Opinion
B189101
8-7-2008
VISTA POINT PROPERTIES et al., Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants, v. ARTHUR SIMONEAU et al., Defendants, Cross-complainants and Respondents; SANTA MONICA MOUNTAIN PROPERTIES et al., Cross-defendants and Appellants.
Behrouz Shafie & Associates, Behrouz Shafie; Benedon & Serlin, Gerald M. Serlin and Douglas G. Benedon for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants. Law Offices of Linda E. OBrien, Linda E. OBrien; Turner, Reynolds, Greco & OHara and Richard J. Reynolds for Defendants, Cross-complainants and Respondents.
Not to be Published
In this quiet title action, the trial court determined that appellants Vista Point Properties, LLC (Vista Point), Haynes, LLC (Haynes), Santa Monica Mountain Properties, LLC (Santa Monica) and Saddle Peak Properties, LLC (Saddle Peak) had no rights to certain easements for ingress and egress over property owned by Arthur Simoneau and Jill Ajioka (Simoneau or Simoneau Property). We affirm the judgment because substantial evidence supports the trial courts findings that (1) appellants failed to establish their right to an easement known as the "Old Easement" over the Simoneau Property, and (2) only Vista Point 21-42, Vista Point 23-17, Saddle Peak 24-19 and Saddle Peak 23-24 were entitled to the "New Easement" and only Vista Point 21-42 and Saddle Peak 24-19 were entitled to the "Swenson Road Easement" over the Simoneau Property.
Each of the parties owns one or more parcels of property in the northeast quarter of section 23, township 1 south, range 17 west, San Bernardino Meridian.
Vista Point is the owner of (1) Assessor Parcel No. 4448-023-016 (hereinafter parcel 23-16 or Vista Point 23-16) (2) Assessor Parcel No. 4448-021-042 (parcel 21-42 or Vista Point 21-42), and (3) Assessor Parcel No. 4448-023-017 (parcel 23-17 or Vista Point 23-17). Haynes is the owner of Assessor Parcel No. 4448-023-019 (parcel 23-19 or Haynes 23-19). Saddle Peak owns Assessor Parcel Nos. 4448-024-019 (Saddle Peak 24-19) and 4448-023-024 (Saddle Peak 23-24). Santa Monica is the owner of Assessor Parcel No. 4448-023-018 (parcel 23-18 or Santa Monica 23-18).
The map attached to this opinion as appendix A, post, was trial exhibit 171/5 and depicts the ownership of the properties in 2004.
Many of appellants contentions are based on an interpretation of instruments granting ingress and egress easements (that is, right-of-way easements) that were recorded by prior owners of the properties from 1964 to 1970, before most of the properties were subdivided into the parcels that currently exist, and long before 1998 to 2003, the period when appellants acquired their parcels. As to the Old Easement, Vista Point 23-16 and Haynes 23-19 claim rights to that easement under three Grant Deeds executed in 1966, instrument Nos. 202, 204, and 2727, and under a "Declaration and Grant of Easements" executed in 1970, instrument No. 4410. Appellants claim a right to the Swenson Road Easement under a 1964 "Mutual Grant of Easement," instrument No. 1496. The Swenson Road Easement was developed as a road; neither the Old Easement nor the New Easement over the Simoneau Property was ever developed or used as a right-of-way or road.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
This case was tried in two phases to the court sitting without a jury in 2004 and 2005. The following is a summary of the evidence at the first and second phases of the trial.
1. Properties and Road System at Time of Trial (2004 and 2005)
The Simoneau Property (Assessor Parcel No. 4448-021-041 or Simoneau 21-41) is approximately two and one-half acres improved with a residence and related structures. All of the other properties involved in this lawsuit are undeveloped. The properties are located in the Topanga area of the Santa Monica Mountains, hilly terrain with many canyons and ravines. All of the properties are located in the northeast quarter of section 23, township 1 south, range 17 west, San Bernardino Meridian. The northeast quarter of section 23 (NEQ) is further divided into quarters, with Simoneau 21-41, Vista Point 21-42, and Saddle Peak 24-19 located in the northeast quarter of the NEQ. Simoneau 21-41 is the northern-most property of those involved in this case. In the southeast quarter of the NEQ, are Saddle Peak 23-24, Vista Point 23-16, Vista Point 23-17, Santa Monica 23-18, and Haynes 23-19. (See appen. A, post.)
Sometime before the first phase of the trial in March 2004, the Simoneau Property underwent a lot line adjustment in which Simoneau acquired an adjacent 10-foot-wide strip of property through a portion of the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 24, township 1 south, range 17 west, San Bernardino Meridian, in order to reach the public street, Saddle Peak Road, so as to have access to a water line and meter to service the Simoneau Property.
There is no publicly maintained road in the northeast quarter of the NEQ, but winding northerly and easterly of the properties involved in this case is Saddle Peak Road, and southeasterly of the properties involved in this case is another public road, Las Flores Heights Road. Near the properties are several private roads, including Swenson Drive, Parkhouse Lane, and Little Las Flores Road.
Swenson Drive begins at Saddle Peak Road easterly of Simoneau 21-41 and winds in a westerly direction. Although the Swenson Road Easement is described as 60 feet wide, Swenson Drive as constructed is only partially paved and in the area of Simoneau 21-41 the paved portion of Swenson Drive is about 18 to 20 feet wide. A 30-foot-wide strip on the northerly part of Simoneau 21-41 is burdened with the Swenson Road Easement. The record does not establish whether the paved portion of Swenson Drive is located on Simoneau 21-41 or on the northerly 30 feet of the easement, but Arthur Simoneau testified that since 1989 he lived in the house and parked his car on a 12-by-20-foot concrete pad that was located from 5 to 20 feet from the paved area of Swenson Drive. According to trial exhibit 105, a portion of the concrete pad protruded into the 30-foot strip of Simoneau 21-41 burdened with the Swenson Road Easement.
Swenson Drive continues southwesterly through the northwest quarter of the NEQ, then southerly through the southwest quarter of the NEQ, where the roadway continues as Little Las Flores Road. Little Las Flores Road continues in a northeasterly direction through the southeast quarter of the NEQ, but the paved part of Little Las Flores Road stops before reaching the southern boundary of parcel 23-16 and the southerly boundary of parcel 23-19. The former owner of parcel 23-16 for 40 years, Joseph Schmid, testified that he usually would gain access to his property by taking Swenson Drive to "something of a road coming in this way" (Little Las Flores Road) and then he would "walk over." According to John MacNeil, a land surveyor, one could walk from the end of Little Las Flores Road to the southwesterly boundary of parcel 23-19 with "some hard climbing," but there was no pathway that led to parcel 23-19 from the west.
Southeasterly of the properties involved in this case, two publicly maintained roads, Saddle Peak Road and Las Flores Heights Road, provide access to a private road, Applefield Lane, which then provides access to another private road, Parkhouse Lane, which abuts parcels 23-18 and 23-19. Parkhouse Lane is a dirt roadway that was in place since the 1980s. The easement for Las Flores Heights Road was deeded to Los Angeles County and accepted by the county in 1936.
Alan Haynes, the owner of parcel 23-19 from 1977 to 2003, most often used Parkhouse Lane to gain access to his property. Although there was a locked gate between Saddle Peak Road and Applefield Lane, Haynes was given permission to go through the gate to gain access to Applefield Lane and then Parkhouse Lane. According to land surveyor MacNeil, before recent rains had washed out the road in the area of parcel 23-18, one could drive a car to that property by taking Saddle Peak Road to Applefield Lane and then to Parkhouse Lane.
2. 1963 to 1986
In 1963, Allen and Charlotte Dale (Dale) owned (except for 10 acres in the southeast quarter of the NEQ) the entire NEQ. From September 1963 to August 1964, Dale also owned property easterly of parcel 21-41 (later owned by Simoneau), in the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 24, but Dales property in section 24 did not abut property in the southeast quarter of the NEQ.
In September 1963, Dale conveyed by "Grant Deed" the northeast quarter of the NEQ to Edward Glauder, Jesus Rodarte, and Jack Gardener (GRG). (The property conveyed was later to be subdivided into other parcels, including Simoneau 21-41, Vista Point 21-42, and Saddle Peak 24-19.) Dales Grant Deed to GRG reserved for the benefit of Dales remaining lands in the NEQ a 60-foot-wide easement for road and utility purposes, but did not locate the easement, requiring the grantors and grantees to locate the easement and record an instrument granting the easement within a year. In January 1964, Dale conveyed the northwest and southwest quarters of the NEQ to others.
a. Swenson Road Easement
Within a year of the September 1963 Grant Deed, in March 1964, in a recorded Mutual Grant of Easement (instrument No. 1496), Dale, GRG (owners of the northeast quarter of the NEQ) and the owners of the northwest and southwest quarters of the NEQ granted to each other a 60-foot road and utility easement, the Swenson Road Easement. The Mutual Grant of Easement stated the Swenson Road Easement was to be appurtenant to the northeast, northwest and southwest quarters of the NEQ. The Mutual Grant of Easement made reference neither to the southeast quarter of the NEQ nor to any property within that quarter. According to Steve Leger, a land title research consultant who testified for plaintiffs, instrument No. 1496 does not refer to any property in the southeast quarter of the NEQ.
The parties agreed, and the judgment so provides, that Vista Point 21-42 and Saddle Peak 24-19 (both in the northeast quarter of the NEQ) have appurtenant easements over the Swenson Road Easement on the Simoneau Property. At issue on this appeal is whether the parcels in the southeast quarter of the NEQ (Vista Point 23-16, Vista Point 23-17, Haynes 23-19, Santa Monica 23-18, and Saddle Peak 23-24) have rights to the Swenson Road Easement.
b. 1964 to 1966 Conveyances (Southeast Quarter of NEQ)
In June 1964 Dale conveyed to Stephen and Audrey Vernon a large part of the southeast quarter of the NEQ, which was later subdivided and included parcels 23-16, 23-18, 23-19, and 23-24. In March 1965, the Vernons conveyed the portion of their property (later subdivided to include parcels 23-16, 23-18, and 23-19) to Glauder and Rodarte by a Grant Deed which did not mention the Swenson Road Easement. Glauder and Rodarte in turn granted a fractional interest in the property to Egon Maerz. In August 1965, Glauder, Rodarte and Maerz (GRM) granted parcel 23-16 to Anthony DeVivo and others (DeVivo). The Grant Deed to DeVivo did not describe the Swenson Road Easement.
By Grant Deed executed on February 8, 1966, and recorded on February 16, 1966, DeVivo conveyed parcel 23-16 to Jerome, Joseph, and Alice Schmid and Edward and Marilyn Wesel (Schmid and Wesel).
None of the foregoing deeds of property in the southeast quarter of the NEQ mentioned or described the Swenson Road Easement.
c. Instrument No. 202
By Grant Deed, instrument No. 202, executed on February 23, 1966, and recorded on March 2, 1966, GRG conveyed part of the northeast quarter of the NEQ (which was later subdivided to include parcels Simoneau 21-41, Vista Point 21-42, and Saddle Peak 24-19) to Herbert and Patricia Russell and Marcus and Helen Elliott (Russell and Elliott). In instrument No. 202, GRG reserved, "with the right to grant the same to others," a 40-foot-wide easement (the Old Easement), which began at the southern boundary of the northeast quarter of the NEQ and ran northerly on the westerly boundaries of parcels 21-42 and 21-41. After two-thirds of the length of the westerly boundary of parcel 21-42, the Old Easement turned easterly and then ran northeasterly through parcel 21-41 and into the Swenson Road Easement. The owners of the properties in the northeast and southeast quarters of the NEQ at the time instrument No. 202 was recorded are depicted in trial exhibit 171/6, attached to this opinion as appendix B, post.
According to Leger, instrument No. 202 did not describe any property owned by GRG that was intended to benefit from the reserved easement; after the conveyance to Russell and Elliott, GRG did not own property together in the NEQ.
