Opinion
No. 05-04-01209-CV
Opinion Filed March 3, 2006.
On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-00172-E.
Reverse and Remand.
Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices LANG and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ramesh K. Wadhwa and Sarita Wadhwa appeal the trial court's order of nonsuit dismissing their cause with prejudice. In six issues, appellants challenge the dismissal order and related issues. Because we conclude the Wadhwas had withdrawn their consent prior to judgment being rendered, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellants sued appellees for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. On February 24, 2004, attorneys for appellants and appellees appeared before the trial court and announced the parties had settled. The settlement agreement announced on the record provided, among other things, that appellee Sikh Study Circle DFW, Inc. would pay $2000 over a ninety-day period to appellants; appellees Gurdwara Sikh Sangat and Kirphal Singh Bhogal would withdraw their motions for summary judgment; and appellants would dismiss with prejudice all their claims against appellees in the form of a nonsuit with prejudice.
Two months later, appellants' counsel moved to withdraw from the case, asserting he had received a letter from Ramesh Wadhwa questioning the settlement of the case. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw. Thereafter, appellees filed a motion to enter nonsuit. After a hearing on August 4, 2004, the trial court granted appellees' motion and signed the order of nonsuit dismissing appellants' claims with prejudice.
In their first issue, appellants assert the trial court erred in rendering judgment dismissing the case with prejudice after they had notified the court that they did not consent to the settlement agreement. Appellants argue that the August 4, 2004 order of nonsuit is void because they notified the court prior to rendition of the judgment that they did not consent to the settlement agreement. To resolve appellants' first issue, we must first determine when the judgment was rendered to determine whether consent was withdrawn prior to the entry. Appellees contend the nonsuit was rendered at the February 24, 2004 hearing. Appellants contend the February 24, 2004 hearing resulted only in the trial court's approval of the settlement agreement and did not constitute a rendition of judgment. Rather, appellants assert judgment was rendered on August 4, 2004 after they had withdrawn their consent. We agree with appellants.
A review of the record indicates appellants were not present during the hearing on February 24, 2004. Counsel for the parties appeared and announced they had entered into a stipulation and agreement. After hearing the terms of the agreement, the trial court had the following exchange with counsel:
The Court: Can you do the nonsuits within the next 30 days? Or are you wanting to wait until the payout is completed to do that?
Mr. Cobb: I think we can go ahead and sign up the agreement and do the nonsuit within 30 days, because the agreement will provide for how it is going to be paid out. . . . My name is Jerry Cobb. I represent the plaintiffs, and that is the agreement.
The Court: Anything further?
Mr. Cobb: No.
Mr. Nanji: No, that's all.
The Court: Again, congratulations on reaching this agreement. I'm somewhat relieved. . . . So I do approve of the settlement, and I congratulate you on working things out. It sounds like it is in the best interest of all the parties. Congratulations on reaching an agreement.
The docket entry for February 24, 2004 states, "Attys. announced settlement."
Approval of a settlement does not necessarily constitute rendition of judgment. S A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995). Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. Id. A rendition of judgment is the pronouncement by the court of its conclusions and decision upon the matters submitted to it for adjudication. Buffalo Bag Co. v. Joachim, 704 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The words spoken or written by the trial court must evince a present, as opposed to future, act that effectively decides the issues before the court. S A Rest. Corp., 892 S.W.2d at 858. The words used by the trial court must clearly indicate the intent to render judgment at the time the words are expressed. Id.
In this case, we only have the trial court's approval of the settlement agreement, without any oral or written indication that it rendered judgment during the February 24, 2004 hearing. Accordingly, in this case, the judgment was not rendered until the trial court signed the order of nonsuit on August 4, 2004.
Appellants next contend that the judgment signed on August 4, 2004 was improper because appellants had withdrawn their consent. A party may revoke its consent to a settlement agreement at any time before judgment is rendered on the agreement. Id. at 857. A trial court abuses it discretion if it enforces a settlement agreement as an agreed judgment after one of the parties has withdrawn its consent. See Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1996).
A written settlement agreement may be enforced though one party withdraws consent before judgment is rendered on the agreement. Mantas, 925 S.W.2d. at 658. Where consent is lacking, however, a court may not render an agreed judgment on the settlement agreement, but may enforce it only as a written contract. Id. The party seeking enforcement must pursue a separate breach of contract claim, which is subject to the normal rules of pleading and proof. Id. The record does not indicate that appellees pleaded and proved a breach of contract action.
Appellants notified the trial court numerous times prior to the rendition of judgment that they did not consent to the agreement announced on February 24, 2004. Specifically, Ramesh notified the court of his lack of consent to the agreement in his June 22, 2004 "advisory to the court and delayed setting request" and in his July 14, 2004 "reply to defendant's motion and supplement to enter nonsuit." Additionally, Ramesh and Sarita voiced their lack of consent to the settlement during the August 4, 2004 hearing on the defendants' motion for nonsuit. Because the judgment dismissing appellants' claims was rendered after appellants expressed their lack of consent, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion. We resolve appellants' first issue in their favor. Our resolution of the first issue disposes of the appellants' other issues. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1.
We reverse the August 4, 2004 judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.