Opinion
C. A. 4:23-135-SAL-TER
01-30-2023
Clint Walker, #46069, Petitioner, v. Nadia Pressley, Administrator of the Williamsburg County Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, brings this action as a state pre-trial detainee requesting habeas relief under § 2241. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. The Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Petitioner has filed this same action before, No. 4:21-cv-01837-SAL, in which a recommendation of summary dismissal remains pending before the court in that action. This action is still subject to dismissal for similar and additional reasons as it was in 2021.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings. The Petitioner is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(per curiam); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, the petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, this court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Following the required initial review, it is recommended that the Petition should be summarily dismissed.
The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases are also applicable to Section 2241 cases. See Rule 1(b) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner has filed what is referred to as a local § 2241 Petition. Petitioner is a state pretrial detainee requesting habeas relief of release from custody and dismissal of all state charges or release on a personal recognizance bond. (ECF No. 1 at 28). Petitioner's numerous alleged grounds are: violation of the Fourth Amendment, fabricated evidence via a falsified autopsy report, violation of Rule 48(a), (b), improper methods to bolster prosecution's case, intentional delay of prosecution waiting on SLED results, falsified evidence to create probable cause for arrest warrants, abuse of process, bond denied as a result of prosecutor's perjury, defective preliminary hearing, invalid finding of probable cause, hearsay about evidence, defective affidavits supporting defective arrest warrants, fraud on the grand jury, denial of a fair bond hearing, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment. (ECF No. 1).
Petitioner alleges there was a bogus trial in January 2022; public records do not show any hearings or trials in January 2022. (ECF No. 1 at 15). Plaintiff alleges his attorneys have done nothing for him. (ECF No. 1 at 27). Petitioner attaches 45 pages of documents which includes affidavits, arrest warrants, the victim's autopsy report with manner of death as homicide from blunt head trauma(case history on the autopsy report included report from investigators of arson and report of bat used to beat), SLED forensic evidence report with DNA from bat and knife and Petitioner's shirt forwarded elsewhere, the April 2020 DNA report after forwarding(which showed profile from grip of bat with Petitioner and victim “excluded as possible contributors,” and the unknown contributor was entered into CODIS, Petitioner's shirt with victim's DNA on), chain of custody logs, K9 usage report, interview transcript of a witness regarding suspect, woods, and evidence, transcript of a witness' statement of talking with Petitioner on day of fire, and the Fire Station report. (ECF No. 1-1).
Public records out of Williamsburg County show Petitioner has been charged with murder, 2018A4510100673(arrested 12/17/18, bond hearing the same date, preliminary hearing scheduled in 2019, true bill dated of 10/24/19, represented previously on the docket by attorney Doward Harvin, then William Barr, and now represented by Steven Fowler, motion for discovery filed 1/16/19, motion for bond filed 2/16/21, several filings in 2022, with attorney changes in 2022) and second degree arson, 2018A4510100700(arrested 12/29/18, bond hearing the same date, preliminary hearing scheduled 3/13/19, true bill date 10/24/19, represented previously by attorney Doward Harvin, then William Barr, and now represented by Steven Fowler, motion for discovery filed 1/16/19, notice of appearance filed 5/13/21, with several filing in 2022, and with attorney changes in 2022). No speedy trial motion has been filed according to public docket and Petitioner is represented by an attorney.
See generally, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/williamsburg/publicindex/ (with search parameters limited by Petitioner's name). The court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869 at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records); Williams v. Long, No. 07-3459-PWG, 2008 WL 4848362 at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2008) (noting that some courts have found postings on government websites as inherently authentic or self-authenticating).
This case is subject to summary dismissal based on the following principles regarding abstention.
Ordinarily, federal habeas corpus relief for a state prisoner is available post-conviction. However, “[p]re-trial petitions for habeas corpus are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[A]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution” is not attainable through federal habeas corpus. Dickerson v. State of Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976)).
In Younger v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
The following test is applicable to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The information contained in the Petition filed in this case, supplemented by public records, indicate that an ongoing state criminal proceeding exists. The second criteria has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court's statement that “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criteria in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.' ” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
Specifically, federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-26; see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973). While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pre-trial intervention. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975). Where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. Id.; see also Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979). Where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, such as by appeal or collateral review processes, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Moore, 515 F.2d at 449.
Petitioner's claims may be raised in state court through motions. These claims may be comparable to the speedy-trial claim that was involved in the Moore case. In Moore, 515 F.2d at 443, the court concluded that the federal court should abstain from considering a speedy-trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226-27. Considerations made by this court in considering special circumstances in this case are the years in which the COVID-19 pandemic slowed state court processes, the number of defendant attorney changes in the state court actions, and the filings made in the state court over the years. Because Petitioner can pursue his claims in state court, he fails to demonstrate “special circumstances,” or to show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief of release from detainment. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Petitioner is precluded from federal habeas relief at this time and his Petition should be dismissed.
Blankenship v. W. Virginia, No. 1:15-CV-29, 2016 WL 3247884, at *3 (N.D. W.Va. May 20, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3248424 (N.D. W.Va. June 10, 2016)(dismissing § 2241 petition, considering four year delay created in part by attorney changes did not rise to extraordinary circumstances).
Petitioner's speedy trial claim does not meet the criteria of special circumstances. There has not been inordinate delay. See e.g. Mathis v. Hood, 851 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1988)(six-year delay).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The petitioner is advised that he may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).
Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in the waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).