Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:98CV421-P-D
March 13, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. The Court has duly considered the motions and the parties' memoranda and is ready to rule.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant case is a suit by Harry Vinson and Brad Vinson against some twenty-five defendants. The Complaint consists of a confusing menagerie of allegations. Construed liberally, the plaintiffs allege that all of the defendants participated in a grand conspiracy to "extort and defraud [the] Plaintiffs of their personal, private and real property" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiffs allege that some twenty-five (25) defendants including two chancellors, six chancery and circuit clerks, five attorneys and their respective law firms, eight physicians and medical providers conspired alongside plaintiffs' sister to deprive them of their real and personal property. The alleged motive behind the conspiracy was a desire to retaliate against the plaintiffs for their participation in an establishment known as Dads Against Discrimination ("DADS").
Rita Vinson is the sister and aunt of Harry and Brad Vinson, respectively. For simplicity's sake, she will be referred to as the plaintiffs' sister throughout the opinion.
The plaintiffs seek to recover damages for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights due to the defendants' varied levels of involvement in chancery court proceedings affecting the care and management of their parents' persons and estates. In particular, the plaintiffs complain about alleged irregularities stemming from an action styled Woodrow W. Vinson and Kernith B. Vinson v. Harry W. Vinson and Brad Vinson and Luxury Homes, Inc., Chancery Court of Lee County, Mississippi, Cause No. 96-0078.
Woodrow and Kernith Vinson are the parents and grandparents of Harry and Brad Vinson, respectively. For simplicity's sake, they will be referred to as the plaintiffs' parents throughout the opinion. . . .
The action was filed on or about January 22, 1996 and the relief sought included the avoidance of certain real estate conveyances. On or about January 23, 1996, counsel for Mr. Woodrow W. and Mrs. Kernith B. Vinson presented lis pendens notices for filing with the Chancery Clerks of Lee, Union and Pontotoc counties (identified in the plaintiffs' Complaint as William Benson, Larry Koon and Reggie Collums respectively).
Chancellor John C. Ross handled the matter initially; his involvement was limited to the issuance of a preliminary injunction; he later transferred the matter to Judge Ervin. On October 13, 1998 Chancellor Timothy Ervin entered a Final Decree in Cause No. 96-0078. The decree set aside numerous land conveyances and ordered the aforementioned chancery clerks to execute deeds reconveying the property to Woodrow Vinson. In addition, the decree imposed a judicial lien on all properties owned by Harry Vinson, Brad Vinson and Luxury Homes, Inc. until they complied with other aspects of the Final Decree. Other relief included the voidance of powers of attorney held by Harry Vinson and the appointment of a guardian ad litem and temporary conservator over Mr. and Mrs. Vinson. William Benson and the other chancery clerks evidently accepted the Final Decree for filing, executed quitclaim deeds as directed by Judge Ervin's decree and enrolled the decree in the land records for the above-named counties.
Judge Ross also presided over a separate case involving plaintiff Brad Vinson.
During the same period, the circuit clerks for Lee, Union and Pontotoc Counties (Joyce Loftin, Thomas Stanford and Tracy Robinson) were presented with abstracts of the judgment in Cause No. 96-0078 for filing in their respective jurisdictions. They too accepted the abstracts and filed them in accordance with established procedure.
Plaintiffs later filed the instant suit, naming the chancellors and the court clerks (along with the clerks' sureties) as party defendants. In addition, they named certain lawyers as defendants, namely Kay Trapp, Fred Bush, Jr., the law firm of Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., Anna Catherine Pipkin, the law firm of Greer and Pipkin, Michael Gratz, the law firm of Gratz Gratz, Mark Shelton and the law firm of Shelton and Weeden. These parties' inclusion as defendants apparently resulted from their roles in the various chancery proceedings concerning Woodrow and Kernith Vinson. Trapp, Bush and the Phelps Dunbar firm represented Mr. and Mrs. Vinson in Cause No. 96-0078. Anna Catherine Pipkin acted as counsel for Rita Vinson in Cause No. 96-0110, a related proceeding regarding a petition to establish a conservatorship over Mr. and Mrs. Vinson. Mark Shelton and his law firm were apparently included due to Mr. Shelton's role as guardian ad litem and temporary conservator by virtue of Judge Ervin's judgment in Cause No. 96-0078. Finally, Michael Gratz and his law firm enjoyed an even more tenuous link to the proceedings: Mr. Gratz was approached concerning the possibility of his assuming the position of conservator for the elderly Vinsons a responsibility he never accepted.
