Virginia E. P. Co. v. Commonwealth

9 Citing cases

  1. Virginia Elec. Power Co. v. Com

    174 Va. 316 (Va. 1940)

    This section further provides how such gross transportation receipts shall be ascertained by the State Corporation Commission when the railway lies (a) wholly within this State, or (b) partly within and partly without this State. In Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S.E. 775, we held that the term "gross transportation receipts" of a railway corporation, within the meaning of sections 177 and 178 of the Constitution, includes receipts from its bus operations as well as those from its railway operations, and hence that it is entirely within the power of the General Assembly to enact adequate legislation to use such bus receipts as a measure of the corporation's franchise tax. The company does not controvert this holding.

  2. Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth

    176 Va. 170 (Va. 1940)   Cited 7 times
    In Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 170, 179, 10 S.E.2d 535, 540 (affirmed 313 U.S. 117, 61 S.Ct. 881, 85 L. ed. 1223), we pointed out that: "Inequalities or exemptions in state taxation are not forbidden by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause does not limit the power of the state to make any reasonable classification of property, occupations, persons or corporations, for purposes of taxation. It merely forbids inequality caused by clearly arbitrary action, particularly such as is attributable to hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes."

    It merely forbids inequality caused by clearly arbitrary action, particularly such as is attributable to hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes. "F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Va., 253 U.S. 412 [40 S. Ct. 560], 64 L. Ed. 989; Beers v. Glynn, 211 U.S. 477 [29 S. Ct. 186], 53 L. Ed. 290; Merhants' M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461 [17 S. Ct. 829], 42 L. Ed. 236; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 [10 S. Ct. 533], 33 L. Ed. 892; Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S.E. 775; Farmers' Mechanics' Benev. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Roanoke and Botetourt Counties v. Horton, 157 Va. 114, 160 S.E. 315; Leonard v. Maxwell [ 216 N.C. 89], 9 S.E.2d 316. Nor does this clause forbid exemption or classification based upon a principle of equalization of the tax load, whereby a class is exempted from an additional tax because it is taxed in another way.

  3. Vending Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy

    79 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1954)   Cited 8 times
    Holding Virginia's constitutional provision that "`[n]o law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title'" is intended to "prevent the members of the legislature and the people from being misled" as to the character of the legislation but does not "require that the caption of an act state its full purpose as completely as the act itself"

    Unless the classification in the Act is arbitrary and unreasonable it cannot be successfully attacked. V. E. P. Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S.E. 775. For the reasons here expressed the decree appealed from is

  4. Ea. Coast Fr. Lines v. City of Richmond

    194 Va. 517 (Va. 1953)   Cited 8 times

    That the legislature has power to adopt different classifications for tax purposes is well settled. Va. Elec. P. Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S.E. 775; Caskey Baking Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 313 U.S. 117, 121, 61 S.Ct. 881, 85 L. ed. 1223. The legislature has in its discretion classified the rolling stock of motor vehicle carriers which operate over fixed routes under certificates of convenience and necessity issued by the State Corporation Commission, in one group, and those which operate differently in another.

  5. Rountree Corp. v. City of Richmond

    188 Va. 701 (Va. 1949)   Cited 12 times

    The testimony shows without contradiction that the questioned terms used in the ordinances are well understood in the trade and have a common meaning. A construction long placed upon statutes without protest from officials charged with their enforcement is entitled to great weight. See McConkey v. Fredericksburg, 179 Va. 556, 19 S.E.2d 682. And in Virginia Elec., etc., Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S.E. 775, we held that in doubtful cases the court will adopt that construction which administrative officers charged with the duty of enforcing a particular law have placed on such law where such construction has been acquiesced in by the legislative body and the public for a long period of time. A departmental construction of a statute is persuasive that it is the correct construction to be applied. Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E.2d 529.

  6. City of Richmond v. Commonwealth

    188 Va. 600 (Va. 1948)   Cited 15 times

    The above quoted text is abundantly sustained by the decisions of this court. In Virginia Elec., etc., Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S.E. 775, the Virginia Electric and Power Company contended that the imposition upon it of a tax on gross receipts from its bus operations, as well as from its electric lines, constituted an unlawful discrimination against it because no such tax is imposed on other corporations conducting the same or similar business. After pointing out that there was no other company which conducted "a single uniform transportation system, partly by rail and partly by motor vehicle, in any municipality similar to appellant," we held that the discrimination in the taxes imposed was justified because the classification of the Virginia Electric and Power Company separately from the other bus companies was supported by a substantial difference in its business.

  7. Brooks Transp. Co. v. Lynchburg

    37 S.E.2d 857 (Va. 1946)   Cited 1 times

    The legislative recognition of this cannot be the basis of a convincing charge that it is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. In Virginia Elec., etc., Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 704, 194 S.E. 775, this court said: [4, 5] "The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence of the government of the States.

  8. State ex Rel. Halferty v. Kansas City P. L. Co.

    346 Mo. 1069 (Mo. 1940)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that a public water supply district is a “ ‘municipal corporation’ in the broad sense sometimes attributed to that term”

    (3) The State Tax Commission and the State board of equalization have, in the performance and administration of their respective duties, placed upon the statutes in question the identical construction contended for by appellant herein, which construction, in the absence of judicial authority to the contrary, is entitled to great weight with the courts. State ex rel. v. Baker, 293 S.W. 399, 316 Mo. 853; Journal of State Board of Equalization, 137, pp. 227, 264, 239, 385; State ex rel. v. Fendorff, 317 Mo. 579; Lefman v. Schuler, 317 Mo. 671; 59 C.J. 1025-27; Virginia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 194 S.E. 775; State v. Standard Oil Co., 182 So. 531; In re Bernay's Estate, 126 S.W.2d 209; Holmes v. Borgen, 273 N.W. 623; Skelton v. United States, 88 F.2d 599; Kingan Co. v. Smith, 17 F. Supp. 217; Patterson v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799; Hadden v. Tax Comm., 190 S.E. 249. (4) Appellant's petition is substantially in the form prescribed by Section 10039, Revised Statutes 1929, and properly states a cause of action in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. Sec. 10039, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Ry., 113 Mo. 297; State ex rel. v. Ry., 101 Mo. 136.

  9. Bouldin v. Commonwealth

    355 S.E.2d 352 (Va. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 13 times

    In the instant case certification of the DMV transcript was made on July 23, 1985, slightly more than four years after his third or "triggering" conviction of June 14, 1981. Consequently even if one of Bouldin's three convictions had been for driving under the influence the trial court would have been powerless under Code Sec. 46.1-387.3 to treat Bouldin any differently. Bouldin is, therefore, without standing to raise his equal protection challenge to the constitutionality of Code Sec. 46.1-387.1 et seq. Cf. California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 67-70 (1974); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1912); DeFebio v. County School Board of Fairfax County, 199 Va. 511, 514, 100 S.E.2d 760, 762-63 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 218 (1958); Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 621, 627-29, 195 S.E. 486, 489-90 (1938); Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 709, 194 S.E. 775, 783 (1938). Finally, Bouldin contends that the habitual offender proceedings against him were time-barred for three reasons.