According to Simoneaus title consultant, Richard Kadow, the Grant Deed from GRG to Russell and Elliott (instrument No. 202) was not in the chain of title for parcel 23-16 because the grantors, GRG, did not own parcel 23-16 at the time instrument No. 202 was executed (parcel 23-16 being owned at that time by Schmid and Wesel), and instrument No. 202 did not describe parcel 23-16. Kadow also testified that instrument No. 202 was not in the chain of title for parcel 23-19 because the deed did not describe parcel 23-19 or any portion of it.
d. Instrument No. 204
Executed and recorded on the same date and time as instrument No. 202 was instrument No. 204, an Easement Grant Deed, in which GRG, the Maerzes, the Kubics and the Uhlenkotts granted the Old Easement to GRG, Maerz, DeVivo, and to Harry Dempster, Earl Priest, and Morgan Sohlberg, the owners of other properties in the northeast quarter of the NEQ, easterly of parcel 21-41. (See appen. B, post.) Instrument No. 204 provided that the Old Easement was granted "with the right to grant the same to others." According to Kadow, instrument No. 204 was not in the chain of title of either parcel 23-16 or 23-19 for the same reasons that applied to instrument No. 202.
e. Instrument No. 2727
Although DeVivo had conveyed parcel 23-16 to Schmid and Wesel on February 8, 1966, DeVivo recorded on March 2, 1966, a Grant Deed, instrument No. 2727 (executed on Feb. 15, 1966), granting the Old Easement to Schmid and Wesel. Instrument No. 2727 did not mention or describe parcel 23-16. According to Candace Daly, a title engineer who researched the chain of title for parcel 23-16 by examining recorded documents, instrument No. 2727, executed by DeVivo, was not in the chain of title for parcel 23-16. After DeVivos Grant Deed conveying parcel 23-16 to Schmid and Wesel was recorded on February 16, 1966, it was proper to stop searching the grantor index for DeVivos name in connection with parcel 23-16. Up to 2000, there was no grant deed of a fee interest in parcel 23-16 which included any reference to an easement involving Simoneau 21-41.
f. Instrument No. 4410
In 1970, Russell and Elliott subdivided their property in the northeast quarter of the NEQ into four parcels: parcel 21-41 (later sold to Simoneau), parcel 21-42 (later owned by Vista Point), parcel 24-20, and parcel 24-19 (later owned by Saddle Peak). To avoid the creation of landlocked parcels by the subdivision process, Los Angeles County required that Russell and Elliott grant road easements. On February 27, 1970, Russell and Elliott recorded a Declaration and Grant of Easements (instrument No. 4410), declaring the "strips of land shown on [the] map, attached hereto, to be easements for road purposes and to be appurtenant to all land in said Sec. 23," and granting "said easements to all owners, their heirs, successors and assigns in said Sec. 23 as said owners fee interests appear of record, the vesting of title to said easements to take effect upon recording in the office of the County Recorder by any fee owner of a portion of Sec. 23 of an acceptance of said easements." The map attached to instrument No. 4410 depicted the Old Easement and the Swenson Drive Easement over parcel 21-41.
Before 2000, no property owner in section 23 had recorded an acceptance pursuant to instrument No. 4410. Moreover, the Old Easement across parcel 21-41 was never developed and there was no evidence that anyone ever used the Old Easement across parcel 21-41 to gain access to Swenson Drive or to gain access from Swenson Drive to any of the other parcels involved in this lawsuit. Nor was there any evidence that the paved portion of Swenson Drive crossed any part of parcel 21-41.
g. 1966 to 1986 Conveyances (Southeast Quarter of the NEQ)
In the 1970s, the property in the southeast quarter of the NEQ, owned by GRM in 1966, was subdivided into parcels 23-17, 23-18, and 23-19. In the early 1970s, parcels 23-17 and 23-18 were each conveyed by Grant Deed and "Quitclaim Deed" to third parties. In 1972, a Grant Deed was recorded conveying parcel 23-19 to Glauder. None of the foregoing deeds conveying parcels 23-17, 23-18 and 23-19 mentioned the Old Easement or contained any easements over parcel 21-41. Except for the March 2, 1966 Grant Deed in which DeVivo granted the Old Easement to Schmid and Wesel, and the 1970 Declaration and Grant of Easements, no recorded document referred to the Old Easement between March 2, 1966, and 1986, when Simoneau purchased parcel 21-41. And according to Leger, after parcel 23-19 was split from common ownership with parcels 23-17 and 23-18, there were no recorded deeds granting to parcel 23-19 an easement across parcels 23-18 and 23-17. According to the map (appen. A, post), parcel 23-19 could not effectively make use of the Old Easement without traversing parcels 23-18 and 23-17.
Kadows chain of title reports prepared for parcels 23-16 and 23-19 did not include instruments Nos. 202, 204, 2727, or 4410 in either chain of title. Dalys chain of title report for parcel 23-16 listed 31 recorded deeds conveying the fee title up to July 2001, but instruments Nos. 202, 204, 2727, and 4410 were not in the chain of title.
3. New Easement
In August 1986, the Russells and Elliotts conveyed by "Individual Grant Deed" parcel 21-41 to Simoneau. Recorded the same day as the deed granting parcel 21-41 to Simoneau was an "Easement Quitclaim Deed" by which the Russells and Elliotts quitclaimed the Old Easement to Simoneau, and an "Easement Deed" by which Simoneau granted to the Russells and Elliotts the New Easement. The southerly part of the Old Easement and the New Easement is the same, but instead of the Old Easements easterly angle across parcel 21-41, the New Easement continues northerly along the westerly boundary of parcel 21-41 to Swenson Drive. Over the next year, Simoneau obtained quitclaim deeds from the owners of the following four parcels, who agreed to give up the Old Easement in exchange for the New Easement: parcel 24-19 (Saddle Peak 24-19), parcel 21-42 (Vista Point 21-42), parcel 23-24 (Saddle Peak 23-24), and parcel 23-17 (Vista Point 23-17).
Pursuant to the parties stipulation and the evidence, the judgment provides that Vista Point 21-42, Vista Point 23-17, Saddle Peak 24-19, and Saddle Peak 23-24 have appurtenant easements over the New Easement on the Simoneau Property. These provisions of the judgment are not at issue on appeal.
By 1989, Simoneau had built a house, a concrete pad, a water tank and other structures on the part of his property described in the northeasterly leg of the Old Easement.