The Court would point out that little, if any, of this could be divined from a reading of plaintiffs' Complaint. Rather, most of the facts elaborating upon the involvement of the defendant attorneys have been distilled from a careful perusal of the parties' briefs, especially the plaintiffs' responses to the various motions seeking dismissal of the action. They are undisputed.
The plaintiffs Vinson also named various physicians and other medical providers as defendants, in particular Drs. Keith Young, Nell Moore, Antone Tannehill, F.L. Lummus, Samuel Pace, IMA Foundation, Inc. and North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged that these care givers to Woodrow Vinson played an active role in the conspiracy against them by acquiescing in their sister's diabolical plot to prescribe unnecessary mind-altering drugs to the elder Mr. Vinson and thereby permit Rita Vinson to gain control over Mr. and Mrs. Vinson and their assets. The Complaint also asserts medical malpractice claims against the defendant medical providers.
All defendants responded to the suit with motions to dismiss. Chancellors Ervin and Ross seek dismissal based on the doctrine of judicial immunity. The chancery and circuit clerks likewise present motions to dismiss based on quasi-judicial immunity. The sureties for said defendants, namely United States Fidelity Guaranty Insurance Company (USFG), State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity), whose alleged liability is solely derivative of their insureds, also seek dismissal. Lastly, the attorney defendants and their law firms, along with the physicians, corporate medical providers and individual defendant Rita Vinson presented their own motions to dismiss predicated largely on the plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead a conspiracy under the civil rights statutes. The matter has been fully briefed and the Court is ready to rule.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if a party fails to state a claim under which relief can be granted. The allegation of the complaint must be accepted as true when the Court considers whether the Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action. See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1991); cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3057, 112 S.Ct. 298, 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991). Only the complaint and allegations contained therein are to be considered in reaching a decision on a defendant Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims which would entitle him or her to relief.
LEGAL ANALYSIS Judicial Immunity
An established tenet of our jurisprudence is judicial immunity. Brinkman v. Johnson, 793 F.2d 111, 112 (5 th Cir. 1986); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357-59 (1978). Judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages stemming from actions taken pursuant to their judicial role; immunity may only be overcome where a plaintiff makes a showing that the judge acted in a non-judicial capacity or that the judge lacked jurisdiction. Stump at 356-57; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988). Based on the facts as set forth above, the Court determines that both judges Ervin and Ross are entitled to judicial immunity from liability under the facts as alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint.
Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Joyce Loftin and William Benson filed a Motion to Dismiss, in which defendants Stanford, Koon, Collums and Robinson joined. Each of these defendants is being sued based on acts arising out of the performance of their official duties as chancery and circuit clerks.
Like judges, court clerks are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their office. Boston v. Lafayette County, Mississippi, 744 F. Supp. 745, 750 (N.D.Miss. 1990), aff'd. 933 F.2d 1003 (5 th Cir. 1991) ("quasi-judicial immunity shields lower officials, such as clerks, who implement judicial orders."); Johnson v. Craft, 673 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.Miss. 1987) ("Court clerks are immune from liability when performing official acts.").
Defendants Benson, Collums and Koon were acting within the scope of their duties as chancery clerks when they accepted Judge Ervin's Final Decree for filing and when they executed the deeds complained of by the plaintiffs. The same is true for their actions in enrolling the decree as a part of the land records for their respective counties. Said defendants are entitled to the protection of quasi-judicial immunity under the circumstances presented.
Likewise, defendants Loftin, Robinson and Stanford were acting within the course and scope of their duties as circuit clerks when they accepted and filed abstracts of Judge Ervin's judgment in the records of Lee, Pontotoc and Union Counties. They, too, enjoy absolute immunity from suit for the acts complained of by plaintiffs.
In addition to suing these particular defendants, plaintiffs also joined as defendants those insurance companies acting as surety for the defendant clerk's bonds. The plaintiffs' claims against bond sureties USFG, State Farm and Fidelity arise solely from the actions of the defendant clerks, i.e., their alleged liability is merely derivative of that of their insureds. As defendants Loftin, Robinson, Stanford, Benson, Collums and Koon acted within the scope of their professional duties and they are immune from liability, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the defendant sureties. USFG, State Farm and Fidelity are entitled to dismissal of the claims against them.
Failure to Adequately Plead Conspiracy under §§ 1983 and 1985(3).
The vast majority of the remaining defendants fall into two categories: attorneys who participated in the underlying chancery proceedings in some form or fashion and Mr. Woodrow Vinson's medical providers who participated in the alleged conspiracy by over medicating Mr. Vinson and thereby permitting plaintiffs' sister Rita Vinson to exert undue influence over her parents' persons and estates. Rita Vinson's responsive pleadings also petitioned the Court to dismiss the Complaint against her. All seek summary judgment based on the plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead a conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs' civil rights under §§ 1983 and 1985(3).
Rita Vinson pursued her defense pro se. Although she did not submit a separate memorandum of authorities reciting her legal argument, the Court finds the legal authorities regarding the pleading standard for civil rights conspiracies equally dispositive to the claims asserted against Rita Vinson.
A private individual's conduct may support a claim under § 1983 if the individual is a "willing participant in a joint action with the state or its agents." Brinkman, 793 F.2d at 112; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are:
an action which violates a right protected under § 1983;
actions taken in concert by the defendants with specific intent to violate the protected right.
Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5 th Cir. 1999).
Conspiracy claims under either § 1983 or § 1985(3) require that the claimant relate specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations. Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5 th Cir. 1986); U.S. ex rel Simmons v. Zibilich, 542 F.2d 259 (5 th Cir. 1976). See also Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 566 (5 th Cir. 1991); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5 th Cir. 1987). The operative facts of the conspiracy must be pled with particularity, not merely insinuated in broad, vague assertions. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1370. Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific facts which connect the individual defendants (lawyers, medical providers and Rita Vinson) to a conspiracy with state actors to deprive them of any right protected under the federal Constitution. Instead, they have concocted a mishmash of bald allegations. Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under §§ 1983 and 1985(3).
Plaintiffs have wholly failed to plead sufficient facts to support a conspiracy claim under either § 1983 or § 1985(3). As a result, the defendants are entitled to a dismissal of the claims against them.
An additional deficiency in plaintiffs' § 1985(3) claim is the failure to allege racial or other class-based animus. The plaintiffs' affiliation with "DADS" is not sufficient to meet the necessary requirement of a class based prejudice. Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083, 1088 (5th Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. United Parcel Service, 21 F. Supp. 627, 630 (S.D.Miss. 1998).
Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Bring a Med-Mal Claim
Messrs. Vinson also asserted claims for medical malpractice against the defendant physicians/medical providers. This claim must fail because plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants ever rendered any treatment to them. Plaintiffs' claims stem solely from alleged deficiencies in treatment provided to their father; they have not alleged any facts nor have they cited any law which affords them standing to sue under such circumstances. Defendants Young, Moore, Tannehill, Lummus, Pace, IMA Foundation, Inc. and North Mississippi Medical Center are entitled to dismissal of this claim as well.
Motions for Fees and Expenses Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Defendants also petitioned the Court for an award of attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and F.R.C.P. 11(b). The Court will consider said requests if presented in the form of a properly supported motion accompanied by a supporting memorandum of authorities. The defendants are to file any motions for fees within ten (10) days following the entry of this Opinion.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the chancellors and court clerks are absolutely immune from suit based on judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. The remaining defendants are entitled to dismissal for plaintiff's failure to adequately plead any operative facts supportive of a conspiracy claim under either § 1983 or § 1985(3). A separate judgment will be entered herein in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58.
This, the 13th, day of March, 2000.