Opinion
A147521
04-21-2017
BRENDA E. VILLAFRANCO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STANLEY CHARLES, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SFL-70300)
In this marital dissolution case, husband appeals from an order following a long-scheduled evidentiary hearing, a hearing at which husband was self-represented, his attorney having substituted out two weeks before the hearing. The appeal makes essentially one contention, that the trial court erred in refusing husband's oral request at the hearing for a continuance. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The record on appeal is sparse: a one-volume, 79-page reporter's transcript, and a clerk's transcript consisting of 44 pages, almost all of which are materials from December 15, 2015 forward. So, it is difficult to ascertain precisely what developed below, and we piece together most of the background from the register of actions, and what we can glean from it and the one transcript of the hearing. Thus:
Appellant Stanley Charles and respondent Brenda Villafranco were married on September 20, 2013, following "going out" for some nine years. The marriage did not last long, as on May 26, 2015, Villafranco filed a petition for dissolution.
Charles is the self-employed owner of Charles Tax and Financials. Villafranco worked at the business for some period of time, among other things training employees. At some point, Villafranco stopped working to become a "home stay mom" to their newborn son.
As noted, in May 2015, representing herself, Villafranco filed a petition for dissolution with minor child, followed shortly by an amended petition. And on June 4, Villafranco filed a request for domestic violence restraining order, on which hearing was set for June 23. This, too, was filed by Villafranco herself.
On June 10, also representing himself, Charles filed his response to the domestic violence petition, and on June 18, his response to the amended petition.
On June 23, attorney Kent Bulloch substituted in as attorney for Charles, and the hearing on the domestic violence petition was held before the Honorable Robert Boyd. Judge Boyd found the incident did not rise to the level of domestic violence, and denied the restraining order.
On July 8, attorney C. Boyd Terre substituted in to represent Villafranco, and both sides were now represented by counsel.
On July 30, the matter came on for what the register of actions calls "review, child custody, visitation, child support," before the Honorable Bradford DeMeo. Both Villafranco and Charles were represented by counsel. After a conference in which attorney Bulloch updated the situation, Judge DeMeo heard argument, following which he made various orders, including setting a custody schedule and a schedule for visitation. Judge DeMeo's order concluded as follows:
"After 60 days on this schedule the parties shall amend visitation to reasonable visitation working toward a more balanced custody schedule.
"All other details in the Family Court Services recommendation are ordered.
"The parties are ordered to meet and confer within 60 days to agree [to] a parenting plan moving forward.
"Respondent[']s counsel is to prepare and submit [a] formal order for Court[']s signature.
"CONTINUED FROM 07/30/2015 TO - 08/27/2015 at 8:30am S23, REVIEW, CHILD SUPPORT with reporter [¶] . . . [¶]
"CONTINUED FROM 07/30/2015 TO PARENTING PLAN - 10/08/2015 at 8:30am S23, REVIEW, CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION, OTHER with reporter."
On August 26, the August 27 hearing was continued to October 8, on which date the matter came on for hearing before Judge DeMeo, again for "review, child custody, visitation, child support." Again, both sides were represented by counsel. As to what there occurred, the register of actions reads as follows:
"Court and counsel discuss issues. Counsel requests an evidentiary hearing, Court makes temporary orders as follows:
"Court orders Respondent to pay child support of $1228.
"Court orders Respondent to pay spousal support of $1448.
"Payment for October is due immediately, Court reserves on balances due for August and September.
"Court orders both parties to exchange all bank account statements and to file current Income and Expense declarations no later than 10 days prior to the date set for evidentiary hearing.
"Father is ordered to provide proof of expenses claimed, e.g. cancelled checks for software fees, legal expenses, [N]etflix bills.
"Mother is ordered to provide proof of her school enrollment and progress reports from school.
"Court reserves jurisdiction to retroactively adjust support according to proof provided.
"Father shall have additional visits every other Thursday from 10am to 6pm.
"All other current orders remain in full force and effect.
"Father shall register for the Court Ordered class by 10/15/15.
"Both parties shall sign an authorization for their Co-Parent Counselor to provide a report to the Court.
"SETTING ORDER
"Petitioner[']s counsel is to prepare and submit formal order for Court[']s signature.
"CONTINUED FROM 10/08/2015 TO [¶] STATUS OF PARENTING CLASSES - 12/15/2015 at 9:00am S23, REVIEW, CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION, CHILD SUPPORT, COMPLIANCE, OTHER with reporter."
On November 5, Judge DeMeo filed his findings and order after hearing.
Of particular significance is the portion of the order that the parties were to "exchange all bank account statements and to file current Income and Expense declarations no later than 10 days prior to the date set for evidentiary hearing," which hearing was set for December 15.
On November 6, Villafranco filed her income and expense declaration, and on December 3 her supplemental declaration. The next day, December 4, Villafranco filed a "Statement of Issues/Settle Conf or Trial."
Meanwhile, on December 2, attorney Bulloch substituted out as attorney for Charles. He was once again representing himself.
That gets us to December 15, the hearing at which Judge DeMeo did what he did—and made the rulings about which Charles complains on appeal.
The hearing began with Judge DeMeo asking if the parties were ready to proceed. Charles answered, "Yes." Then, prior to actually proceeding, Villafranco's attorney said that there was "one pretrial motion," going on to explain that she had "just [been] handed a profit and loss statement" and it was late. Colloquy followed, in which Charles attempted to explain about his efforts to communicate with his former attorney, and his apparent effort to obtain new counsel, Rudy Bonilla. Judge DeMeo ultimately ruled that he was "granting the motion . . . to exclude."
Charles's brief describes that Charles "showed up at the trial with an armload of financial documents to support his arguments." Nothing is cited in claimed support, and as quoted the document was described as a "profit and loss statement."
Immediately following Judge DeMeo's ruling on the motion to exclude, this brief exchange occurred:
"MR. CHARLES: Can we reschedule so I can have some time?
"And I also was sick for the past few weeks and had surgery and whatnot.
"Can we rescheduled [sic] so they can have a chance to look at it?
"I really provide [sic] everything I had to Mr. Bulloch. I don't even have like my file from him. I provided—as far as the financial part, I know how to do it. I know all the documents I have, and they were all taken care of because that's what I do in the office, make sure I have all the financials.
"I would just ask if we can give it a couple days because I have **serving with me. [sic] I've never
"THE COURT: Well, we don't have a couple days. The next available date for trial is all the way in March. We're booked up. We have nothing but this morning and then another day in March. So we're impacted.
"MS. HERNANDEZ [counsel for Villafranco]: Your Honor, we object on several grounds:
"One is that, like I said, we have been very flexible with attempting to reschedule. There was an e-mail sent to your judicial assistant when we found out that Mr. Charles might be needing to turn himself into jail and would not be available. So, we were flexible and we alerted Ms. Missy Lemley on November 20th and copied Mr. Bulloch. I received no response. I sent Mr. Bulloch . . . a letter on November 30th again suggesting that we move it and I received no response. I had a telephone conversation with Mr. Rudy Bonilla on December 8th and agreed to moving today's date because he was going to be out and not be in town. He's actually gonna be leaving I believe Thursday. And so the suggestion was that we would have a meeting in my office and move out the evidentiary hearing to when the court was next available and then found out that Mr. Bonilla was not going to be able to represent Mr. Charles is what I was told. And so that's why we did not reschedule today.
"On top of all of this, Mr. Charles is not current with his support payments. He's over six thousand in arrears, and that's not counting September because there was no order made in September. So, to move it out would prejudice my client.
"THE COURT: I'm going to deny the request to continue the matter. We will proceed today.
"So, Ms. Hernandez, you may proceed."
That is the sum total of Charles's request for continuance, denial of which Charles asserts was error.
Judge DeMeo then heard testimony from Charles, called under Evidence Code section 776 as a witness on behalf of Villafranco. Charles testified among other things to his 2014 income and to various expenses he had incurred.
Villafranco then took the stand and testified in some detail to her relationship with Charles, including her working at his business. Charles then cross-examined her.
Charles then testified on his own behalf, being given great leeway by Judge DeMeo, including allowing a seven-page narration. Following cross-examination, Charles testified on redirect for some three pages of narrative.
Following a brief recess, Charles then called Villafranco as his witness, going on to cross-examine her for 10 pages.
Finally, Charles said he had more evidence to present, to "clarify a couple of things she mentioned." Two more pages of narrative by Charles followed.
Judge DeMeo then heard some discussion about the evidence, in the course of which Villafranco's attorney described where Villafranco's evidence—her calculations—came from: "My calculations have been based on documentation that he himself [i.e., Charles] has provided. He has not provided any documentation other than very limited profit and loss statements, and every time we come to court he provides a different profit and loss statement. He doesn't provide an income and expense declaration, he doesn't provide any back up for these profit and loss statements. So for him to say that my calculations are incorrect, they're based on information that he's providing and he's not providing any back up even though he's been court ordered to do it. I would have ordered or I would have propounded discovery on him had the court not ordered him to provide the documentation at the last hearing, but because the court ordered all of the documents that I was requesting—that I would have requested, I didn't go through the expense of doing formal discovery. And he's still not complying with the court order."
Judge DeMeo responded: "I understand. I'm going to stop it right here. We've gone way beyond on the issue. The issue is that he has not seen your calculations supposedly, but at this point, again, you know, your choice of lawyers is what you're stuck with and not fair to stop them from presenting their case because they don't have any control over your choice. [¶] So, what I'm going to do is I'm going to have the parties give their final closing argument and then I'll take the matter under submission."
Judge DeMeo then heard closing argument, including eight pages from Charles. He then took the matter under submission.
On December 17, Judge DeMeo issued his statement of decision. It was detailed indeed, providing in pertinent part as follows:
"This Statement of Decision addresses the following issues:
"Child support, spousal support, arrears, imputation of income, parenting plan and attorney fees.
"In this document the Court announces its Statement of Decision on the issues presented to the Court. Pending further order(s) or entry of Judgment, this Statement of Decision constitutes the temporary orders of the Court.
"Credibility of Witnesses
"The credibility of witnesses is one of the important and crucial parts of this trial. The Court listened to all testimony presented. Pursuant to California Evidence Code section 780, the Court will make findings based on the credibility of witnesses and how much weight to be given to their testimony and opinions.
"Determination of Disputed Factual Issues:
"Determination of Income: The Court must determine the income of each party in order to set child support, spousal support and attorney fees.
"Respondent has not filed an income and expense declaration in this case. He did provide a profit and loss statement for his tax practice covering January through August of 2015. He claims that as a tax preparer that all of his income comes in the first half of the year, but his expenses extend throughout the entire 12 month calendar year.
"Petitioner worked for Respondent for several years and is intimately familiar with the business and Respondent's accounting practices.
"Petitioner presented evidence of Respondent's annual income. She introduced into evidence, without objection, Respondent's 2014 tax return showing that he earned $117,000 gross income. She testified that in recent years he has averaged an annual income of $139,772 per year. Many business deductions were taken on the 2014 tax return reducing Respondent's income for that year to $58,478. However, Petitioner demonstrated by testimony and other evidence that Respondent wrote down many personal expenses through his business. After the add-backs, Petitioner demonstrated Respondent's current earning capacity to be approximately $9,600 per month net of business expenses and allowable personal expenses.
"Respondent testified that he has used credit cards and money from family to pay his bills in 2015. However, he took two trips to Haiti, one financed by his family and the other he paid himself, and has paid his criminal attorney $25,000 in retainers prior to July 2015. The Court will impute monthly income to Respondent in the amount of $9,600 per month net of business expenses for purposes of calculating guideline child support and spousal support.