4. Appellants Acquire Property in the NEQ
Fereydoon Mashali is the manager of Vista Point, Saddle Peak, Santa Monica and Haynes, all California limited liability companies. In 1990, Mashali acquired parcels 24-19 and 21-42 by Grant Deeds which described only the New Easement. In 1990, Mashali also acquired parcel 23-18 by a "Corporation Grant Deed" which described neither the Old Easement nor the New Easement. In 1991, Mashali acquired parcel 23-17 by an Individual Grant Deed that described only the New Easement. In 1993, Mashali acquired parcel 23-24 by a Grant Deed which described only the New Easement. By 1998, all five of the foregoing parcels had been quitclaimed to their respective current owners by Quitclaim Deeds which did not mention the Old Easement.
In April 2000, Vista Point acquired parcel 23-16 from Schmid and Wesel by a Grant Deed purporting to convey the Old Easement to Vista Point. In June 2003, Haynes LLC acquired parcel 23-19 from Alan and Patricia Haynes by a Grant Deed which did not mention or convey the Old Easement. Between 2000 and 2004, appellants attempted to acquire rights to the Old Easement by recording "Easement Acceptances" under the 1970 Declaration and Grant of Easements (instrument No. 4410).
5. First Lawsuit ( Santa Monica Mountain Properties, LLC et al. v. Simoneau et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2000, No. SC054544))
In 1998, Santa Monica 23-18, Vista Point 21-42, Vista Point 23-17, Saddle Peak 23-24, and Saddle Peak 24-19 filed a lawsuit against Simoneau for interference with easements and Simoneau cross-complained for quiet title with respect to the Old Easement (referred to herein as the First Lawsuit). In October 2000, a judgment was entered in favor of Simoneau on both the complaint and the cross-complaint. Santa Monica 23-18 appealed from the judgment, which was affirmed in a nonpublished opinion by Division Five of the Second Appellate District in August 2002, upholding the determination that Santa Monica 23-18 had no right to the Old Easement and that Simoneau did not interfere with Vista Points and Saddle Peaks use of the New Easement. (Santa Monica Mountain Properties v. Simoneau (Aug. 21, 2002, B146877) [nonpub. opn.].)
6. Vista Points Attempt to Convey the Old Easement to Santa Monica and Saddle Peak
In 2003, Vista Point recorded Grant Deeds, instruments Nos. 03-0218304 and 03-0218305 (exhibits 117 and 118) purporting to convey the Old Easement to Santa Monica, Vista Point, and Saddle Peak.
B. Trial Court Proceedings
Vista Point 23-16 and Haynes 23-19 filed the instant action for declaratory relief and quiet title against Simoneau in June 2000. Simoneau cross-complained for declaratory relief and quiet title against Vista Point, Haynes, Saddle Peak and Santa Monica. The parties specified numerous issues for resolution and the case was tried to the court in two phases, resulting in a joint stipulation, an order, and two statements of decision which together resolved all the issues presented by the parties. As pertinent to the issues on this appeal, the statements of decision contained the following findings:
(1) Instruments Nos. 202, 204, and 2727 did not create an easement (Old Easement) appurtenant to Vista Point 23-16. The trial court found that "there was substantial evidence that the [Old Easement] reserved in [instrument No. 202] was appurtenant to the land which eventually became known as parcel 21-41." (At the time instrument No. 202 was recorded, Simoneau 21-41, Vista Point 21-42, and Saddle Peak 24-19 were part of one larger parcel that was not yet subdivided.) But the court found that "there was insufficient evidence that the [Old Easement] was appurtenant to parcel 23-16." The court noted that by instrument No. 204, GRG and others purported to convey the Old Easement to, among others, DeVivo, but "the DeVivos were no longer owners or record of parcel 23-16 and, therefore, the attempted conveyance of the [Old Easement] was ineffectual. [¶]. . . Thus, the DeVivos attempted conveyance of the [Old Easement] to the Schmids and Wesels on March 2, 1966 by way of [instrument No. 2727] was ineffectual and the [Old Easement] is not appurtenant to parcel 23-16." The trial court also found that, based on the evidence provided by Daly, Kadow, and Leger, instruments Nos. 202, 204, 2727, and 4410 were not in the chain of title for parcel 23-16.
(2) Instruments Nos. 202 and 204 did not create an easement (Old Easement) appurtenant to Haynes 23-19. The trial court explained that "as of March 2, 1966, [GRM] were the owners of a non adjoining [as to parcels 21-41 and 21-42] parcel of land, a portion of which later became parcel 23-19. . . . However, no evidence was presented to this Court which would show that the [Old Easement] was reserved in subsequently recorded instruments in the chain of title for parcel 23-19. . . . [¶] [T]he [Old Easement] established by [instrument No. 202] and purportedly conveyed to certain parties by [instrument No. 204] did not create an easement appurtenant to parcel 23-19. An appurtenant easement `cannot be extended to benefit additional property that was not a part of the dominant tenement at the time of the easement. . . . Plaintiffs have failed in their burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that what is now parcel 23-19 was part of the `dominant tenement at the time of the easement."
(3) Instrument No. 4410 (the 1970 Declaration and Grant of Easements) did not convey the Old Easement to plaintiffs and cross-defendants, and their purported acceptances over 30 years later were ineffectual because the offer set forth in instrument No. 4410 expired before 2000. The trial court found that instrument No. 4410 did not by itself convey the Old Easement, noting that the instrument stated that the vesting of title to the easement was to take effect upon the recording of an acceptance in the county recorders office. The court also found "as a matter of law that the more than 30 year delay [by plaintiffs and cross-defendants] in recording [their] acceptances [between 2000 and 2004] was unreasonable." Citing Civil Code sections 1587, subdivision 2, and 1657, and noting that plaintiffs and cross-defendants did not cite any persuasive authority that the foregoing statutes did not apply to easements, the court concluded that "the offer set forth in [instrument No. 4410] expired for lack of acceptance prior to 2000."
Civil Code section 1587 provides in pertinent part: "A proposal is revoked: [¶] . . . [¶] 2. By the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or if no time is so prescribed, the lapse of a reasonable time without communication of the acceptance."
Civil Code section 1657 provides: "If no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed. If the act is in its nature capable of being done instantly — as, for example, if it consists in the payment of money only — it must be performed immediately upon the thing to be done being exactly ascertained."
The trial court also explained that it was "especially persuaded by the fact that circumstances have changed dramatically since the recording of [instrument No. 4410] in 1970. These circumstances include: (1) the purchase of parcel 21-41 by defendants in 1986; (2) defendants 1986 and 1987 efforts to `quiet title on their own behalf by negotiating with adjacent property owners to move the easement; (3) defendants open and notorious use of their own land, including the building of their home on part of the [Old Easement]; (4) the lack of evidence that any property owner ever sought to develop the [Old Easement] prior to 1998; and (5) plaintiffs/cross-defendants delay, until well after the prior litigation commenced, to record their so-called `acceptances of the easement. [¶] To the extent plaintiffs/cross-defendants are seeking equitable relief in enforcing their `acceptances, they are barred by the doctrines of laches and waiver."
(4) Vista Point never had any right in the Old Easement and Vista Point 23-16 and Haynes 23-19 did not have the right to grant the Old Easement to others. Accordingly, the 2003 Grant Deeds (exhibits 117 and 118) by Vista Point purporting to grant the Old Easement to the other parties were declared void and canceled. The trial court determined that even if it assumed that the Old Easement was appurtenant to either parcel 23-16 or 23-19, neither owner had the right to grant the Old Easement "in gross" because "`[a]n easement appurtenant to land cannot be severed from the land and transferred separately so as to convert it into an easement in gross. [Citation.]" The court also rejected the theory that there was a plan for a road system in the NEQ that provided access over the Simoneau Property.
(5) The judgment in the First Lawsuit bars Santa Monica 23-18 from asserting a right to the Old Easement and because Mashali is the manager of Vista Point, Santa Monica, and Saddle Peak, the latter entities are collaterally estopped by the prior judgment from asserting claims to the Old Easement.
(6) Santa Monica 23-18, Vista Point 23-16, and Haynes 23-19 had no right to either the Old Easement or the New Easement based on the equitable theories of unclean hands and balancing of hardships. The trial court found that Mashali, as the manager of all four entities involved in this case, was not an innocent purchaser as to parcels 23-16 and 23-19 because parcel 23-18 was already involved in litigation when parcels 23-16 and 23-19 were purchased. The previous litigation also determined that parcel 23-18 had no right to the Old Easement. The court reasoned: "This court will not allow in equity a finding contrary to what the appellate court has already determined in the previous matter." Further, the court found that Mashali had actual or constructive notice that the three parcels had no right to the New Easement and that Simoneau "vigorously disputed" the right of the three parcels to the New Easement and to "any unrecorded easement over their property."
(7) Vista Point 23-17 failed to establish any right to the Old Easement under equitable principles of unclean hands and balancing of hardships.
(8) The parcels in the southeast quarter of the NEQ (Santa Monica 23-18, Vista Point 23-16, 23-17, Haynes 23-19, and Saddle Peak 23-24) had no right to the Swenson Road Easement because there was no recorded document granting them such easement in their chains of title.
(9) Plaintiffs and cross-defendants have no right to any easement by necessity over the Simoneau Property. The trial court found that because Saddle Peak 24-19 and Vista Point 21-42 have rights to the New Easement and the Swenson Road Easement, they failed to establish a right to an easement under the principle of easement by necessity. Similarly, Vista Point 23-17 and Saddle Peak 23-24 have a right to the New Easement (which provides access to Swenson Drive, a private road), and they also, with Santa Monica 23-18, failed to show one of the requirements for an easement by necessity — common ownership of property with access to a public road that, after a conveyance, leaves one parcel landlocked. Here, there were no public roads in the NEQ, so any conveyance would not have caused the denial of access to a public road.
The trial court noted that the previous owners of Haynes 23-19 and Vista Point 23-16 testified that they had obtained permission from other property owners to gain access to their parcels, so "the ability to claim an easement by necessity by future property owners is forever terminated."
Plaintiffs and cross-defendants appealed from the judgment entered in favor of Simoneau.
DISCUSSION
A. Instruments Nos. 202 (March 2, 1966 Grant Deed from GRG to Russell and Elliott) and 204 (March 2, 1966 Easement Grand Deed)
Appellants challenge the trial courts finding that there was insufficient evidence that instruments Nos. 202 and 204 granted the Old Easement appurtenant to parcels 23-16 and 23-19. The trial court was correct because, as explained below, instrument No. 202 reserved to GRG only an easement in gross. As the easement of GRG was in gross, it was personal to them and not appurtenant to any land. Although instrument No. 202 reserved to GRG the right to grant the easement to others (which right GRG exercised in instrument No. 204), GRG could grant to others only what it owned, namely, an easement in gross. "`"Where an easement is founded upon a grant, . . . only those interests expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident thereto pass from the owner of the fee." [Citation.]" (Glass v. Gulf Oil Co. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 412, 428 (Glass).) Accordingly, instrument No. 204 granted only an easement in gross.
Although the trial court did not decide whether the easement reserved in instrument No. 202 was either appurtenant or in gross, the only correct legal conclusion to be drawn from the language of instrument No. 202 and that is consistent with the trial courts findings is that the easement reserved was in gross, that is, it was personal to GRG, and did not attach itself to any land owned by GRG.
"`An easement is a restricted right to specific, limited, definable use or activity upon anothers property, which right must be less than the right of ownership. [Citation.]" (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 (Scruby).) A reservation of an easement must be to the grantor or to the grantors property and cannot be made to a stranger to the deed. (Elliott v. McCombs (1941) 17 Cal.2d 23, 28.) "`An easement is appurtenant when it is attached to the land of the owner of the easement, and benefits him as the owner or possessor of that land. The land to which it is attached is called the dominant tenement, and the land which bears the burden, i.e., the land of another which is used or enjoyed, is called the servient tenement. . . . An easement in gross is not attached to any particular land as dominant tenement, but belongs to a person individually. [Citation.] [¶] Because an easement in gross is personal, it may be conveyed independent of land. [Citation.] To the contrary, an easement appurtenant cannot be transferred to a third party or severed from the land. [Citation.]" (City of Anaheim v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Cal. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 763, 767-768.) Because an easement in gross is a personal right to use the land of another, there is no dominant tenement. (County Sanitation Dist. v. Watson Land Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1279.)
A right-of-way easement may be granted and held in gross (Civ. Code, § 802), and "an easement in gross is both assignable and inheritable unless restricted by proper language to certain individuals." (LeDeit v. Ehlert (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 154, 166.)
Civil Code section 802 provides: "The following land burdens, or servitudes upon land, may be granted and held, though not attached to land: [¶] One — The right to pasture, and of fishing and taking game. [¶] Two — The right of a seat in church. [¶] Three — The right of burial. [¶] Four — The right of taking rents and tolls. [¶] Five — The right of way. [¶] Six — The right of taking water, wood, minerals, or other things."
Civil Code section 1044 provides: "Property of any kind may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by this article."
"In construing an instrument conveying an easement, the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. If the language is clear and explicit in the conveyance, there is no occasion for the use of parol evidence to show the nature and extent of the rights acquired. [Citations.] If the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the instrument creating the easement is not reasonably susceptible." (Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.)
To determine whether an easement is appurtenant or in gross, courts apply "the general rules relating to the interpretation of deeds. [Citation.] In most cases, `Grants are to be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general . . . . [Citation.]" (Moylan v. Dykes (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 561, 569.) "`[W]hen the language of the deed is ambiguous, and it does not clearly appear whether the easement was intended to be in gross or appurtenant to land, it is never construed as personal when it may fairly be construed as appurtenant to some other estate." (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 523.)
Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that instruments Nos. 202 and 204 are not ambiguous and can only be fairly construed to reserve or convey easements in gross as to the Old Easement. Although GRG, as grantors in instrument No. 202, conveyed their property to Russell and Elliott and reserved the Old Easement, the Grant Deed contains no language describing any property to be benefited by the reserved easement or any dominant tenement to which the easement was to be appurtenant. The Grant Deed also contains no language that GRG reserved the easement for themselves "`and their successors," language that has been held to indicate an intention to grant an appurtenant easement. (Whitson v. Goudeseune (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 445, 447; see also Eastman v. Piper (1924) 68 Cal.App. 554, 568 ["words `heirs or assigns necessarily create an easement appurtenant, since words of such import are inconsistent with . . . character of an easement in gross"].)
And there is no evidence that GRG owned any other property in the NEQ to which the reserved easement could attach. No evidence was offered to show that GRG intended to benefit the property owned by GRM in the southeast quarter of the NEQ. Indeed, within a few years, the property owned by GRM (later subdivided into parcels 23-17, 23-18, and 23-19) was conveyed to others by deeds which did not mention the Old Easement. "Though the probative facts are undisputed, an appellate court cannot substitute its inferences for those of the trial court reasonably grounded on substantial evidence. [Citations.] We are required to draw those inferences which support the judgment." (Hewitt v. Meaney (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 361, 368.) Accordingly, both on its face and construed with the extrinsic evidence in this case, we conclude that instrument No. 202 reserved the Old Easement to GRG in gross.
Because there are no words of inheritance or succession in either instrument No. 202 or 204, the Old Easement cannot be passed by inheritance. But both instruments, which were recorded at the same time (8:00 a.m. on March 2, 1966), contain language affording the right of conveyance. In instrument No. 202, GRG reserved the Old Easement to themselves "with the right to grant the same to others." In instrument No. 204, GRG granted the Old Easement to certain named individuals, including DeVivo, "with the right to grant the same to others." Thus, in both instruments the right to assign the Old Easement is "restricted by proper language to certain individuals." (LeDeit v. Ehlert, supra, 205 Cal.App.2d at p. 166.)
As both instruments Nos. 202 and 204 were recorded at the same time, it is proper to construe them together in order to ascertain which individuals have the right to assign the Old Easement. Construed together, the instruments are not ambiguous and afford the right to assign the Old Easement only to GRG and to the grantees named in instrument No. 204. In other words, the named grantees in instrument No. 204, such as DeVivo, had a right to transfer the Old Easement, but DeVivos grantee did not have the right of transfer. To interpret the instruments to afford a right of transfer to the grantees of the named grantees, such as to the grantees of DeVivo, would insert language that does not appear in the instruments and would convert the limited right of assignability set out in the instruments to one of perpetual assignability. Such perpetual assignability would be tantamount to the creation of an appurtenant easement. Because GRG and GRGs grantees received an easement in gross, they could not grant to others the right to an appurtenant easement. (See Glass, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 428.)
B. Instrument No. 2727
Appellants contend that instrument No. 204, which granted the Old Easement to DeVivo, conveyed an appurtenant easement benefiting parcel 23-16, and that, under the "after acquired title doctrine" of Civil Code section 1106, DeVivo conveyed that appurtenant easement to Schmid and Wesel by instrument No. 2727. The contention is without merit. As explained above, GRG conveyed to DeVivo only an easement in gross. Because DeVivo was named as a grantee in instrument No. 204, DeVivo had the right to grant the Old Easement in gross to Schmid and Wesel, which DeVivo accomplished by Grant Deed, instrument No. 2727. But instrument No. 204 did not give Schmid and Wesel the right to grant the Old Easement to others, and their purported grant of the Old Easement in the 2000 Grant Deed of parcel 23-16 to Vista Point is ineffective. Thus, the trial court properly determined that Vista Point 23-16 was not entitled to the Old Easement under instruments Nos. 202, 204, and 2727.
Civil Code section 1106 provides: "Where a person purports by proper instrument to grant real property in fee-simple, and subsequently acquires any title, or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the grantee, or his successors."
With respect to Haynes 23-19, Santa Monica 23-18, and Vista Point 23-17, there was no evidence that their predecessors in interest who were grantees named in instrument No. 204 ever exercised their right to grant the Old Easement. And Saddle Peak 24-19 and 23-24 and Vista Point 21-42 and 23-17 expressly gave up their rights to the Old Easement in exchange for the New Easement. Accordingly, appellants have no right to the Old Easement under instruments Nos. 202, 204 and 2727.
C. Instrument No. 4410 (1970 Declaration and Grant of Easements)
Ignoring the language in instrument No. 4410 that provided that "vesting of title to said easements to take effect upon recording in the office of the County Recorder by any fee owner of a portion of said Sec. 23 of an acceptance of said easements," appellants argue that at the time instrument No. 4410 was recorded, "the easements became an immediate and irrevocable burden on the Russells and Elliotts property, including what is now the Simoneau Property." But appellants interpretation improperly renders surplusage the language in the instrument requiring a recording of an acceptance of the easements. Appellants offer no persuasive authority or argument that the trial courts interpretation of instrument No. 4410 is erroneous.
