a recovery of sums paid pursuant to the retainer.
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Wallach, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.