"Child Support:
"Without a court order, or agreement with Petitioner, Respondent has unilaterally deducted amounts from his child support payments for his voluntary payment of Petitioner's cell phone bill, and car payments. This court does not approve these deductions. Respondent is in arrears. After imputing income of $9,600 to Respondent child support shall be $1,493.00 per month from and after August 1, 2015. Respondent has paid a total of $8,426.49 from August through December as payment on both child support and spousal support. Applying one half of the amount paid to child support, Respondent is in arrears of child support in the amount of $3,252.00.
"Spousal Support:
"Without a court order, or agreement with Petitioner, Respondent has unilaterally deducted amounts from his spousal support payments for his voluntary payment of Petitioner's cell phone bill, and obligations payments. This court does not approve these deductions. Respondent is in arrears for spousal support. After imputing income of $9,600 to Respondent spousal support shall be $1,749.00 per month from and after August 1, 2015. Respondent has paid a total of $8,426.49 from August through December as payment on both child support and spousal support. Applying one half of the amount paid to spousal support, Respondent is in arrears of spousal support in the amount of $4,532.00.
"Arrears:
"The evidence shows that Respondent's spousal support and child support payments are in arrears in the amount of $7,784.00 at the time of this hearing. Arrears shall be paid in monthly increments of $500 beginning January 1, 2016. This amount shall be paid on the first day of each month starting January 1, 2016. . . .
"Attorney Fees:
"Petitioner provided evidence that she has incurred attorney fees in this matter as a result of Respondent's failure to comply with court orders and his arrears in paying child support and spousal support requiring this hearing. This court considered the factors set out in Family Code §§ 2030-2032 and § 4320.
"The court finds that Petitioner clearly has a need for attorney fees, and Respondent has the ability to pay attorney fees on behalf of petitioner. There is a huge disparity in income between the parties with Respondent earning significant income and Petitioner not. Therefore, upon evidence presented to the satisfaction of the court, Petitioner is awarded $10,000 in attorney fees. Said fees shall be paid monthly in the amount of $500 until paid in full. This amount shall be paid on the first day of each month starting January 1, 2016. . . .
"Custody and Parenting Time:
"Respondent missed some visits with his child in November. He traveled to Haiti and did not inform Petitioner that he would not be present for his visits. Nonetheless, he authorized his sister to retrieve his child during the entire time he was out of the country. He arranged this without telling Petitioner, and without a court order authorizing such arrangement leaving the child's mother to believe the child was with him each time. The court finds this to be an extremely bad parenting choice and very bad parenting judgment. Respondent has not attended the parenting classes previously ordered. During the Thanksgiving Holiday there was confusion for the exchange of the child the parties argued to the court that the other was at fault. The court finds that the failed exchange is very sad for the sake of the child and admonishes both parents to make extra effort to be sure the child has his holiday time as scheduled.
"In light of Respondent's poor parenting choice, this court is ordering his visits with the child reduced to Saturdays from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. every weekend. There will be no further weekday visits as Respondent indicated that even though he can control his work schedule as a self-employed individual, he has plans to set up a play room at his office to occupy the child on weekdays implying that he will not be with the child at all times.
"The child shall not be left alone with Respondent's brother Jerald Charles, Jr. at any time. Both parties shall be present at all exchanges. Exchanges shall be silent and civil.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
On December 23, Villafranco filed a request for clarification of the statement of decision. Judge DeMeo filed his response on December 28, denying most of what was sought by Villafranco.
On January 25, Judge DeMeo filed his findings and orders after hearing.
On January 22, 2016, once again represented by counsel, Charles filed his notice of appeal, appealing from the statement of decision and the response to request for clarification.
DISCUSSION
Charles is represented on appeal by counsel, who has filed the briefs on Charles's behalf. The opening brief describes the issues presented as follows:
"1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant a continuance of the trial to find new counsel.
"2. Whether the trial court's denial of a continuance to Appellant had the effect of denying him the due process right of the assistance of counsel, since he would be unable to retain counsel without a continuance.
"3. Whether the appellate court should vacate the Statement of Decision, filed on December 17, 2015, and the Court's Response to Petitioner's Request for Clarification re Statement of Decision, filed on December 28, 2015, and remand the matter for trial."
Charles's opening brief is unusual, if not unique, in one significant respect: nowhere in the brief, nowhere in connection with any of the "issues presented," is there any argument attempting to show just where, or how, the statement of decision was wrong—where there was error. The closest it comes is this: "The child support, spousal support, and attorney fee awards were incorrect. Even though Appellant's complete financial evidence was available to opposing counsel and to the trial court, the Dissomaster Report attached to the Statement of Decision filed on December 17, 2015 was inaccurate, because it did not include $31,453.00 in mortgage interest, even though the mortgage interest figure was available in the parties' 2014 income tax return. In addition, the trial court did not calculate Appellant's net income properly."
Charles's reply brief is no better, stating on page four that "[t]he effect of denying Appellant his request for one continuance was that spousal support, child support, and an award of attorney fees to Respondent were improperly calculated, which was a miscarriage of justice and an abuse of discretion." And on the next page, this: "The court based its decision regarding child support, spousal support, and attorney fees on Appellant's 2014 income tax return and testimony by Respondent. Evidence of Appellant's current income was excluded by a Motion in Limine. The 2014 income tax return did not accurately reflect Appellant's true income at the time of the trial on December 15, 2015. The Statement of Decision states that the 2014 income tax return came in without objection, which is no surprise, since Appellant admittedly did not know what he was doing when he represented himself at the trial."
This last statement is misleading, as the tax return not only came in without objection, it came in with the full blessing of Charles. The facts include that Villafranco testified she had been "the office manager" for Charles's business, including "training the employees" for four years. Villafranco then authenticated their joint 2014 tax return, and her attorney moved to admit it in evidence. This colloquy followed:
"THE COURT: Any objections?
"MR. CHARLES: I'm not sure what that means.
"THE COURT: Well, it's the copy you have there and what they're looking at. Any objections to it being admitted into evidence?
"MR. CHARLES: No. Everything good with it.
"THE COURT: Okay. Then petitioner's number 1 is received into evidence."
This is hardly sufficient.
The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that an appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct. "All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown." (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) In accordance with that presumption, Charles's burden on appeal requires him to affirmatively show error—and error that is prejudicial.
This is how the leading appellate treatise describes it:
"Appellant's burden also includes the obligation to present argument and legal authority on each point raised. This requires more than simply stating a bare assertion that the judgment, or part of it, is erroneous and leaving it to the appellate court to figure out why; it is not the appellate court's role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. [See Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 [Cal.App.]4th 344, 368—'This court is not inclined to act as counsel . . . for . . . any appellant and furnish a legal argument as to how the trial court's rulings . . . constituted an abuse of discretion' (internal quotes omitted); see also Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. [(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939,] 956.]
"When appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, the court may treat it as waived and pass it without consideration. [People v. Stanley (1995) 10 [Cal.]4th 764, 793; Salas v. California Dept. of Transp. (2011) 198 [Cal.App.]4th 1058, 1074; see EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 [Cal.App.]4th 770, 775—issue deemed waived where appellants failed to support claim by argument, discussion, analysis or citation to record, or to include any trial proceedings in appellate record . . . .]" (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 8:17.1, p. 8-6.)
In sum, Charles's briefs fail to show how he was supposedly harmed by the order that Judge DeMeo entered following the December 15 hearing. Put otherwise, any claim of error in denying the continuance could be considered waived.
But even if Charles's brief was sufficient to raise the first two issues presented—denial of continuance issues that are necessarily related—they would fail. Charles does not demonstrate that Judge DeMeo erred, that he abused his discretion.
To briefly recap the facts, on October 8, Judge DeMeo set the matter for evidentiary hearing on December 15, with the relevant financial information to be exchanged and filed by December 5. Villafranco filed her material. Charles did not. Meanwhile, on December 2, 13 days before the hearing, Charles's attorney withdrew. Charles did nothing at that point to alert the court or move to continue the hearing. That is the background against which Charles's arguments are made, arguments that Judge DeMeo's denial of a continuance was an abuse of discretion, denying Charles "The Due Process Right of the Assistance of Counsel." By no means.
Continuances are governed by the California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 (rule 3.1332) of which provides in relevant part as follows: "To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain." (Rule 3.1332(a).) Subsection (c) then goes on: "Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance." (Rule 3.1332(c).)
The Government Code is similar: it is the trial court's responsibility to "[c]ommence trials on the date scheduled" and "[a]dopt and utilize a firm, consistent policy against continuances, to the maximum extent possible and reasonable, in all stages of the litigation." (Gov. Code, § 68607, subds. (f), (g).) The reason is that public policy favors prompt disposition of civil litigation. There is "no policy . . . of indulgence or liberality in favor of parties seeking continuances." (County of San Bernardino v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 776, 781.)
In light of all this, whether to grant a continuance generally rests within the trial court's broad discretion. (Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1603; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395.) That discretion was not abused here.
Charles asserts that "Among the examples of good cause itemized by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 are '[t]he unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances' and '[a] significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial.' (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c)(3), (7).)" And Charles goes on, "The withdrawal or illness of counsel constitutes good cause for a continuance of the trial date. Forrest v. Department of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 183, 199, disapproved on other grounds in Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1172 (withdrawal); Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246 (illness)." Maybe so. But that does not mean that a continuance is mandated here.
To begin with, subdivision (c)(4) of rule 3.1332 states that good cause for a continuance could be "The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice." Appellant testified that he and his former attorney Bulloch "weren't communicating too well." But he had time to seek other trial counsel, as he attempted to do when he spoke with attorney Bonilla. And Charles's choice to then appear at trial without counsel is not Villafranco's or Judge DeMeo's fault. It should not prejudice Villafranco by causing her to incur additional attorney fees and costs—not to mention delay any hearing until March, for three or more months while Charles was in arrears.
Charles's brief asserts that his "fundamental right to representation and due process was violated. [Charles] was required against his will to appear at trial in pro per, a stranger in a strange land, and was clobbered. [Charles] went to court to seek evenhanded justice; but instead of being treated with impartiality, [Charles] was railroaded through the system." We read the record differently.
Throughout the hearing, Judge DeMeo ensured that Charles was provided with clear instructions as to what was occurring, for example, providing Charles with an explanation of the differences between an opening statement and a closing argument, guiding him with testimony during the evidentiary portion of the hearing, and answering his question prior to admitting an exhibit into evidence. Charles was provided a fair trial by an impartial judicial officer. He was not "railroaded."
Finally, even if there had been error in denying the continuance—which Charles has not shown—such error would not compel reversal. That is because Charles must show not only error, but prejudicial error, a rule that derives from both the state constitution and statutes. Thus, California Constitution, article VI, section 13, mandates that a ruling will not be set aside unless it results in "a miscarriage of justice." Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 475 provides that courts must disregard any error "which . . . does not affect the substantial rights of the parties," and no appealed judgment or order shall be "reversed or affected by reason of any error, ruling, instruction, or defect" unless the record demonstrates that the error was "prejudicial" and caused appellant "substantial injury" and that a "different result would have been probable."
Charles has not met this significant burden, and his appeal must fail. (Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069; see Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 308-310 [reversal not required where appellant failed to meet its burden to show prejudicial error of trial court's exclusion of documents from administrative record and failed to seek writ review]; see also Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 ["Nor will this court act as counsel for appellant by furnishing a legal argument as to how the trial court's ruling was prejudicial"].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Villafranco shall recover her costs on appeal.
/s/_________
Richman, Acting P.J.
We concur:
/s/_________
Stewart, J.
/s/_________
Miller, J.