Opinion
32829, 32830.
DECIDED JANUARY 26, 1950.
Larceny of automobile; from Chatham Superior Court — Judge D. S. Atkinson. October 10, 1949.
Edward J. Goodwin, for plaintiff in error.
Andrew J. Ryan Jr., Solicitor-General, Sylvan A. Garfunkel, Herman N. Coolidge, contra.
1. Where a signature is attacked on the ground of forgery, it is permissible to introduce in evidence for purposes of comparison handwriting proved to be that of the defendant, as the genuineness or falsity of the signature raises a question of fact which is for the determination of the jury, and it is permissible for the jury to make a physical inspection of both the genuine signature and the one in dispute.
2. Where a defendant is charged with the theft of an automobile, and, as part of the scheme or device in connection therewith, there is evidence that he used a forged or fictitious bill of sale, evidence that he had in his possession a supply of such blank bills of sale is admissible as a circumstance throwing light on this transaction.
3. Although the court looks with strong disfavor upon any apparent attempt by a prosecuting attorney to inject inadmissible, prejudicial evidence into the trial of a case, yet in the present instance, where the witness was questioned as to knowledge of a former crime committed by the defendant, to which he made a negative reply, and where the accused in his statement to the jury related the circumstances of the previous trial, such admission rendered harmless the previous error.
4. The evidence supports the verdict and, having the approval of the trial court, will not be disturbed by this court.
DECIDED JANUARY 26, 1950.
Tye Vining was tried and convicted in the Superior Court of Chatham County on two indictments, each charging larceny of an automobile. By consent the cases were tried together. The evidence authorized the jury to find: that on January 11, a 1940 Chevrolet was stolen from R. F. Hinely, and on January 20 a 1946 Chevrolet was stolen from Joe Oliver in Savannah, Georgia; that the defendant was found driving the Hinely car on a highway west of Swainsboro, Georgia; that the motor number on this car had been changed; that the defendant had therein a tag bearing the motor number of the Oliver car, which had last been seen in the latter automobile; that the defendant at first denied all knowledge of the Oliver car, but later informed the officers where it could be located in a private garage in Savannah; that the defendant produced a bill of sale dated January 3 to the Hinely car from one H. G. Davis, but that neither Davis nor the witness whose signature appeared on the same could be located at the addresses given on the bill of sale or elsewhere; that the address under Davis's name was fictitious; and that the defendant had in his living quarters a number of blank bills of sale and unfiled automobile keys. There were also in evidence three signatures reading "H. G. Davis," written by the defendant, for the purpose of comparison with the signature on the bill of sale.
From the verdict of guilty in each case the defendant filed identical motions for new trial on the general grounds, later amended by adding three special grounds, and he assigns error on the overruling of these motions. The cases will here be treated together.
1. Ground 1 of the amended motion for new trial in each case complains that the court erred in admitting in evidence three signatures of H. G. Davis, written by the defendant, to be used for the purpose of comparison with the bill of sale, on the ground that there was no expert testimony to show similarity of handwriting. There is no merit in this contention, as the jury may properly examine other documents in order to reach a conclusion upon a question of fact as to whether a signature is or is not genuine. See Gibson v. Gibson, 54 Ga. App. 187 (2) ( 187 S.E. 155); Rogers v. Rogers, 52 Ga. App. 548 ( 184 S.E. 404); Wilson v. Barnard, 10 Ga. App. 98 (3) ( 72 S.E. 943).
2. Special ground 2 complains of the admission in evidence, over objection, of blank forms of bills of sale found in the apartment of the defendant; the State contending that the defendant had stolen an automobile and forged a bill of sale thereto to himself, the presence of other unused bills of sale in his apartment, if not explained by the defendant, was a circumstance which the jury might consider in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, since, under the State's theory, it would shed some light upon the availability of the means of carrying out the criminal enterprise.
3. Special ground 3 complains of the failure of the court, on motion, to grant a mistrial. The solicitor asked a witness for the defense, on cross-examination, whether he knew that the defendant had been previously convicted of motor theft in Kansas City, to which the witness replied that he did not. It appears from the record that no foundation had been laid for the introduction of previous convictions, and such a question was highly improper. The defendant undertook, however, to make to the jury, a detailed statement concerning his former conviction, and his admission, therefore, rendered harmless the previous error. See Broadnax v. State, 31 Ga. App. 736 ( 122 S.E. 96). This ground of the amended motion is also without merit.
4. The jury was authorized by the evidence to convict under each indictment. The only evidence introduced by the defense was that of the garage owner, who failed to identify the defendant as the person renting the garage in which the stolen car was stored; the testimony of several persons from whom Vining had purchased or to whom he had sold automobiles, and his own explanation. This was that he had met Davis in the street and bought the Hinely car from him, and that thereafter Davis had given him the tag bearing the motor number of the Oliver car and requested that he obtain a license for it. This statement the jury chose to disbelieve. The possession of property recently stolen, not explained to the satisfaction of the jury, is sufficient to authorize it to infer that the accused is guilty. See Morris v. State, 47 Ga. App. 792 ( 171 S.E. 555); Long v. State, 62 Ga. App. 775 ( 9 S.E.2d 845).
The trial court did not err in overruling the motions for a new trial as amended.
Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre, P. J., and Gardner, J., concur.