Summary
In Vijil, our court reversed and remanded the Commission's denial of benefits to a claimant who reported to the hospital with what he thought was a heart attack/stroke but later learned that he had neck and back injuries along with degenerative disc disease.
Summary of this case from Kimble v. Labor Force, Inc.Opinion
No. CA11-1264
05-23-2012
ALBARO VIJIL APPELLANT v. SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP., ST. PAUL TRAVELERS, and SECOND INJURY FUND APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
[NO. F609346]
REVERSED AND REMANDED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON , Judge
Appellant Albaro Vijil appeals from a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying his claim for benefits. Vijil contends that he sustained a compensable injury to his neck while lifting heavy tools at Schlumberger Technology Corporation. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits, finding that Vijil had not proven a causal connection between his injury and his employment. The Commission affirmed. On appeal, Vijil argues that the Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
This is the second time this case has come before us. In Vijil v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 2011 Ark. App. 87, we reversed and remanded to the Commission for the entry of additional findings. This appeal arises from the Commission's order upon remand.
Vijil has been employed by appellee Schlumberger Technology Corp., a company that does work in the oil and gas industry, since 2005. On July 2, 2006, Vijil was unloading large, heavy tools off a truck and onto a platform when he felt a "twitch" or a "muscle spasm" in the midsection of his back. Although he was able to finish his shift, he began experiencing numbness in his left leg over the next two weeks. When the numbness began to spread to his left hand and his chest, he feared he might be experiencing the symptoms of an impending heart attack or stroke, and he saw a cardiologist, Dr. Julio Schwarz, on July 25, 2006. Dr. Schwarz could not find anything wrong vascularly with Vijil but indicated that Vijil was clearly suffering from some type of neuropathy. As a result, Dr. Schwarz referred Vijil to Dr. William Griggs, a neurologist.
At his appointment with Dr. Griggs, Vijil reported that he was experiencing back pain, a sense of pressure to the left of his spine in his lower back, and numbness and tingling in his left leg and arm. Concluding that Vijil had "a clear-cut peripheral neuropathy," Dr. Griggs ordered an MRI of his cervical spine.
Dr. Michael Standefer performed an MRI scan of Vijil's cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine and discovered that Vijil had disc herniations at C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7 and a small disc protrusion at C7-T1 and at C3-4. The MRI also revealed central canal stenosis and multilevel degenerative changes. The thoracic MRI also demonstrated degenerative change and disc bulging at L4-5. Due to the "severe cord compression" and ruptured disc at C5-6, Dr. Standefer recommended prompt surgical intervention.
Vijil subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim, and a hearing was held before an ALJ on April 30, 2009, to determine whether he had sustained a compensable injury. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an opinion filed on July 29, 2009, denying Vijil's claim for benefits. The ALJ found that Vijil had demonstrated that he had objective findings of difficulties with his cervical spine, as shown by the medical records, and that he had established the existence of physical injury by medical evidence. However, the ALJ determined that Vijil had failed to prove that his medically established and objectively documented injuries met the definition of a compensable injury found in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2009).
Specifically, the ALJ found that Vijil failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a causal relationship existed between the incident he alleged had occurred at work and his cervical-spine difficulties. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ emphasized that Vijil's visit to Dr. Standefer on September 5, 2006, was the first occasion on which Vijil reported his belief that his difficulties were related to an incident at work. The ALJ noted that this visit was more than two months after the alleged injury on July 2, 2006, and that Vijil had not previously attributed his injury to a work-related incident. The ALJ, however, failed to discuss the deposition testimony of Travis Rushing, Vijil's co-worker, who testified by deposition that Vijil had reported that he had injured himself on the job the day of the incident.
Rushing stated that, although he was not certain of the exact date, he remembered a day when Vijil mentioned that his back and the side of his leg were hurting. Rushing said that he knew the conversation was the day before they went to a training school, and that he remembered that Vijil said that he was putting a tool on the truck when he hurt his back. Vijil testified that the training school began on July 4, 2006, thus placing the date on which he told Rushing of his work-related injury as July 3, 2006.
