Opinion
No. CV 06 4023267 S
December 4, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#133); MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION (#136); AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#135)
Vincent Metro, LLC ("Vincent") commenced this action for interpleader on November 6, 2006, pursuant to § 52-584, seeking an order determining the rights of the defendants to the funds, and an order discharging it from any obligation to the defendants, Yah Realty, LLC ("Yah"), John Fiztgerald and Rose Fitzgerald, arising out of their claims to the funds, as well as reasonable attorneys fees and cost of the suit. On December 12, 2006, the court, Licari, J., entered an interlocutory judgment of interpleader. Vincent deposited the funds with the clerk of the court on December 29, 2006. See Notice of Deposit of Funds, #103. The defendants entered their appearances on January 26, 2007.
The interpleader statute, General Statutes § 52-484, provides: "Whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the parties and amount in controversy, making all persons parties who claim to be entitled to or interested in such money or other property. Such court shall hear and determine all questions which may arise in the case, may tax costs at its discretion and, under the rules applicable to an action of interpleader, may allow to one or more of the parties a reasonable sum or sums for counsel fees and disbursements, payable out of such fund or property; but no such allowance shall be made unless it has been claimed by the party in his complaint or answer."
Practice Book § 23-44 provides: "No trial on the merits of an interpleader action shall be had until (1) an interlocutory judgment of interpleader shall have been entered; and (2) all defendants shall have filed statements of claim, been defaulted or filed waivers. Issues shall be closed on the claims as in other cases."
Between January and March 2007, the defendants reached an agreement that the funds should be returned to Yah. On March 2, 2007, the defendants filed a motion for an order to release the funds which was denied without prejudice by the court, Licari, J., on May 21 because Vincent's motion to default the defendants for failure to plead had been granted. Vincent then filed a motion for final judgment of interpleader after default which was also denied. The next day, the defendants filed an answer and five-count counterclaim. On January 22, 2008, the defendants filed a revised five-count counterclaim. And, the plaintiff filed an answer to the revised counterclaim. The plaintiff moved for default against the defendant, Rose Fitzpatrick, for failure to state a claim which the court, Thompson, J., denied.
Vincent moved to dismiss the entire counterclaim, pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine. (See Yah Realty v. [Vincent] Enginaro, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 06 5007459 (June 4, 2007, Zoarski, J.T.R.)). The court, Thompson, J., denied motion to dismiss the counterclaim on June 19, 2007. The plaintiff then filed another motion to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that it was moot. The court, Jones, J., denied this motion, observing that issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel might be applicable, but that the motion to dismiss was the improper vehicle with which to raise them.
Vincent moves for summary judgment on both the plaintiff's interpleader complaint and the defendants' revised counterclaims. The defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The defendants also move for summary judgment in their favor on the plaintiff's interpleader action. Attached to their motion is a stipulation signed by all three defendants stating that the defendants are in agreement that the disputed funds should be released to Yah Realty. These matters were argued at short calendar on August 11, 2008.
This case presents the following two issues. First, whether the stipulation entered into by the defendants regarding the disposition of the disputed funds renders the interpleader action moot, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the interpleader action. Second, whether the interlocutory judgment of interpleader may be deemed a final judgment thereby estopping the relitigation of the claims pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel or whether the defendants are entitled to fully litigate their counterclaims.
For reasons set forth herein, this court dismisses the Interlocutory Action as moot, and requests further briefing and argument from the parties regarding the issue of res judicata and collateral estoppel and the revised counterclaim. See, ORDER, dated December 4, 2008.
This case, and its lengthy procedural history, arises from a failed sale of real estate. In July 2005, the plaintiff, Vincent Metro, LLC, and the defendant, Yah Realty, LLC, entered into an agreement whereby Vincent would act as a real estate broker for a property Yah wished to sell. According to the agreement, if the property was sold through Vincent's efforts, Vincent would receive a commission based on the purchase price. Vincent procured defendant John Fitzpatrick as a buyer for the property. Yah and Fitzpatrick entered into a purchase and sales agreement in late 2005. John Fitzpatrick's mother, defendant Rose Fitzpatrick, gave Vincent $20,000 as a deposit in January 2006. Vincent placed these funds into its real estate trust account. Yah and John Fitzpatrick were unable to complete the sale and, in September 2006, officially terminated the deal. In October 2006, both Yah and John Fitzpatrick requested that Vincent return the deposit.
After reviewing the motions for summary judgment filed by both the plaintiff and the defendants regarding the Interpleader Action, the court concludes that the plaintiff's action is moot. The defendants' stipulation concedes that the funds should be returned to defendant Yah. Therefore, there are no disputed facts as to where the funds should go, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the motions for summary judgment concerning the interpleader action.
"Mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties." Hechtman v. Savitsky, 62 Conn.App. 654, 657, CT Page 19315 772 A.2d 673 (2001). "[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time . . . Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ABC, LLC v. State Ethics Commission, 264 Conn. 812, 822-23, 826 A.2d 1077 (2003). "[M]ootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties . . . In other words, the ultimate question is whether the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gerlt v. South Windsor, 284 Conn. 178, 189, 931 A.2d 907 (2007).
Initially, Yah Realty, John Fitzpatrick and Rose Fitzpatrick all made conflicting demands as to the escrow funds held by the plaintiff. Therefore, this action in interpleader was properly filed. However, when the defendants reached an agreement, which is memorialized in the court filing (Motion to Release Deposited Funds, dated March 1, 2007, #107) and the stipulation, the interpleader action became moot.
The task of the court in an interpleader action is to determine which of the adverse and competing claims to a particular fund is entitled to the fund. As a result of the defendants' agreement that the funds be released to Yah there are no longer issues in dispute regarding claims to the escrow funds. The conflicting claims in the interpleader action have been effectively resolved. The court can no longer grant any practical relief. The issue is moot. Accordingly, this court refrains from ruling on the plaintiffs and the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's interpleader action and dismisses the Interpleader Action.