Summary
affirming revocation order and sentences in Anders appeal but remanding for amendment of revocation order to indicate conditions found to have been violated
Summary of this case from J.K. v. StateOpinion
Case No. 2D19-4504
03-10-2021
Maurice Arsenio VIDANA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
SILBERMAN, Judge.
In this appeal filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Maurice Arsenio Vidana, after admitting to violations of probation and entering guilty pleas, challenges the revocation of his probation and resulting sentences in two circuit court cases, 16-CF-13306 and 16-CF-13554, and challenges his judgments and sentences on new law offenses in two circuit court cases, 19-CF-3648 and 19-CF-3904. We affirm in all respects but remand for amendment of the revocation order and note that the affirmance is without prejudice to file an appropriate postconviction motion on a sentencing issue, as discussed below.
As to the two revocation cases, 16-CF-13306 and 16-CF-13554, a single revocation order was entered for both cases. Because the revocation order does not state the conditions of probation that Vidana violated, we remand for the revocation order to be amended to indicate the conditions violated. See Hamiter v. State, 290 So. 3d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (remanding for an amended revocation order in an Anders appeal when the revocation order did not state the condition violated); Freeman v. State, 225 So. 3d 929, 930 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (remanding in an Anders appeal for entry of an amended revocation order that specified the conditions the defendant admitted to violating). Otherwise, we affirm the revocation order and sentences in 16-CF-13306 and 16-CF-13554.
As to the cases on the new law offenses, 19-CF-3648 and 19-CF-3904, our review indicates that the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence with a ten-year minimum mandatory for felon in possession of a firearm in 19-CF-3904. Because Vidana had a prior conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, the parties agreed that a ten-year minimum mandatory applied. Section 775.087(2)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2018), specifically provides for a three-year minimum mandatory for the offense of felon in possession of a firearm. "However, if an offender who is convicted of the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon has a previous conviction of committing or attempting to commit a felony listed in s. 775.084(1)(b)1. and actually possessed a firearm or destructive device during the commission of the prior felony, the offender shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years." § 775.087(2)(a) 1. Section 775.084(1)(b)1 does not list felon in possession of a firearm as an enumerated offense.
Because Vidana did not preserve any issues for review, we affirm the judgments and sentences in 19-CF-3648 and 19-CF-3904 without prejudice to any right Vidana may have to file an appropriate postconviction motion with respect to his ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in case 19-CF-3904. See Young v. State, 988 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
Affirmed and remanded.
NORTHCUTT and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.