Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-2287, SECTION "C"(3).
April 15, 2002
Before the Court is the United States' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). After reviewing the record, the arguments of counsel for the United States and of Plaintiffs, and the relevant law, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is hereby GRANTED.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
On August 3, 2000, Plaintiffs, each appearing pro se, filed suit in this Court, (1) seeking a refund for their 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 federal tax years and (2) contesting tax deficiencies asserted by Defendant. See Rec. Doc. 1. On February 14, 2002, the United States filed this motion, alleging that to the extent Plaintiffs seek (1) nothing more than a judicial redetermination of their federal income tax liability for the tax years in question, such relief would constitute a declaratory judgment, which is prohibited by the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and (2) a refund of federal income tax, such a claim should be dismissed because, inter alia, Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege that they have fully paid their assessed taxes for the years at issue. See Rec. Doc. 19. The Court agrees with the government on both counts.
A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176 n. 7, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980). Such a complaint must be liberally construed. See Callahan v. Commissioner, No. 99-0295-C-M1, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7195, at *2 n. 1 (M.D. La. Apr. 6, 2000). Pro se litigants are not entitled, however, "to special treatment beyond the broad reading of the unskilled pleadings." Id.
First, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 precludes Plaintiffs from seeking a declaratory judgment in the form of a judicial redetermination of their income tax liability here. See Warren v. United States, 874 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs argue that 5 U.S.C. § 703 nevertheless provides this Court with jurisdiction. This Court disagrees. See Hamby v. Janer, 808 F.2d 1433, 1434 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1987). Nor does § 702 avail Plaintiffs. See Warren v. United States, 874 F.2d 280,282 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Smith v. Booth, 823 F.2d 94,97-98 (5th Cir. 1987)) (notwithstanding § 702, Declaratory Judgment Act precludes district court jurisdiction in federal tax cases). Finally, Plaintiffs' reliance on cases setting forth Constitutional and prudential standing requirements strays off the mark. Standing requirements are those Plaintiffs must satisfy as a necessary, though not necessarily sufficient prerequisite to sue in an Article III Court. They do not preclude a federal district court from refusing to entertain a suit when such court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment in the form of a judicial redetermination of their income tax liability, this claim is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
Second, to the extent Plaintiffs seek a refund for the tax years in question, the Complaint must be dismissed because it does not allege that Plaintiffs have fully paid their assessed taxes for the years at issue. See Lamb v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D.S.C. 1984) (claim dismissed where plaintiffs failed to allege compliance with the full payment rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) and Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 2 L.Ed.2d 1165, 78 S.Ct. 1079 (1958), aff'd on reh'g, 362 U.S. 145, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623, reh'g denied, 362 U.S. 972, 80 S.Ct. 953, 4 L.Ed.2d 902 (1960)).
CONCLUSION
In light of the above analysis,
IT IS ORDERED that:
the United States' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.