Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-00004-H-BU
02-12-2020
TRE VON WOODARDS, Plaintiff, v. PHILLIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL, Defendant.
FINDINGS , CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Tre Von Woodards, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights complaint on January 3, 2020. Dkt. No. 1. United States District Judge James Wesley Hendrix referred this action to the undersigned for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. Accordingly, the Court has granted Woodards leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Woodards' complaint presently submitted is subject to summary dismissal. While he appears to allege a personal injury claim, Woodards' one-page complaint contains only the name of a private defendant (Phillip Morris International) and a single, conclusory statement, which simply states: "Personal injury." Dkt. No. 1. The complaint fails to include any details regarding the allegations or state any request for relief. Nor does Woodards makes any explicit reference to a federal law or cause of action.
A district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes that the action:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. Claims lack an arguable basis in fact if they describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios," Id. at 327-28, and such claims may be dismissed
as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim "turns on the sufficiency of the 'factual allegations' in the complaint." Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App'x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam); emphasis added by Smith). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11.
To survive dismissal under the framework of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a plaintiff need only "plead facts sufficient to show" that the claims asserted have "substantive plausibility" by stating "simply, concisely, and directly events" that he contends entitle him to relief. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) ("'Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief' is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; citing Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice, and therefore the need to include sufficient factual allegations, depends on context."))).
In the current context, the Court "must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally." Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."). However, dismissal is proper where "even the most sympathetic reading of [the] pleadings uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the present defendants to liability." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1986).
Woodards' complaint lacks an arguable basis in both law and fact. He fails to offer a legal theory in support of his claims, and he pleads no factual allegations for the Court to consider, much less any logical facts that may support a claim for relief. To the extent that his claims are not factually or legally frivolous, nothing in the complaint indicates that Woodards could state a claim even if the Court allowed him to file an amended complaint or answer a questionnaire. Although the Court must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally, Woodards' complaint must be dismissed with prejudice for his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Upon concluding that a case must be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court retains the discretion to determine whether the case will be dismissed with or without prejudice. Castillo v. Blanco, 330 F. App'x. 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2009). "Though the statute is silent as to whether this dismissal should be with or without prejudice, ... cases are appropriately dismissed with prejudice when 'evidence exists of bad faith, manipulative tactics, or litigiousness.'" Id. (quoting Lay v. Justices-Middle District Court, 811 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that dismissal with prejudice "is an extreme sanction that should only be imposed when evidence exists of bad faith, manipulative tactics, or litigiousness") (citations omitted)). Woodards' recent, repetitive filings with the Court at the very least suggest evidence of litigiousness.
See, e.g., Woodards v. State of Texas, No. 1:19-CV-00153-C-BU; Woodards v. Leonard Green & Partners, No. 1:19-CV-00255-H-BU; and Woodards v. Gannaway, No. 1:19-CV-00256-H-BU.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff Tre Von Woodards' complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of February, 2020.
/s/ _________
JOHN R. PARKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE