See Stinson v. City of Chicago, No. 21 CV 3347, 2024 WL 4466371, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2024) (citing Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill.2d 504, 512 (1996), and Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43-44). “[T]he independent existence of probable cause defeats any Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.” See Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, No. 20 CV 04595, 2024 WL 4278118, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2024) (citing Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 2015)).

Thus, the independent existence of probable cause defeats any Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. See Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that “[p]robable cause is a complete bar to a malicious prosecution claim,” notwithstanding evidence that grand jury indictment was based in part on false information).

Notably, an Illinois grand jury indicted Coleman on all four charged felonies, and such an indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause. Wade v. Collier , 783 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 2015). Coleman points out that this presumption may be rebutted by evidence that law enforcement obtained the indictment through improper or fraudulent means.

The District Court cogently explained why she was not "similarly situated." See Dist. Ct. Op. at 26; see also Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 2015). To the extent that Thomas challenged his state court convictions, any claims predicated on those convictions are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Under Illinois law, a claim for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to establish five elements: “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Swickv. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996) (quoting Joiner v. Benton Cmty. Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ill. 1980)). The “existence of probable cause forms a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim.” Wadev. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 2015). To satisfy the first element, a defendant need not have formally initiated or sustained proceedings; rather, it is enough that the defendant have “played a significant role in causing the prosecution of the plaintiff[.]” Beamanv. Freesmeyer, 131 N.E.3d 488, 499 (Ill. 2019) (quoting Fryev. O'Neill, 520 N.E.2d 1233, 1240 (Ill.App.Ct. 1988)). Police officers or investigators play such a role if they “deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced the [prosecutor or grand jury's] decision.

” Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Illinois law).

Probable cause is thus also a complete bar to a malicious prosecution claim. Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 2015).

See Norris v. Serrato, 761 Fed.Appx. 612, 615 (7th Cir. 2019) (“probable cause is an absolute defense to claims under section 1983 against police officers for an allegedly unreasonable seizure, whether a false arrest or a wrongful pretrial detention” (citing Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015)); Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 2015) (“It is well established that the existence of probable cause forms a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim [under Illinois law.]”)

See Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that “[p]robable cause is a complete bar to a malicious prosecution claim,” notwithstanding argument that grand jury indictment was based on false information).

Korolis argues that the fact that a grand jury indicted Gardley for the Shaw murder is prima facie evidence of probable cause. Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 2015). Gardley rightly points out, however, that the return of an indictment is not conclusive evidence of probable cause.