Opinion
CASE NO. 4:18-CV-116-CDL-MSH
11-27-2018
CARLOS H ANTUNEZ VILLAFUERTE, Petitioner, v. Warden, STEWART DETENTION CENTER, et. al., Respondents.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
Pending before the Court is Respondents' Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief (ECF Nos. 10, 1). For the reasons explained below it is recommended that Respondents' motion be granted and Petitioner's application for relief be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras. Pet. 5, ECF No. 1; Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 7, ECF No. 10-1. He first came to the United States as a 10-year-old unaccompanied minor. Pet. 5. On April 20, 2006, he was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. Id. at 5-6. He was granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") status on October 22, 2013. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 8. That status expired in October 2015. Pet. 6. Petitioner was arrested on August 7, 2017, in Raleigh, North Carolina for failure to appear in state court regarding various driving citations. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 7. In September 2017, he re-applied for DACA status. Id. at 1. On May 25, 2018, Petitioner's application for DACA was denied by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). Id. Meanwhile, he was taken into custody by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE') in December 2017. Id.
The Court received Petitioner's application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on June 10, 2018 (ECF No. 1). It was labeled "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus," but alleged four separate causes of action ("COAs"). The first COA was for "habeas corpus" release from detention. Id. 7-9. The second COA was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 553, and alleged that Respondents acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in denying Petitioner's DACA application, violated USCIS's procedures for processing such applications, and failed to follow the new rulemaking requirements of the APA to the extent they changed the requirements for DACA. Pet. 9-10. The third COA alleged that Respondents violated the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment by denying Petitioner's DACA application without adequate process. Id. at 10-11. The fourth COA requested attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). Id. at 11. Petitioner requested, among other things, declaratory and injunctive relief along with a release from custody. Id. at 3, 12.
On June 27, 2018, Petitioner was removed from the United States to Honduras. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 1. Respondents filed their motion to dismiss on July 10, 2018, contending that Petitioner's removal mooted his petition. Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 10. Petitioner filed a response opposing the motion on July 13, 2018, and Respondents replied on July 27, 2018 (ECF Nos. 11, 12).
DISCUSSION
I. Petitioner's Request for Habeas Relief
Petitioner's first COA seeks his release from detention under the authority of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Pet. 7-9. His removal from the country rendered this request moot.
"Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the consideration of 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Soliman v. United States, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding appeal moot where petitioner was removed from the United States). "The doctrine of mootness derives directly from the case or controversy limitation because 'an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.'" Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242 (citation omitted). "[P]ut another way, a cause is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Therefore, 'if events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed.'" Id. (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).
Removal from the United States pursuant to a final order of removal generally moots an alien's habeas challenge to his continued detention. See, e.g., Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1243-44. "However, dismissal after [removal] is not automatic; a habeas petition continues to present a live controversy after the petitioner's release or deportation when there is some remaining 'collateral consequence' that may be redressed by success on the petition." Martinez v. Sessions, No. 2:18-cv-58-FtM-99CM, 2018 WL 1830845, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2018) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998)).
Despite his removal from the country and release from detention, Petitioner argues his petition is not moot because he has suffered collateral consequences in the form of "concrete legal disadvantages." Pet'r's Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 11. He points to his COAs under the APA and Fifth Amendment as being disadvantaged. Id. Further, he asserts his deportation created a legal disadvantage to obtaining DACA because of the requirement of a continuous presence in the United States for DACA eligibility. Id. at 3.
Petitioner does not explain how his removal has placed him at a legal disadvantage as to these claims.
The collateral consequences identified by Petitioner, however, stem not from his detention but from the removal order. See Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding alien's inability to return to the United States to be a consequence of his removal order, not his detention); see also Jackson v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d 629, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying petitioner's request for declaratory judgment that his continued detention was unauthorized by the INA and/or violated the Fifth Amendment because "any continuing injury to the petitioner stems not from his detention, which has ended, but from the final removal order"). Petitioner did not challenge his removal order in this Court. Now that Petitioner has been removed and is no longer in custody, this Court can provide him with no meaningful relief. As such, dismissal is mandated. Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242.
Such a challenge would be in vain as "the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, divests this court of jurisdiction to hear any challenge to a final order of removal." Walcott v. Holder, No. 4:12-CV-259-CDL, 2013 WL 2405323, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 31, 2013). --------
II. Petitioner's APA and Non-Habeas Claims
In his second and third COAs, Petitioner alleges Respondents violated the APA and Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment in processing his DACA application. Pet. 9-11. Specifically, he alleges Respondents failed to issue a "Notice of Intent to Deny" before denying his application as required by USCIS procedures. Petitioner asserts he should have been given notice of insufficiencies in the application and an opportunity to respond prior to the denial. Pet. 10. He also contends that if Respondents changed the requirements under the DACA program, they failed to follow the new rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Id. Finally, Petitioner alleges Respondents violated his due process rights by denying his application without providing sufficient notice of their intent to deny, an explanation for the denial, and an opportunity to respond. Id. at 11. Petitioner requests a declaration that the denial of his DACA application was unconstitutional and entry of an order "restoring" his DACA status pending re-adjudication of his application and directing Respondents to comply with USCIS's rules and regulations while processing his application. Pet. 12.
These claims are not cognizable here. Petitioner initiated this case as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and paid the applicable $5.00 filing fee (ECF No. 1). "[H]abeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention. Its sole function is to grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose." Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1976). Further, "it cannot be utilized as a base for the review of a refusal to grant collateral administrative relief or as a springboard to adjudicate matters foreign to the question of the legality of custody." Id. at 936. "[T]he only relief available via a habeas corpus action is immediate or speedier release from custody." Lashley v. Gonzalez, No. 1:07-CV-1589-JTC, 2007 WL 2908652, at *1n.1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2007) (citing Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)).
The cause of Petitioner's detention was his removal order and arrest by ICE under that order—not the USCIS's denial of his DACA application. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 1. In fact, Petitioner was taken into DHS/ICE custody at least five months prior to the denial of his DACA application. Id. Even assuming the denial of DACA played a role in his continued detention, Petitioner's removal and release from custody mooted any challenge to that detention. Petitioner has obtained all the relief this court can grant.
Converting Petitioner's habeas petition into a civil action would be inappropriate. The filing fee for a habeas petition is $5.00, while it is $400.00 for a civil complaint. Therefore, the Court recommends that the petition be dismissed, in its entirety, without prejudice. If Petitioner wishes to pursue his non-habeas COAs with a civil complaint, he can do so in the proper venue upon pre-payment of the appropriate filing fee or application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Lall v. Ortiz, No. 18-2793(RBK), 2018 WL 5980445, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2018) (refusing to recharacterize habeas petition as civil complaint under APA).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, it is recommended that Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be dismissed and Respondents' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) be granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED, this 27th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE