Opinion
NO. 01-17-00265-CV
10-24-2017
FREDDIE LEE WALKER, Appellant v. DAVID GUTIERREZ, CHAIRMAN OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES; ROY A. (TONY) GARVIA, COMMISSIONER; WANDA SALIAGAS, COMMISSIONER; AND FEDERICO RANGEL, BOARD MEMBER, Appellees
On Appeal from the 345th District Court Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. D-1-GN-16-005865
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Inmate Freddie Lee Walker brought a declaratory-judgment action in Travis County against individuals he alleged to have played a role in denying him parole. He sought an order requiring the named defendants, all of whom are board members or commissioners of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, to detail the reasons he had been denied parole, explain why he had not been admitted into in-house substance-abuse programs, and indicate when he will be considered for such programs in the future. The defendants filed a joint plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted.
The Texas Supreme Court transferred this suit from the Third Court of appeals to this Court on March 28, 2017. See Misc. Docket No. 17-9035. We are not aware of any differences in precedent between these two appellate courts that would affect this appeal.
In two issues, Walker contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit because it had jurisdiction under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and that it abused its discretion in fulfilling its judicial duties. We affirm.
Background
Walker's pleadings provide a factual background to this dispute. No party challenges his factual assertions. We summarize them here.
Walker was on community supervision following a felony burglary conviction. His community supervision was revoked in 2011 because he failed to meet the conditions for non-confinement, including abstaining from the use of illegal drugs. Thereafter, he was confined to the Ellis Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Since 2011, Walker has been denied parole at least four times.
Walker admits to a history of addiction and to failing urinalysis tests while on community supervision. Since his community provision was revoked, he has sought entry into substance-abuse treatment programs within the Department but has not been admitted to those programs. Instead, he was referred to volunteer substance-abuse programs offered at his unit.
Walker filed a declaratory-judgment action against David Gutierrez, Roy A. Garvia, Wanda Saliagas, and Federico Rangel, individually, alleging that they played a role in his past denials of parole and seeking an order requiring action by each related to his review for parole and for admittance into substance-abuse programs.
Gutierrez, Garvia, Saliagas, and Rangel filed a joint plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Walker's suit and seeking dismissal of the suit. The trial court dismissed Walker's suit for lack of jurisdiction. Walker appeals.
Jurisdiction
In his first issue, Walker contends that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide his case.
A. Standard of review
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case and is never presumed. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law and is reviewed under the de novo standard. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002).
When, as here, the jurisdictional challenge is to the pleadings, "we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause." Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); see Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. We construe the pleadings liberally, looking to the pleader's intent. Villarreal v. Harris Cty., 226 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). If the pleadings lack sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction but do not reveal incurable jurisdictional defects, courts should afford the plaintiff an opportunity to re-plead. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. Conversely, if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then the plea should be sustained and the cause dismissed without an opportunity to re-plead. Id. at 227; see Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004) ("A trial court must grant a plea to the jurisdiction . . . when the pleadings do not state a cause of action upon which the trial court has jurisdiction.").
B. Trial court lacked jurisdiction
The Texas Constitution and state statutes establish the jurisdiction of Texas courts. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). Absent express constitutional or statutory authorization, a district court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a matter. See id.
The statute underlying Walker's claim is Section 508.1411 of the Government Code, which details the requirements placed on the Board of Pardons and Paroles regarding the grant or denial of parole. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 508.1411. These include a requirement that the Board "produce a written statement, in clear and understandable language, that explains: (A) the decision; and (B) the reasons for the decision only to the extent those reasons relate specifically to the inmate . . . ." Id. § 508.1411(a)(1). There is no provision in the statute for jurisdiction in the district courts to review Board compliance with these requirements. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held "that a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy by which to compel the Board of Pardons and Paroles . . . to provide a parole-denial letter in compliance with Texas Government Code § 508.1411 and that § 508.1411 does not create a liberty interest protected by due process." Ex parte Sepeda, 506 S.W.3d 25, 26-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Therefore, jurisdiction, if it exists, must come for another source.
Walker contends that the source for jurisdiction is the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. But the Texas Supreme Court has held that the UDJA is "merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction" and does not, itself, confer jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444; see State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. 1994). While the UDJA authorizes some remedies not otherwise available under the common law, it "does not itself create jurisdiction in the district court to review an agency action not otherwise reviewable." Tex. Comm'n of Licensing & Regulation v. Model Search Am., Inc., 953 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ); see City of Houston v. Williams, 99 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The UDJA does not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Walker's suit.
Walker also cites to various other authority for his contention that the district court had jurisdiction over his suit, but none of those provisions authorize jurisdiction either. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE § 24.011 (addressing writs of mandamus), § 24.200 (providing that particular district court include Travis County); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(a)(1) (concerning venue).
Because Walker's suit seeks to order those affiliated with the Board of Pardons and Paroles to take action related to his denial of parole and Walker has not demonstrated that the district court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of his claim, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the plea to the jurisdiction.
We overrule Walker's first issue.
Abuse of Discretion
In his second issue, Walker contends that the trial court's ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction abused the court's discretion in that it called into question the integrity of the judiciary. He cites to various Code of Judicial Conduct canons establishing standards for ethical conduct of judges, including that judges "shall hear and decide matters assigned to [them] except those in which disqualification is required or recusal is appropriate" and "shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice." See generally TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canons 3(B)(1), (5), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B. He asserts that the handling of the dismissal of his suit demonstrated bias and unfairness and also a failure to follow procedures, including the denial of a court reporter.
To the extent Walker asserts that the grant of the plea against him demonstrates bias and unfairness, we reject his contention, having already concluded that the trial court did not err in dismissing his suit for lack of jurisdiction. To the extent Walker asserts that he was harmed by being denied the benefit of a court reporter at the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, we reject that contention as well because the plea to the jurisdiction challenged whether Walker's pleadings established jurisdiction, the trial court's ruling on that matter is reviewed under a de novo standard, and, as such, a reporter's record is unnecessary for our analysis. Cf. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1979) (stating that court reporter is neither necessary nor appropriate for purposes of Rule 166a(c) summary judgment hearing in which movant has burden to establish entitlement to judgment as matter of law).
Conclusion
We affirm. All pending motions are denied as moot.
Harvey Brown
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown.