Opinion
No. CV02-0817245
October 3, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
On or about March 30, 2002, the plaintiff, Beverly Villanueva, instituted this action alleging that the defendant, Kenneth Tworzydlo, was negligent in the operation of a motor vehicle owned by the defendant, Mohawk Northeast, Inc., in an accident which resulted in personal injury to the plaintiff, a pedestrian. The accident occurred on or about June 1, 2000 in the vicinity of Capitol and Sisson Avenues in Hartford, Connecticut.
Pursuant to Practice Book Section 10-39, the defendants, Mohawk Northeast, Inc. and Kenneth Tworzydlo, have moved to strike the Second, Third and Fifth Counts of the plaintiff's Complaint and her accompanying prayer for relief seeking statutory damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The defendants claim these three counts and the prayer for relief are legally insufficient as none of these counts contains allegations to warrant a claim of recklessness. In Count Three, the plaintiff alleges a claim of common-law recklessness against the defendant operator, Tworzydlo. In Count Two, the plaintiff claims statutory recklessness pursuant to § 14-295 against Tworzydlo; in Count Five, the identical claim is alleged against the owner of the vehicle, Mohawk Northeast, Inc.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied (in an allegation) need not be expressly alleged." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000).
In the First Count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Tworzydlo was negligent "(a) By failing to keep proper control of his vehicle; (b) By failing to keep a proper lookout; (c) By driving at an unreasonable speed for the conditions of the road then and there prevailing; (d) By failing to turn his vehicle to keep it from hitting the plaintiff; (e) By making a right turn against a red control signal and in violation of a clearly posted prohibition against such turns; and (f) By not warning the plaintiff of the impending collision." The First Count also alleges, in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, that at the time, "defendant Tworzydlo proceeded to make an illegal right turn onto Sisson Avenue against a red control signal . . . struck the plaintiff as she was attempting to cross Sisson Avenue," and . . . struck the plaintiff with such force to knock her to the ground."
In the Second Count, the plaintiff alleges statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 by repeating the allegations contained in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the First Count, and further claiming, in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Second Count, that "[t]he defendant Tworzydlo deliberately or with reckless disregard operated said motor vehicle in violation of Sections 14-218a, 14-222, 14-299 and 14-300 and "said violations were substantial factors in causing the plaintiff's injuries." In the Fifth Count, the same factual claim of statutory recklessness is alleged against defendant Mohawk Northeast, Inc., the alleged owner of the vehicle, under a theory of vicarious liability. The plaintiff does not repeat the negligence allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of the First Count in either Count Two or Count Five.
In pertinent part General Statutes § 14-295 provides, "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury . . ."
Although no appellate court has ruled on the issue, there is a split of authority among the trial courts as to what constitutes sufficient pleading of a statutory recklessness claim. In both the Second and Fifth Counts, the plaintiff has correctly alleged deliberate and reckless violations by Tworzydlo, the operator, of two of the motor vehicle statutes enumerated in § 14-295, and that his conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff claims the defendant violated motor vehicle laws prohibiting traveling unreasonably fast and reckless driving, Sections 14-218a and 14-222. During committee debate on the legislation that would become § 14-295, Representative Robert Farr urged its passage, to provide for double or treble damages to recognize that the violations that are included within the bill are "very serious violations." Armstrong v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. 533947 (December 2, 1994, Sheldon, J.), ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 120, 121-22), citing Journal of Proceedings, House of Representatives, April 20, 1988, p. 87.
This court agrees with the majority of Superior Court decisions that have ruled that the only pleading requirements for a sufficient § 14-295 claim is to comply with the specifications in the statute, and the plaintiff has done so. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for relief as to Counts Two and Five therefore properly seeks double/treble damages, as allowed by General Statutes § 14-295. See, e.g., Florio v. DoCarmo, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV03-018367S (July 8, 2004, Matasavage, J.); Santana v. Bruce, Docket No. CV05-4008281S, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, (June 30, 2005, Miller, J.)
In the Third Count, the plaintiff alleges common-law recklessness against the defendant Tworzydlo by incorporating the allegations in paragraphs 6, 7 and of the First Count, and by further claiming, in Paragraph 13, that "[b]y failing to keep a proper lookout, by driving at an unreasonable speed for the conditions of the road then and there prevailing, by making a right turn against a red control signal in violation of a clearly posted prohibition on such turns, and by turning his vehicle and driving directly into the plaintiff, defendant Tworzydlo evinced a reckless disregard for human life." The allegations in the Third Count include some, but not all of the negligence allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of the First Count. The defendants claim this count should be stricken because it merely repeats the allegations sounding in negligence in the First Count. Although there is some similarity in language, Count Three does not contain three of the negligence allegations in Count One, and additionally, Count Three includes a claim that the defendant "evinced a reckless disregard for human life" by "turning his vehicle and driving directly into the plaintiff."
A cause of action of common-law recklessness may be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike even though the allegations of reckless conduct are also alleged as a basis of negligent conduct in another count sounding in negligence. The similarity of allegations does not necessarily render one cause of action invalid.
In Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 813 A.2d. 1003 (2003), the Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of a claim for common-law recklessness and noted, "We are guided by the Appellate Court's thoughtful statement of our relevant case law in deciding this issue. To determine whether the plaintiffs' amended complaint stated a cause of action sounding in recklessness, we look first to the definitions of wilful, wanton and reckless behavior. Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . . While we have attempted to draw definitional distinctions between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention. The defendants are mired in the fact that, aside from the addition of the words willful, wanton and/or reckless actions, the plaintiffs' allegations in their reckless counts mirror their assertions in the counts charging the defendants with negligence. Although there is a difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 262 Conn. 342-42.
"[T]here is no reason why the plaintiff, relying on the same set of facts in negligence counts, cannot set forth in separate counts, causes of action arising out of those same facts alleging recklessness." Adams v. Champagne, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. 061154 (May 27, 1998, Corradino, J.) (22 Conn. L. Rptr. 241-42). "It is frequently urged on this Court that the similarity of allegations renders one cause of action (usually, of course, the recklessness one) invalid. But similarity cannot be the sole focus. To so consider would often require a plaintiff to ratchet down the negligence claim in order to render more visible the conceptual space between the counts. Focus must instead primarily rest on the recklessness-sufficiency of that count." Haley v. Connecticut Light Power, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. 059027 (November 9, 1999, Nadeau, J.) "Rather than follow a mechanistic approach . . . it seems more appropriate . . . to examine instead whether the facts that are alleged could, under any set of facts admissible under the pleadings, support a conclusion of recklessness." Triano v. Fitzpatrick, M.D., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. 494828 (February 17, 2000, Graham, J.) ( 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 454). See also Drennan v. Geist, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV-99-00891 (January 29, 2002, Shapiro, J.).
In examining the nature of the transgressions alleged in Count Three, wherein the plaintiff is alleged to have been "struck with such force to knock her to the ground," including the additional assertion that the defendant "evinced a reckless disregard for human life" by "turning his vehicle and driving directly into the plaintiff," a number of factual scenarios might be implied as provable that would plausibly support a conclusion of recklessness. The plaintiff has adequately pled both statutory recklessness and common-law recklessness.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to strike Counts Two, Three and Five and the General Statutes § 14-295 prayer for relief is denied.
KELLER, J.