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Vijil filed a timely notice of appeal of the ALJ's decision. On March 17, 2010, the Commission entered an opinion affirming and adopting the ALJ's decision. Vijil then filed a timely notice of appeal of that decision to this court on April 15, 2010. We reversed and remanded for additional findings because the Commission found that Vijil had not reported that his injuries were work-related prior to September 5, 2006, despite Rushing's testimony to the contrary. Because the Commission did not discuss Rushing's testimony in its opinion, we could not discern whether the Commission simply found Rushing's testimony to be unbelievable or whether his testimony was overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily.
On remand, the ALJ again denied benefits. This time, the ALJ discussed Rushing's testimony but held that his testimony did not provide the required causal connection between Vijil's objectively found cervical difficulties and the alleged incident. The ALJ held that (1) because the twitch Vijil described at the time of the alleged incident was in the middle of his back and not his cervical spine, it was far too remote in body location from the cervical spine to prove the required causal relationship by a preponderance of the evidence and (2) his failure to report the incident to his supervisor or treating physicians made it improbable that a causal relationship existed.
The Commission once again affirmed and adopted the findings of the ALJ in a 2-1 decision. The dissenting commissioner found that Vijil's credible testimony, which was corroborated by Rushing, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Vijil sustained a compensable injury to his cervical spine on July 2, 2006. Further, the Commissioner found that the fact that Vijil initially believed he was suffering a cardiac event due to left-sided numbness was reasonable. Finally, the dissenting commissioner found that Vijil's initial complaint of pain in his mid-back was not fatal to his claim, because cervical injuries can refer pain to many parts of the body and the ALJ's determination otherwise was based on his own nonmedical conclusion rather than actual medical evidence.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Commission's decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of the claim. When reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Raulston v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 272, _ S.W.3d _. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; even if a preponderance of the evidence might indicate a contrary result, if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. St. Joseph's Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Redmond, 2012 Ark. App. 7, _ S.W.3d _. The Commission is required to weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party. Keller v. L.A. Darling Fixtures, 40 Ark. App. 94, 845 S.W.2d 15 (1992).
To receive workers' compensation benefits, a claimant must establish (1) that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, (2) that the injury caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services, (3) that there is medical evidence supported by objective findings establishing the injury, and (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by the time and place of the occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (Supp. 2009). As the claimant, appellant bears the burden of proving a compensable injury by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9- 102(4)(E)(i) (Supp. 2009). Compensation must be denied if the claimant fails to prove any one of these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. Rippe v. Delbert Hooten Logging, 100 Ark. App. 227, 266 S.W.3d 217 (2007) (citing Mikel v. Engineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997)).
"In order to prove a compensable injury [the claimant] must prove, among other things, a causal relationship between his employment and the injury." Searcy Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 72, 110 S.W.3d 306, 308 (2003) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Westbrook, 77 Ark. App. 167, 171, 72 S.W.3d 889, 892 (2002)). The determination of whether a causal connection exists is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. Jeter v. B.R. McGinty Mech., 62 Ark. App. 53, 968 S.W.2d 645 (1998).
In the present case, the Commission, by adopting the findings of the ALJ, determined that Vijil had failed to prove a causal connection between his injury and his employment because (1) the symptoms Vijil reported at the time of the alleged injury were far too remote in body location from the cervical spine and, therefore, were not indicative of a cervical spine injury and (2) his failure to report the incident to his supervisor or treating physicians made it improbable that a causal relationship existed.
Vijil, however, argues that he did not report the incident at work to the cardiologist because he was unaware that he had injured his cervical spine; rather, his concern at that time was that the numbness he was experiencing was indicative of a stroke or a heart attack. Schlumberger responds that Vijil's description of what he experienced at the time of the alleged injury—the "mid-back twitch"—was "too remote from the cervical spine" to prove a causal relationship. Schlumberger also points out the contradictory testimony of Richard Pearson, who testified that Vijil told him that his limp came from an injury he sustained while he was working for FedEx.
We must once again reverse and remand to the Commission for a determination of whether benefits should be awarded. The Commission in this case determined that, due to their locations, the symptoms described by Vijil could not be causally related to his cervical spine injury. However, nothing in the record negates the possibility of a causal relationship. Thus, this is a medical conclusion not supported by the record before us.
Reversed and remanded.
PITTMAN and BROWN, JJ., agree.