Opinion
1:23-cv-00904-CL
04-22-2024
MARTINA VILLEGAS, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS DUBIEL, and FARMER'S CHOICE, LLC, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK D. CLARKE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 24, filed against Defendant Farmer's Choice, LLC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. The Clerk of Court entered an order of default as to Farmer's Choice, LLC on January 8, 2024. For the reasons below, Plaintiff's Motion should be GRANTED.
Farmer's Choice is the sole remaining Defendant. Plaintiff dismissed Defendant Thomas Dubiel from this matter without prejudice on February 21, 2024. See ECF No. 26.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Farmer's Choice (“the LLC”) is a limited liability company registered in Oregon with its principal place of business in Grants Pass. Compl, ECF No. 1 at ¶3. The managing member and registered agent for the LLC is Thomas Dubiel. Id. at ¶2. Mr. Dubiel is believed to be an individual engaged in the business of growing and marketing hemp under several different names and entities. Id.
Plaintiff refers to Defendant as both “Farmer's Choice” and “Farmer Choice.” Compare Pl. Compl., ECF No. 1 with Pl. Mots., ECF Nos. 19, 24. As of right now, the case caption identifies the party as “Farmer's Choice, LLC.” If Plaintiff seeks to correct or substitute that name, she may move to do so. For consistency and clarity, Court here will refer to Defendant as “the LLC.”
Plaintiff Martina Villegas (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was recruited by Mr. Dubiel, using an unlicensed farm-labor contractor, Rene Zarate, to harvest, process, and package hemp for market. Id. at¶4. As compensation, Ms. Zarate promised Plaintiff at least $15.00 per hour worked, or $5.00 per pound of product processed. Id. at ¶ 5.
The LLC employed Plaintiff from approximately December 7, 2020, to December 20, 2020. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that she earned $855.00 in wages over the following shifts:
See Narbona Decl., ECF No. 25 at 4.
Date
Hours
Waaes
12/7/20
7.5 .
$112.50
12/8/20
7.5
$112.50
12/9/20
9.5
$142.50
12/10/20
12/11/20
12/12/20
12/13/20
7.5
$112.50
12/14/20
7.5
$112.50
12/15/20
7.5
$112.50
12/16/20
10
$150.00
Total:
57 hours
$855.00
To date, the LLC has not paid Plaintiff for any of the 57 hours that she worked. ECF No., 1 at ¶ 6. Plaintiff has repeatedly requested that her wages be paid, but she remains uncompensated. Id. at ¶ 8. The LLC has also failed to provide Plaintiff with an itemized pay statement listing all hours worked, the specific amounts or bases for all deductions, and any information regarding the employer's name, address, and employee identification number from December 2020. Id. at ¶ 9.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June 21, 2023, alleging that the LLC failed to pay the agreed upon wages earned and all minimum wages required under Oregon and federal wage laws. She asserts five claims for relief: (1) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act; (2) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of Oregon's wage and hour laws; (3) failure to pay wages upon termination in violation of Oregon's wage and hour laws; (4) breach of contract; and (5) violation of ORS § 658.440.
On February 21, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed Defendant Thomas Dubiel from this matter without prejudice, citing an inability to serve him with summons and complaint. ECF No. 26.
On January 8, 2024, the Clerk of Court filed an entry of default as to the LLC. ECF No. 23. Following the LLC's failure to submit a timely response or otherwise defend itself in this matter, Plaintiff now moves for entry of default judgment. ECF No. 24. She seeks a judgment against Defendant LLC awarding unpaid minimum wages, penalty wages, liquidated damages, and statutory damages in the sum of $8,468.25. Id. at 2.
This Court has federal question jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this action is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims based in Oregon law under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, being that they are so related to claims within the Court's original jurisdiction that they . form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to this litigation occurred in this district and Defendant LLC resides here.
LEGAL STANDARD
The decision to grant or deny a motion for default judgment is within the discretion of the court. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). In exercising its discretion, the court must consider seven factors, often referred to as the Eitel factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice . to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiffs substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
Upon entry of default, plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact regarding liability, except any allegations relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff must establish damages by proof unless the amount is liquidated or otherwise susceptible of computation. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). Relief for cases of default judgment “must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c).
DISCUSSION
All the Eitel factors either weigh in favor of granting default judgment or they are neutral, except the policy factor favoring a judgment on the merits. On balance, the factors strongly favor granting the motion.
I. The possibility of prejudice to Plaintiff weighs in favor of default judgment.
The LLC has failed to appear in this matter at any point. Plaintiff has alleged that since she completed her work hours for the LLC and former Defendant Dubiel, they have been unresponsive and inaccessible. Given that absence, it is likely that a denial of default judgment would result in Plaintiff being left without any legal recourse for recovery against the LLC's allegedly unlawful actions. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Frei, No. 4:12-cv-0127-BLW, 2013 WL 3190685, *1 (D. Idaho Jun. 21, 2013); see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The possibility of prejudice therefore weighs in favor of default judgment, finding that Plaintiff has no alternative means by which to resolve her current claims.
II. The sufficiency of the Complaint and the merits of Plaintiff's substantive claims also weigh in favor of default judgment.
Since the Clerk of the Court has entered default, the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint are taken as true and binding against the defaulting party, the LLC. Garcia v. Pacwest Contracting LLC, No. 3:12-cv-01930-SI, 2016 WL 526236, 1 (D. Or. Feb 9, 2016) (citing Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). The question thus becomes whether Plaintiff is entitled to recover on the facts set forth in the Complaint and the supporting declarations. .
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by the LLC to engage in interstate commerce in the performance of agricultural labor, such as handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, or grading hemp in its unmanufactured state. ECF No. 1 at ¶1. Plaintiff did this work from December 7,2020, to December 20,2020. Id. She was promised $15.00 in exchange for each hour she worked, or $5.00 per pound of produce processed. Id. at ¶5. She completed 57 hours of work. Id. at 6. The LLC willfully failed to deliver Plaintiff her final pay immediately upon termination of her employment. Id. at 10. Plaintiff has requested repeatedly that her wages be paid. Id. at 8. The LLC, to date, has not paid Plaintiff for any of the 57 hours that she worked. Id. at 6. The LLC has failed to provide Plaintiff with an itemized pay statement that lists all the hours she worked. Id. at 9. The LLC has failed to provide the specific amounts and bases for all deductions. Id. The LLC has failed to provide . identifying information such as the employer's name, address, and employer identification number from December 2020. Id. Finally, the LLC used an unregistered farm labor contractor to hire Plaintiff. Id. at 4.
Because it is an employer's responsibility to maintain and produce records of the hours worked by employees, any questions regarding the exact number of hours worked should be resolved in favor of the employee. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687-88 (1946); see also Presley v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 200 Or.App. 113, 119 (2005). . .
These allegations sufficiently state a claim under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for failure to pay minimum wage, and under the Oregon Contractor Registration Act, ORS 658.440. Plaintiff has also sufficiently stated claims for nonpayment of wages upon termination in violation of ORS 653.025 and 653.055 and late payment of wages in violation of ORS 652.140 and 652.150.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks to recover the following damages:
(1) Unpaid contract wages, calculated under a contract theory (57 hours at $15 per hour, for a total of $855.00)
(2) FLSA liquidated damages for unpaid federal minimum wage . (57 hours at $7.25, for a total of $413.25)
(3) ORS 652.150 penalty wages for failure to pay minimum wage ($15 per hour x 8 hours x 30 days, for a total of $3,600.00)
(4) ORS 652.150 penalty wages for failure to pay upon termination ($15 per hour x 8 hours x 30 days, for a total of $3,600.00)ECF No. 24 at 4-10; see also Narbona Decl., ECF No. 25.
The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to the requested damages.
To obtain the statutory penalty, Plaintiff must prove that the LLC's conduct was “willful.” Sabin v. Willamette Western Corp., 216 Or 1083, 1093 (1976). Willful means that “the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent.” Id. Plaintiff here has sufficiently alleged willfulness.
Plaintiff seeks to recover two penalties based on separate statutes: failure to pay minimum wages (ORS 653.055) and failure to wages upon termination (ORS 652.140).
Under ORS 635.055(1)(b), failing to pay minimum wages as required by ORS 653.025 subjects an employer to statutory penalties under ORS 652.150.
Under ORS 652.140, willful failure to pay an employee all wages earned and unpaid upon termination subjects an employer to statutory penalties under ORS 652.150, as well.
“Oregon law provides that ‘[w]here there are two separate statutory schemes and two separate remedies, each with its own purpose, an employer who violated both laws is liable for the penalties provided in each.'” Mathis v. Hous. Auth. of Umatilla Cnty., 242 F.Supp.2d 777, 787 (D. Or. 2002) (citing Hurger v. Hyatt Lake Resort, Inc., 170 Or.App. 320, 323 (2000)).
In this context, “ORS 652.140 and ORS 653.055 represent separate theories of recovery.” Cornier v. Paul Tulacz, DVMPC, 176 Or.App. 245, 250 (2001). Plaintiff seeks to penalize two different types of employer misconduct: failing to pay what is minimally required as . compensation for work performed in Oregon and failing to pay any wages earned and owing timely upon the earning employee's termination. Because Plaintiff here was deprived of any payment at all, as opposed to merely a late payment that otherwise complied with minimum wage standards, this ruling is not foreclosed by the holding of Hurger v. Hyatt Lake Resort, Inc., 170 Or.App. 320 (2000). Similarly, being that the FLSA is not penal in nature, the Court finds that the requested penalties do not constitute double recovery. See Mathis, 242 F.Supp.2d at 789 (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
As to all of the claims alleged, Plaintiff has stated an adequate claim for relief, and the substantive merits of the claims weigh in favor of granting default judgment. Plaintiff has satisfied the second and third Eitel factors.
III. The sum of money at stake in this action is neutral.
Plaintiff seeks $8,468.25 in damages, reflecting unpaid base wages at the agreed upon contract rate, FLSA liquidated damages, and Oregon unpaid wage penalties. Considering that sum in relation to the LLC's conduct, the Court finds that Plaintiff is seeking reasonable compensation for her hours worked. See PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also J& J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Rafael, No. CIVS-10-1046 LKKGGH, 2011 WL 445803, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb 8, 2011). Plaintiff here calculated her damages based on the facts in the complaint and applicable wage laws, and she supported them with submitted declarations. The sum of money at stake therefore neither weighs in favor nor against default judgment.
IV. The possibility of a dispute concerning material facts weighs in favor of default judgment.
Under the general rule, Plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true after the Clerk's entry of default. Tele Video, 826 F.2d at 918; see also Elektra Entm't Grp. Inc v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Without the LLC's version of facts or any other countervailing evidence, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists in the matter. This factor therefore indicates the propriety of entering a default judgment.
V. No evidence suggests default was due to excusable neglect; this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
Given that Plaintiff performed 57 hours of unpaid labor, repeatedly requested due compensation, and proximately served the LLC with summons and complaint in accordance with ORS 63.121, the LLC's failure to respond at any point in this litigation more so indicates intentional evasion than simple neglect. Coupled with the fact that over three months have passed since the Clerk's entry of default, the possibility of excusable neglect is remote. This factor favors granting Plaintiff a default judgment.
VI. Policy favors a decision on the merits of the case; this factor weighs against default judgment.
The strong preference of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to have cases decided on their merits weighs against granting Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. However, the basic existence of Rule 55(b) “indicates that ‘this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.'” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d. at 1177 (original citations omitted). The LLC's failure to defend against Plaintiff's claims renders a decision on the merits impossible here. Accordingly, this factor does not preclude the Court from granting default judgment against the LLC.
CONCLUSION
The Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff's motion for default judgment because the only factor that weighs against default judgment is the final policy factor, which is not dispositive. The Court notes that gaps and questions regarding the relationships implicated by this case still exist. However, without an appearance by the LLC and its side of the facts or any other countervailing evidence, the factors weigh in Plaintiff's favor, and the Court cannot find a reason to deny the motion for default judgment.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 24, against Defendant Fanner's Choice, LLC in the requested amount of $8,468.25, itemized as follows:
1. Unpaid wages of $855.00 ($15.00x57 hours)
2. ORS § 652.150 penalty for failure to pay wages upon termination of $3,600.00 ($15.00 x 8 x 30)
3. ORS § 652.150 penalty for failure to pay minimum wages of$3,600.00 ($15.00x8x30)
4. FLSA liquidated damages of $413.25 ($7.25 x 57 hours) .
SCHEDULING
This Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. If objections are filed, any response is due fourteen (14) days from the date of the objections. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6. Parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order.