Appellants fail to offer any persuasive authority that Civil Code sections 1587 and 1657 are inapplicable to instrument No. 4410 (see fn. 3, ante) or that the trial courts findings with respect to instrument No. 4410 were not supported by substantial evidence. The cases cited by appellants fail to establish that the trial court erred in applying Civil Code sections 1587 and 1657: Quacchia v. County of Santa Cruz (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 770 is inapposite because it addressed the issue of the procedure applicable for offers of dedication of public streets by subdivision map. The instant case presents no issue of an offer of dedication of a public street. Also inapposite is Ratchford v. County of Sonoma (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 1056, where a property owner whose residence protruded onto a public street as mapped in a recorded subdivision brought an abandonment proceeding before the board of supervisors to vacate the portion of the street occupied by the residence. The appellate court held that the board exceeded its jurisdiction and that the resolution vacating a portion of the mapped street was void. (Id. at p. 1077.)
Appellants fault Simoneau for failing to bring a statutory action under Civil Code sections 887.010 through 887.090, dealing with actions by owners of property subject to an easement to establish abandonment of the easement and to clear the easement from title. Appellants failed to raise this issue below. Even had they not waived the issue, appellants fail to establish any prejudicial error, that is, that they could have prevailed in establishing (1) their right to the Old Easement and (2) that they would have prevailed in a statutory abandonment action.
Among other things, appellants fail to establish that the Old Easement was not abandoned within the meaning of Civil Code section 887.050. Civil Code section 887.050, subdivision (a) provides: "For purposes of this chapter, an easement is abandoned if all of the following conditions are satisfied for a period of 20 years immediately preceding commencement of the action to establish abandonment of the easement: [¶] (1) The easement is not used at any time. [¶] (2) No separate property tax assessment is made of the easement or, if made, no taxes are paid on the assessment. [¶] (3) No instrument creating, reserving, transferring, or otherwise evidencing the easement is recorded."
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that appellants did not acquire any rights to the Old Easement or the Swenson Road Easement pursuant to instruments Nos. 202, 204, and 4410. Because appellants had no right to the Old Easement, Vista Point could not convey to others a right that it did not have. Vista Points attempt to convey the Old Easement to others was ineffectual. Thus, appellants fail to establish that the cancellation of instruments Nos. 03-0218304 and 03-0218305 (exhibits 117 and 118) constitutes error.
D. Easement by Necessity
Appellants challenge the trial courts finding that the requirement of strict necessity was defeated by the evidence that the former owners of parcels 23-16 and 23-19 had obtained permission to use private roads or other private property to gain access to their parcels. Appellants contend that the foregoing evidence was irrelevant and that Simoneau was required to show that the former owners of parcels 23-16 and 23-19 had secured easements over Parkhouse Lane or other property. But appellants fail to cite any authority requiring a formal grant of an easement to defeat the requirement of strict necessity.
"An easement by way of necessity arises by operation of law when it is established that (1) there is a strict necessity for the right-of-way, as when the claimants property is landlocked and (2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity." (Moores v. Walsh (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1049.) "In California a right-of-way from necessity cannot exist in the absence of strict necessity." (Horowitz v. Noble (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 120, 130 (Horowitz).) "As was said in the very early California case of Kripp v. Curtis (1886) 71 Cal. 62, 65 . . ., and consistently followed since that date: `The right of way from necessity must be in fact what the term naturally imports, and cannot exist except in cases of strict necessity. It will not exist where a man can get to his property through his own land. That the way over his own land is too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist, does not alter the case, and it is only where there is no way through his own land that a grantee can claim a right over that of his grantor. It must also appear that the grantee has no other way. [Citation.]" (Horowitz, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at pp. 130-131, fn. 4.)
Relying on Roemer v. Pappas (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 201, appellants argue that the strict necessity element can be defeated only if the former owners of parcels 23-19 and 23-16 were granted easements to access their properties, and the evidence of permissive use here is thus irrelevant. But Roemer does not stand for that proposition. In Roemer, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial courts finding of an easement by necessity, noting that the plaintiffs had contacted an adjoining property owner who denied the plaintiffs access. The Court of Appeal stated that "the trial court correctly concluded that such attempt is not a prerequisite for establishing an easement by way of necessity: `Plaintiffs common law right to seek a right-of-way of necessity is not affected by the fact that they could have a right-of-way by condemnation [citations]." (Id. at p. 206.)
Roemer is inapposite here because the prior owners of parcels 23-16 and 23-19 were not denied access, but were granted access to use Swenson Road (parcel 23-16) or Parkhouse Lane (parcel 23-19) in order to gain access to their properties.
The trial court reasonably could have inferred from the testimony of their former owners that Vista Point 23-16 and Haynes 23-19 each had another way to access their properties without using the Simoneau Property. Substantial evidence also supports the trial courts findings with respect to Santa Monica 23-18. The trial court reasonably could have inferred from the evidence of permissive use of Parkhouse Lane by Haynes that Parkhouse Lane was also available to provide access to Santa Monica 23-18. Substantial evidence thus supports the trial courts finding that Vista Point 23-16, Haynes 23-19, and Santa Monica 23-18 failed to establish the strict necessity required for an easement by necessity.
As Saddle Peak 24-19 and 23-24 and Vista Point 21-42 and 23-17 had rights to the New Easement, substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that these parcels did not meet the first requirement of strict necessity. The New Easement provided access to Swenson Drive, which provided access to Saddle Peak Road. Substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that there was no showing of strict necessity for the Old Easement as to the foregoing parcels.
E. Equitable Easements or Servitudes
Appellants contend that the statements of decision fail to resolve the issue of whether they have access easements based on the equitable servitude doctrine and that they are entitled to such an equitable easement or servitude. But the record shows that these issues were waived by failure to litigate them below.
Before the second phase of the trial, the trial court spent much time discussing the issues with the parties, and appellants had ample opportunity to raise these points and to request a resolution of them. According to the February 2005 joint status conference statement and stipulations, the parties together requested resolution of a total of 10 issues. The court and the parties later resolved four of those issues before the phase two trial, so that only six of the original 10 issues were tried in phase two. The six remaining issues for phase two of the trial were: (1) Whether the 2003 Grant Deeds (exhibits 117 and 118) should be declared null and void; (2) whether appellants have a right to either the Old Easement or the New Easement based on their affirmative defenses of balancing of hardship or unclean hands; (3) whether appellants have a right to an easement by necessity over the Simoneau Property; (4) whether appellants have a right to either the Old Easement or the New Easement based on any equitable affirmative defenses alleged in their answer to the cross-complaint; (5) whether Simoneau adversely possessed the Old Easement; and (6) whether appellants have the right to use the Swenson Road Easement over the Simoneau Property.
In the lengthy discussions among the parties and the court before phase two of the trial, appellants agreed that issues numbers (2) and (4) were the same and that balancing of hardships and unclean hands were the only equitable issues to be resolved. The trial courts November 2005 statement of decision resolved all six issues. The record reveals that appellants had ample opportunity to request a trial on the equitable servitude issue at the second phase of the trial, but failed to do so. The trial court cannot be faulted for failing to address issues not presented to it, and appellants cannot change their position on appeal and adopt a new and different theory based on new factual considerations. (Sommer v. Gabor (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1468-1469.) We decline to address the issue of equitable servitudes.
F. Waiver by Stipulation and Res Judicata
Because we have addressed the merits of appellants claims to a right to the Old Easement and concluded that they have no right to the Old Easement, we need not address their contentions that the trial court erred (1) by determining that they had stipulated away their right to the Old Easement during the course of phase two of the trial and (2) in applying principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel by virtue of the judgment in the First Lawsuit.
G. Swenson Road Easement
Appellants claim that they all have a right to the Swenson Road Easement by virtue of the 1964 Mutual Grant of Easement, instrument No. 1496. The judgment provides that the two parcels in the northeast quarter of the NEQ (Saddle Peak 24-19 and Vista Point 21-42) have a right to the Swenson Road Easement, so we assume that appellants are challenging only the denial of the Swenson Road Easement to the remaining parcels, in the southeast quarter of the NEQ.
Appellants provide no authority to support their contention that instrument No. 1496 grants the Swenson Road Easement to the parcels in the southeast quarter of the NEQ. The trial court correctly interpreted the Mutual Grant of Easement as granting the easement only to property in the northeast, northwest and southwest quarters of the NEQ because neither the southeast quarter of the NEQ nor any property therein is mentioned in the Mutual Grant of Easement.
H. Injunctive Relief
The quiet title decree in the judgment enjoins each appellant from "using or attempting to use, transferring or attempting to transfer, granting or attempting to grant, and/or recording or attempting to record" any interest in the easements or easements over the Simoneau Property to which each appellant has no right. The judgment also enjoins each appellant and all subsequent owners of each of the parcels from bringing a lawsuit claiming any rights to those easements.
Appellants contend that the foregoing relief was improper because there was no indication that any of the appellants would bring another lawsuit and an injunction cannot bind subsequent owners of property. Their arguments are unpersuasive.
As explained in Wolf v. Gall (1916) 174 Cal. 140 at page 144: "The plaintiffs and defendants were seeking to have title quieted against each other. The action to quiet title, under our practice, is a development of the bill of peace of the court of chancery. The main purpose of this proceeding was to prevent repeated attempts to litigate a title, and to protect the real owner of the right against the annoyance and expense incidental to a multiplicity of suits. It was upon these considerations that the court of chancery `has granted perpetual injunctions to restrain further litigation, and thus has in some degree put that restraint upon litigation which was the policy of the ancient law in real actions. [Citation.] `The obvious design of such a bill, says Story (2 Equity Jurisprudence, 13th ed., sec. 853), `is to procure repose from perpetual litigation, and therefore it is justly called a bill of peace. . . . The obvious ground of the jurisdiction of courts of equity in cases of this sort is to suppress useless litigation and to prevent multiplicity of suits."
"The plain and direct manner of giving this repose [from further litigation] is by enjoining the defeated parties from asserting a hostile claim. Such injunction is in no sense incidental to the relief sought. It is an inherent part of the relief itself. [A] decree like the one in the case before us, declaring that the [defendant] is the owner of the property and enjoining the [plaintiffs] from further setting up a claim thereto, is a proper form of judgment." (Wolf v. Gall, supra, 174 Cal. at p. 145; see also Mansfield v. Kaiser (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 632, 637.)
And, a quiet title decree is binding not only on the party to the action, but on heirs and those in privity with the party to the action. (Estate of Hanson (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 71, 77; see also Luckhardt v. Mooradian (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 501, 519 ["judgment concludes not only the adverse party but also all those claiming under the title he represents"].) We interpret the part of the judgment pertaining to "subsequent owners" to mean that the judgment is binding on those in privity with appellants by purchasing one of the parcels subject to the judgment. "A privy is one who, after rendition of the judgment, has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase." (Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811.) Because the authorities cited by appellants do not involve quiet title actions, they do not persuade us that the portions of the judgment affording injunctive relief are erroneous.
I. Description of the Simoneau Property
Appellants complain that the description of the Simoneau Property in the judgment did not match the legal description of the Simoneau Property in the pleadings. The description of parcel 21-41 in the judgment included a strip of property in the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 24. Appellants argue that Simoneaus property in section 24 was not at issue at trial and the judgment improperly expanded the scope of the properties at issue. Appellants also complain that the judgment describes the entire easement for Swenson Drive leading to Saddle Peak Road, but at issue in this lawsuit was only the Swenson Road Easement over the Simoneau Property.
We conclude that the judgment properly describes the Simoneau Property as including a portion in section 24 because there was testimony at trial that the Simoneau Property underwent a lot line adjustment to include a strip of property in section 24. (See fn. 2, ante.) Appellants also do not explain how they are aggrieved by the judgments description of the Simoneau Property. With respect to the Swenson Road Easement, the judgment clearly provides that the quiet title decree affected only that portion of the Swenson Road Easement that was located on the Simoneau Property. The judgment properly describes the Simoneau Property and the easements at issue in this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Appendix B
NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE