Opinion
8:20-bk-06059-RCT Adv. 8:20-ap-00609-RCT
04-25-2022
In re: Kurt Wesley Stevenson, Debtor. v. Kurt Wesley Stevenson, Defendant. Vista Money, LLC and Vineet Katial, Plaintiffs,
Chapter 7
ORDER FINDING DEBTOR'S MICHIGAN STATE COURT JUDGMENT DEBT TO PLAINTIFFS IS DISCHARGEABLE
Roberta A. Colton United States Bankruptcy Judge
A trial in this proceeding was held on April 11, 2022 on Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint to Determine the Dischargeability of Debt. Plaintiffs seek a determination that the debt resulting from a Michigan state court judgment for business defamation, defamation, 1 tortious interference, and invasion of privacy is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). As explained below, the Court finds that the debt is dischargeable.
Doc. 2. The parties' closing arguments are filed at Documents 71 and 74, and a transcript of the trial is filed at Document 69. References to the trial transcript are made as "Trans. p. __."
Only two witnesses testified during the trial-Plaintiff Vineet Katial and Defendant-Debtor Kurt Stevenson. The exhibits entered into evidence (Doc. 68) at trial are docketed at Docket Numbers 52 through 62.
Pla. Ex. 33.
Plaintiff Vista Money, LLC ("Vista Money") is a Michigan company that provides services related to prepaid debit card programs.3 Plaintiff Vineet Katial is the CEO of Vista Money. On May 7, 2015, Debtor-Defendant Kurt Stevenson entered into a Marketer Agreement to sell prepaid debit cards under a program with Vista Money. Both Vista Money and Debtor would make money from the debit cards' service and transaction fees charged to the buyers for using the cards.
Doc. 50, ¶ 2.
Pla. Ex. 33.
Pla. Ex. 33.
Debtor testified at the trial to the following: Open Payment Systems ("OPS") introduced Debtor to Katial and Vista Money. Katial, on behalf of Vista Money, agreed to provide Debtor with active Lion-branded personalized prepaid debit cards within 90 days, as well as providing the software and support services for the cards.
Lion is the name of one of Debtor's businesses.
Trans. p. 34, 129.
After Debtor entered into the Marketer Agreement with Vista Money, Katial directed Debtor to follow the instructions given by OPS, including paying OPS money when requested.Katial told Debtor that OPS (via David Allen and Josh Allen) would manage Debtor's 2 account. Katial told Debtor that he needed to pay $25,000 for Vista Money's software and services, and OPS told Debtor that he need to buy 5, 000 prepaid cards at a cost of $15,000.
Trans. p. 35-37, 50, 53, 140-41, 153.
Trans. p. 34, 52, 152.
Trans. p. 35-36.
When OPS told Debtor that he needed to wire payments, totaling $40,000, to OPS in connection with the prepaid debit cards, Debtor did so, as directed by Katial. Debtor assumed that OPS would send $25,000 of the money to Vista Money to pay for the software system for the prepaid cards and that OPS would send the remaining $15,000 to the printer for the cards.However, Debtor admitted that he does not know whether OPS forwarded the $25,000 to Vista Money, and Debtor acknowledged that he did not pay any money directly to Vista Money.
Trans. p. 35-37, 50, 53, 140-41, 153.
Trans. p. 38, 140-43.
Trans. p. 39-40.
At some point, Vista Money gave Debtor a sample debit card to test, and there were problems with the card. Debtor tried to contact Katial and OPS regarding the problems, but he could not get a response. So, Debtor called TAB bank, as TAB bank's phone number was on the back of the card. However, according to paragraph 3.14 of the Marketer Agreement, Debtor was prohibited from having direct communication with TAB bank regarding the cards.Thereafter, in March of 2016, Vista Money terminated the Marketer Agreement due to Debtor's communication with TAB bank, which Katial contends resulted in TAB bank's termination of services in connection with the prepaid debit card program.
Trans. p. 117.
Trans. p. 45, 55-56, 143, 174.
Trans. p. 55.
Pla. Ex. 33; Trans. p. 43.
Trans. p. 199-200.
During this time, Debtor never received the promised Lion-branded prepaid debit cards from Vista Money. Debtor was upset and wanted the promised cards or a return of the $40,000 3 he had paid. Debtor repeatedly attempted to contact Katial, but he could not reach Katial. Debtor called Katial, and Debtor learned that his number had been blocked by Katial. Debtor emailed Katial and received no response. Frustrated, Debtor searched for other ways to contact Katial, and he hired a collection agency to help him.
Trans. p. 55-56, 144-45.
Trans. p. 45, 55-56, 174.
Trans. p. 122.
In August of 2017, after Debtor learned that Katial was a member of the Ann Arbor Rotary Club, Debtor called the Rotary Club. Debtor told the Rotary Club that Vista Money owed him $40,000 to $50,000 for work that it did not get done and that he was unable to get in contact with Katial. This message was relayed to Katial via email by the Rotary Club. The Rotary Club's email to Katial described Debtor's phone call as simply an attempt to contact Katial:
Pla. Ex. 32.
I didn't get (or ask for) too many details but it sounded like he [Debtor] owns several companies in FL and he paid your company $50K to do some work for him that didn't get done. He was frustrated that he couldn't contact you and thought you had dropped out of sight to avoid him and maybe others. He got to me through our Rotary Club when he googled your name and Ann Arbor. He seemed like a reasonable fellow and was not yelling or threatening or otherwise unpleasant.
Pla. Ex. 32.
It appears that Debtor's frustration with the situation came to a head on November 8, 2017. On that day, Debtor left a voicemail for Katial asking that Katial return his $40,000 or call him back. Debtor also sent Katial a direct message on LinkedIn stating that Katial had 4 15 days to return his $40,000 or “the gloves are off.” Debtor also emailed Katial that day demanding that Katial wire the $40,000 to him immediately.
Pla. Ex. 22.
Pla. Ex. 20.
Pla. Ex. 21.
Debtor then broadened his audience in an attempt to get a response from Katial. On November 8, 2017, Debtor emailed Katial (at several email addresses) and David Allen, stating:
I would appreciate if you would give me a call, and/or just return the money that has been stolen from me. I paid your company $40,000.00 for a product that was not delivered, and caused my company to shut down. I have found that you have 7 judgement [sic] against you currently so obviously you steal from alot [sic] of people.
Pla. Ex. 25.
That same day, Debtor received a cease-and desist letter regarding his communications with Katial and his associates, which was purportedly from Katial, but it did not contain Katial's signature. Debtor believed this cease-and-desist letter to be fake, because it was unsigned and not from an attorney.
Pla. Ex. 1 (Doc. 51-1, p. 21 of 39).
Trans. p. 57, 68, 99.
The next day, Debtor again emailed Katial and David Allen, stating:
You cannot just decide to cancel and steal my money when the platform never worked correctly. I have hundreds of emails concerning this matter with both of you. I made numerous attempts over a 2 year period for you to fix the issues with the product. At this point I can see you are both very bad people and thieves. Trust me the entire world will know about both of you shortly, your business reputations will be destroyed globally, and I will get my money back plus attorney fees and damages. You can't charge for a product and then never deliver it, and then just decide your [sic] going to cancel because you were committing fraudulent activities with TAB bank. My attorneys have all the information they need to destroy you both. Neither of you will never [sic] work in the banking industry again. You have had substantial opportunities to refund my money and move on with your lives. I am not afraid of your empty threats, and/or fake atty [sic] letters. My legal team is all over both of you and all of your subsidiary companies. You are doing this to yourselves. Simply5
wire my funds back and it stops. If you continue with your empty threats I will just use that against you in court as well. You can pay me back my $40,000.00 now or pay $250,000.00 in damages and attorney fees, and have both of your reputations destroyed it's your call.
Pla. Ex. 25.
During this same two-day period in November, after learning of Katial's connection to the Pittsfield Township, Debtor called the Pittsfield Township offices and informed them of his intent to pursue litigation against Katial. When someone from the Pittsfield Township emailed Debtor about his phone call, Debtor responded to the email, stating:
Trans. p. 71.
[A]s we proceed I will keep you informed. My attorneys informed me this morning that they have found numerous companies that [Katial] along with his partners David and Josh Allen have committed the same crime against. I'm one of seven at this point.
Pla. Ex. 24.
Katial then sent an email to Debtor stating that he had sent a cease-and-desist letter to Debtor and asked that Debtor "[p]lease stop all harassment and refer all inquiries to our attorney." Debtor responded to Katial's email (which included other recipients), stating:
Pla. Ex. 24.
[A]n informal request [referring to the cease and desist letter] sent from someone other than you who is not an attorney will not stop me from letting the entire globe know that you are a thief and have stolen money from not just my company but several companies stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars. We have already filed formal complaints with the FTC and the FBI. My legal team will not stop until you return my money or end up in jail.
Pla. Ex. 24.
Also on November 9, 2017, Debtor published an article on LinkedIn titled, "Open Payment Systems LLC / Vista Money LLC - White Label Prepaid Card Company Scams 6 Thousands of Dollars from small startups.” The article featured a picture of Katial surrounded by a border stating, "SCAM ALERT," and included a link to Katial's LinkedIn page. Debtor included the link to Katial in order to get Katial to call him. The article stated the following, in relevant part:
Pla. Ex. 26.
Pla. Ex. 26.
Trans. p. 95-96.
I am currently filing a lawsuit against these companies and am looking for all of the other companies that they have scammed out of money. Interestingly enough I found this article right here in LinkedIn about these criminals doing the same thing. [A website link to a LinkedIn article by Chris Gallant regarding OPS was included. So, if you have been scammed by either of these companies please reach out to me. My suggestion would be to not work with any of these people and/or their companies!
We have found that these two companies have scammed at least 7 companies out of $40,000+ each. I'm sure we will find more! We have filed formal complaints with the FTC as well. Hopefully some agency will look into these guys and shut them down for good. So, I am using the power of Linkedin [sic] and Social media to get the word out!
These guys setup [sic] companies and rip people off for $40,000 or less and then shut the doors and re-run it over and over.Debtor left a response on Chris Gallant's LinkedIn article regarding OPS, stating:
This exact same thing happened to me and my company with open payment systems and David Allen and Vista Money and Vineet katial. They scammed me out of $40,000.00. I am currently filing a lawsuit against them and would welcome anyone else that had the same experience.7
Pla. Ex. 29.
During the trial, Debtor identified four alleged victims: (1) himself, (2) Chris Gallant, (3) the clients of attorney Brian Augustine, and (4) a guys whose name Debtor could not remember. (Trans. p. 191).
Pla. Ex. 26.
Pla. Ex. 29.
After Debtor posted his LinkedIn article, on November 10, 2018, Katial's attorney sent Debtor a cease-and-desist letter. The evidence before the Court is disputed regarding how long Debtor's LinkedIn article remained posted after Debtor received this cease-and-desist letter.
Pla. Ex. 1 (Doc. 51-1, p. 31-32 of 39).
Thereafter, on January 2, 2018, Debtor sent an email to Katial, as well as David and Josh Allen at Epin Labs (a company of which Katial was listed as a director), which had a subject line of "Scam Artists - Finally you're going to jail!!!!! !" In the email, Debtor stated:
Pla. Ex. 27; Trans. p. 47.
I have now skip traced you both and [Katial] to these other companies. Really Allpayout and epinlabs. I gave you guys the chance to return my money. You can expect to see around 100k press releases go out tomm [sic] about you both and [Katial] and all your scam companies.Debtor also called Epin Labs and left a voicemail stating that Katial stole his money. Debtor's voicemail was calm and non-threatening.
Pla. Ex. 27.
Pla. Ex. 23. Exhibit 23 is an audio recording. The exhibit list identifies Exhibit 23 as a voicemail to "Ethan Labs," and the Court assumes that "Ethan" is a typo.
Pla. Ex. 23.
Debtor testified that his purpose for contacting Katial and his associates was not to harm Katial, but to get Katial to call him and either refund his $40,000 or provide him with the prepaid debit cards. After more than two years after entering into the Marketer Agreement with Vista Money, Debtor still did not have the prepaid debit cards, and he believed that he had been scammed as part of a criminal scheme by Katial, Vista Money, and OPS. 8
Trans. p. 61, 82, 104, 146-47, 154-55, 157-58, 160, 169-70, 174-75, 189.
Trans. p. 136, 141-42, 150-51, 155, 170, 176, 178.
Debtor testified that he hired an attorney to file suit against Vista Money and Katial.Debtor's attorney sent Vista Money and Katial a demand letter for the return of Debtor's money, and in response (in August of 2018), Vista Money and Katial sued Debtor (a Florida resident) in Michigan state court. Vista Money and Katial asserted claims against Debtor for business defamation (Count I) and tortious interference (Count II). Additionally, Katial asserted claims against Debtor for defamation (Count III) and invasion of privacy (Count IV). The Michigan state court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all of their claims and later entered a $450,000 default judgment against Debtor.
Trans. p. 120-21.
Pla. Ex. 1; Trans. p. 120-21.
Pla. Ex. 1.
Pla. Ex. 1.
Pla. Exs. 10, 11, 18.
Thereafter, Debtor filed a petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. Plaintiffs initiated this adversary proceeding to have the Michigan judgment debt declared non-dischargeable as a debt for a "willful and malicious injury" under § 523(a)(6).
Doc. 2.
Whether a debt is non-dischargeable is governed by the Bankruptcy Code and is a core proceeding. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing non-dischargeability by a preponderance of the evidence. "[B]ut 'intertwined with this burden is the basic principle of bankruptcy that exceptions to discharge must be strictly construed against a creditor and liberally construed in favor of a debtor so that the debtor may be afforded a fresh start.'" 9
See Gonzalez v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 538 B.R. 145, 151 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
See Kane v. Stewart Tilgham Fox & Bianchi P.A. (In re Kane), 755 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Harris v. Jayo (In re Harris), 3 F.4th 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Hudson, 107 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." "Willful" and "malicious" are distinct requirements.
See Hanson v. Brown (In re Brown), 541 B.R. 906, 912 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015).
A. Willful
"'A debtor is responsible for a 'willful' injury when he or she commits an intentional act[, ] the purpose of which is to cause injury or which is substantially certain to cause injury.'"Thus, non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6) requires the bankruptcy court to find "a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury." And, debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not satisfy the element of willfulness.
Kane, 755 F.3d at 1293 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Maxfield v. Jennings (In re Jennings), 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2012)).
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
See id. at 64.
The Eleventh Circuit has not stated whether the "substantially certain to cause injury" inquiry should be evaluated under the more stringent subjective standard (requiring proof that the debtor actually knew that the act was substantially certain to injure the creditor) or under an objective standard (requiring the creditor to show only that the debtor's act was substantially certain to cause injury). However, for cases involving financial harm, this Court agrees with those courts that apply the more stringent subjective standard. As explained by one court: "because of the somewhat attenuated relationship between the defendant's act and the resulting [financial] harm, a purely objective substantial certainty analysis would bring the court 10 dangerously close to the [lesser] recklessness standard." In determining the debtor's subjective intent, "the debtor's knowledge or belief may be proven not only by the debtor's admissions, but also by circumstantial evidence tending to establish what the debtor knew when taking the injury producing actions."
See id.; Monson v. Galaz (In re Monson), 661 Fed.Appx. 675, 684 n.9 (11th Cir. 2016).
See Stewart Tilgham Fox & Bianchi P.A. v. Kane (In re Kane), 470 B.R. 902, 942 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012); FJK Tee Jay Ltd v. Keitel (In re Keitel), Adv. Proc. No. 16-01440-EPK, 2018 WL 9597494, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May 11, 2018).
Kane, 470 B.R. at 942.
George v. George (In re George), Adv. No. 8:09-ap-00445-CED, 2012 WL 1229840 at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. April 11, 2012) (citing Carrilo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1147 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)).
B. Malicious
A "malicious" injury is "'wrongful and without just cause or excessive even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will.'" Malice may be implied "'if the nature of the act itself implies a sufficient degree of malice.'" Specific intent to harm the creditor is not required. Courts look at the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a debtor acted with malice.
Kane, 755 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Jennings, 670 F.3d at 1334).
Monson, 661 Fed.Appx. at 683 (quoting Lee v. Ikner (In re Ikner), 883 F.2d 986, 991 (11th Cir. 1989)).
See Kane, 755 F.3d at 1294 (citing Jennings, 670 F.3d at 1334).
See Washington Mutual Bank v. Dubovoy (In re Dubovoy), 377 B.R. 705, 710 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (citing Automotive Finance Corp. v. Penton (In re Penton), 299 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003)).
C. Analysis
The Michigan judgment debt resulted from four claims-defamation, business defamation, tortious interference, and invasion of privacy-and this Court must determine whether Debtor acted willfully and maliciously when he engaged in the conduct on which these claims are based. Specifically, the conduct that the Court must analyze is Debtor's constant communications with third-parties regarding Katial and Vista Money. As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that Debtor's conduct rose to a level beyond recklessness, and "debts arising from reckless . . . conduct do not fall within the compass of 11 § 523(a)(6)." Furthermore, Debtor's conduct cannot be found to be malicious, because the evidence shows that Debtor believed the statements he made to be true.
Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 64.
See Thompson v. Durrance (In re Durrance), 84 B.R. 238, 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Kanaga v. Landon (In re Landon), Adv. No. 19-01038-M, 2020 WL 4658284, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ok. Aug. 11, 2020) (stating that in order for a defamation judgment to be non-dischargeable, the plaintiff must show that the debtor acted maliciously, which means that the plaintiff must show that "the debtor knew that the defamatory statement was false" and that "there was no just cause or excuse for making the statement"); Jefferson v. Holland (In re Holland), 428 B.R. 465, 474 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2010) (stating that a defamatory statement is not malicious if the debtor actually believed that the statement was true); Irvin v. Faller (In re Faller), 547 B.R. 766, 772 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2016); Merritt v. Rizzo (In re Rizzo), 337 B.R. 180, 189 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2006); Harris v. Kamps (In re Kamps), 575 B.R. 62, 82-84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2017).
1. Business Defamation and Defamation
In Michigan, the elements of business defamation and defamation are (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and (4) either actionability per se or the existence of special harm. The Michigan judgment establishes that these four elements have been met; the issue for this Court is whether Debtor's defamatory statements caused a willful and malicious injury. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that they suffered a willful and malicious injury.
See Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek Michigan, 487 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Mich. 1992) (citation omitted).
The evidence before the Court shows that Debtor was extremely frustrated with Plaintiffs. Debtor wanted to sell prepaid debit cards under his Marketer Agreement with Vista Money, and in furtherance of that objective, he paid OPS $40,000 pursuant to Katial's directive. The Court finds Debtor's testimony that Katial directed Debtor to pay OPS to be credible. 12 Further, the Court finds credible Debtor's testimony that Katial said that OPS would manage Debtor's account and to follow OPS' instructions.
There was other testimony by Debtor that the Court did not find credible, such as his accusations that certain email evidence was falsified and manipulated. However, just because Debtor's "credibility was doubtful on [some] matters, . . . does not mean it was doubtful on all." Rizzo, 337 B.R. at 190.
As such, when Debtor did not receive the debit cards from Vista Money, for which he believed he had paid Vista Money $40,000 by making the wire transfers to OPS at Katial's direction, Debtor's frustration towards OPS and Vista Money is understandable. Making matters worse, for more than two years, Debtor could not get a response from Vista Money or Katial regarding the services Vista Money promised to provide under the Marketer Agreement or arranging a refund of his $40,000.
A result, Debtor decided to try to get Katial to respond to him by telling Katial's associates of his need to speak with Katial. In doing so, Debtor stated his belief to third parties that Vista Money and Katial had stole his $40,000, that they had scammed him, and thus, that Katial was a criminal. The Court finds that Debtor honestly believed these statements were true when he made them (and he still believes them to be true), but he made these statements with reckless disregard for their falsity.
The Court finds that the purpose of Debtor's statements was to get Katial to call him and resolve the situation-either by providing working debit cards or by refunding his money. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the purpose of Debtor's statements was to injure them. The Court acknowledges that Debtor threatened to injure Plaintiffs' reputations, but the Court finds that the communications at issue were not done to carry out the threat. 13
See Kamps, 575 B.R. at 83 (finding that the debtor credibly testified that in making the defamatory statements, his primary intent was to defend his reputation and protect others, and thus, while the debtor acted recklessly, he did not willfully injure the plaintiff).
Thus, the Court finds that Debtor did not act willfully as the term is defined under § 523(a)(6)-Debtor did not intend to harm Plaintiffs by the defamatory statements. Instead, he made the statements with reckless disregard for their falsity, which is not sufficient to support a willfulness finding.
Likewise, the Court finds that Debtor did not act maliciously, because he honestly believed the statements he made were true. It is undisputed that Debtor entered into a Marketer Agreement with Vista Money to sell prepaid debit cards and that he paid $40,000 towards that objective. Debtor's testimony that he paid the $40,000 to OPS at Katial's direction is credible. Viewing the facts from Debtor's perspective, it understandable that he felt that he was scammed and that his money was stolen. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Debtor did not act maliciously.
It is likely that neither party is perceiving the other accurately. Katial testified that he was so fearful of Debtor due to Debtor's "relentless" communications that he believed that Debtor had committed a crime and that he and his family might be in danger. (Trans. p. 215-20). Thus, both parties are resolute in their belief that the other has committed a crime.
See, e.g., Rizzo, 337 B.R. at 189-90 & 189 n.10 (finding that despite the fact that there had been an ugly and long-standing feud between the debtor and the plaintiff and that the debtor probably would have very much liked to harm the plaintiff, the debtor's defamatory statement to the third-party that the plaintiff had engaged in money-laundering was not done with malicious intent; the court found that the debtor honestly believed that the plaintiff had engaged in money laundering, in part, because the debtor did not understand the legal requirements for such an offense); Holland, 428 B.R. at 474-75 (stating that the evidence showed that the debtor believed, and still believes, that the plaintiff embezzled money, and therefore, the court found that the debtor did not make the statement maliciously under § 523(a)(6)); Kamps, 575 B.R. 62, 83-84.
2. Tortious Interference
In Michigan, the elements of tortious interference are: (1) a contract or advantageous business relationship; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the contract, business relationship, or expectancy; (3) intentional and improper interference by the defendant, inducing or causing a breach, disruption, or termination of the contract, business relationship, or expectancy; and (4) 14 resultant damage to the plaintiff. The Michigan judgment establishes Debtor's liability for tortious interference, although it did not specify which contract or business relationship that Debtor interfered with.
See Mino v. Clio Sch. Dist., 661 N.W.2d 586, 597-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that Debtor interfered with their relationship with TAB bank, there is no evidence before the Court that Debtor did so willfully or maliciously. The evidence before the Court shows only that Debtor reached out to Tab bank because his debit card was not working and TAB bank's phone number was on the back of the card. No evidence was presented at trial regarding what Debtor said to TAB bank, and it appears that TAB bank may have terminated its relationship with Plaintiffs simply because a debit card seller contacted the bank, as opposed to Vista Money, regarding problems with the debit cards. There is no evidence that Debtor contacted TAB bank with the intent of causing TAB bank to terminate its relationship with Plaintiff, nor is there evidence before the Court that Debtor knew that his communication with TAB bank could have caused such a result.
To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that Debtor's publication of the "SCAM ALERT" article on LinkedIn interfered with their relationship with a specific business contact in Asia, the Court again finds that Debtor did not act willfully or maliciously. The evidence before the Court shows that Debtor did not intend his article to cause harm or to interfere with Plaintiffs' business relationships. Clearly, Debtor acted recklessly by posting the article on LinkedIn and linking Katial in the article, but again, the Court finds that the purpose in doing so was to get Katial to call him and resolve the situation by either providing the debit cards or refunding his money. Likewise, Debtor believed the statements contained in the article were true. As such, 15 the Court finds that Debtor did not willfully or maliciously tortiously interfere with Plaintiffs' business relationships.
The only evidence presented at trial regarding the business contact in Asia was that the person contacted Katial; what the person said to Katial would be hearsay. (Trans. p. 212-14).
3. Invasion of Privacy
In Michigan, the elements of false light invasion of privacy are: (1) a communication was broadcast to the public in general or publicized to a large number of people; (2) the communication places the injured party in a light which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. The Michigan judgment establishes that Debtor invaded Katial's privacy, but the Court must determine if Debtor did so willfully and maliciously. For all of the reasons stated above with respect to the analysis of the defamation claims, the Court finds that Debtor acted recklessly, as opposed to willfully and maliciously.
See Early Detection Ctr., P.C., v. New York Life Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
III. Conclusion
As explained above, the Court finds that Debtor did not willfully and maliciously injure Plaintiffs. As such, § 526(a)(6) does not apply, and the Michigan judgment is dischargeable.
It is so ORDERED.
Service of this Order other than by CM/ECF is not required. Local Rule 9013-3(b). 16