Opinion
C. A. 1:23-5647-DCC-SVH
03-04-2024
Russell Vickery, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Chad McBride, Captain David Baker, Admin. Lt. Nathan Mitchell, Medical Director John Doe, and Medical Supervisor John Doe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Russell Vickery (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee at the Anderson County Detention Center (“ACDC”). [ECF No. i at i, 3]. Proceeding pro se and in form pauperis, Plaintiff brings this action to challenge various conditions of confinement at ACDC under 42 U.S.C. § i983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this action be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff contends the conditions of confinement at ACDC substantially fall below the minimum standards required by law for local detention facilities, creating “extreme duress to all pretrial detainees” at ACDC and constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [ECF No. 1 at 8]. By way of summary, Plaintiff has identified the following allegedly unconstitutional conditions faced by ACDC pretrial detainees:
• ACDC is at 300% capacity with three men in each cell that is less than 70 square feet.
• The detainees are in their crowded cells for 23 hours a day on lockdown.
• There are three operational “unsanitary showers” covered in mold and peeling paint for approximately 88 pretrial detainees in the C-Pod Unit, and two of the showers have broken tiles and are not draining properly.
• Only one roll of toilet paper is issued per person per week.
• There is no evacuation route posted in common areas in case of a fire, despite ACDC being at three times the rated capacity.
• There are no two-way intercoms for emergency calls in the cells where pretrial detainees are locked for 23 hours a day.
• Legal mail is being held for up to and over a month.
• Notary publics at ACDC have been ordered not to notarize certain documents for inmates.
• There is no IRC counsel for addressing facility issues or to process inmate grievances.
• Medical care falls below the requisite standard of care.
• Corrections officers are locking inmates in their rooms for 72 hours to prevent them from talking to each other.[Id. at 8-12]. Based on these issues, Plaintiff alleges that all pretrial detainees are being punished unlawfully because they are forced to live in overcrowded, unsanitary, and dangerous conditions. [Id. at 12-13].
Plaintiff requests a declaration that the acts and omissions described in the complaint violate his rights under the Constitution; a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to eliminate 23-hour-a-day lockdown, eliminate overcrowding, sterilize and decontaminate ACDC, provide two rolls of toilet paper per person per week, fix all showers and drains, repair two-way emergency intercoms in all cells, implement high priority procedures for holding hearings and disposing of inmate cases, and implement additional requirements for holding preliminary hearings; compensatory damages for the cost of bringing the lawsuit; and any other additional relief deemed proper by the court. Id. at 13-14.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975).The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b)
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a pro se complaint. [ECF No. 1]. On December 7, 2023, the court determined that individuals listed as plaintiffs beside Plaintiff should be dropped from this case and permitted to file individual cases. [ECF No. 6]. By orders dated December 7, 2023, Plaintiff (1) was notified that this action was subject to summary dismissal unless he filed an amended complaint by December 28, 2023, that cured the deficiencies of his original complaint and (2) was advised of the documents needed to bring this case into proper form for service of process. [ECF No. 10, 12].
On December 13, 2023, the Clerk entered Plaintiff's notice of change of address. [ECF No. 14]. That same day, the Clerk mailed this court's prior orders to Plaintiff at his updated address. [ECF No. 15]. Neither the originally mailed documents nor the subsequently mailed documents were returned to the court as undeliverable, and Plaintiff is presumed to have received the court's orders. However, other than submitting his change of address, Plaintiff has not responded to the court's orders. Thus, out of an abundance of caution, the court issued an order dated January 16, 2024, again directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and otherwise bring this case into proper form. [ECF No. 17].
Thereafter, on January 31, 2024, the Clerk entered a letter from Plaintiff. [ECF No. 23]. Plaintiff noted in that letter that it was “NOT AN AMENDED COMPLAINT.” Id. at 2. After the time for filing an amended complaint expired, the court entered another order, dated February 13, 2024, again directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and otherwise bring this case into proper form. [ECF No. 26]. That order contained the following notice:
Accordingly, this Order is entered to provide Plaintiff one FINAL opportunity to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within
the time set forth in this Order, this action will be subject to dismissal.Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).
On February 28, 2024, the Clerk docketed a letter from Plaintiff [ECF No. 28], in which he appears to challenge and/or object to the court's orders and makes the following pertinent assertions: (1) Plaintiff contends that this case was filed as a class action and he insists that it cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim, id. at 1-2; (2) Plaintiff contends that this action “is NOT a pro se complaint,” Id. at 2; (3) Plaintiff asserts that, if the court terminates all plaintiffs in this action, he will “go to media platforms and suggest to the other Plaintiffs to do the same for exposure . . .” Id. at 3. On March 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed another document titled “NOTICE,” which states “THIS IS NOT AN AMENDED COMPLAINT.” [ECF No. 30 at 2]. Plaintiff did not, however, file an amended complaint.
This action is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to prosecute his claims. “The Court has inherent power to manage its docket in the interests of justice.” Luberda v. Purdue Frederick Corp., No. 4:13-cv-00897-RBH, 2013 WL 12157548, at *1 (D.S.C. May 31, 2013). It also has the authority expressly recognized in Rule 41(b) to dismiss actions for failure to prosecute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (authorizing a district court to dismiss an action if a plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court); see also Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting Rule 41“recognize[s] that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them, and this authority includes the power to order dismissal of an action for failure to comply with court orders”). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint pursuant to this court's orders, and the time for doing so has lapsed. He has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with multiple orders of this court. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
2. The Complaint is Subject to Summary Dismissal
Furthermore, the undersigned concludes the original complaint filed in this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below, to the extent the court does not dismiss the action under Rule 41(b). The complaint was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
a. Pro Se Representation and Class Action Claims
As an initial matter, the court finds that Plaintiff is not permitted to represent other pro se individuals in this action. Plaintiff purportedly brings this case as a class action. [ECF No. 1 at 2 (listing various individuals as “Class Members”), 12 (referring to a “class leader”), 15 (listing Plaintiff as the “class leader”)]. Further, Plaintiff's complaint makes numerous allegations concerning all inmates at ACDC. However, pro se plaintiffs may not represent one another. See Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schls., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“An individual unquestionably has the right to litigate his own claims in federal court.... The right to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others”); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a prisoner's suit is “confined to redress for violation of his own personal rights and not one by him as a knight- errant for all prisoners”). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff intends to represent any other individual in this matter, he is not permitted to do so.
Similarly, “a pro se inmate . . . is not qualified to prosecute a class action or assert a claim on behalf of others.” Wright v. Beard, No. 1:23-cv-153-KDB, 2023 WL 6466804, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 4, 2023); see also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting “the competence of a layman representing himself [is] clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others” and concluding “it is plain error to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action”). Thus, it is well settled that pro se plaintiffs may not prosecute class action claims on behalf of others. See Watson v. Kanode, No. 7:21-cv-00119, 2023 WL 6447318, at *3 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2023) (noting a pro se inmate cannot bring a class action and “lacks standing to file or otherwise pursue federal claims on behalf of other inmates”). Because “pro se class actions are not permissible,” Johnson v. Thompson, No. 4:23-cv-3558-SAL-TER, 2023 WL 4827462, at *1 (D.S.C. July 27, 2023), the class claims asserted in this case are subject to dismissal.
b. Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
The named Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action because Plaintiff provides no specific factual allegations against them to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. Weller, 901 F.2d at 397 (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations against defendants); Gibson v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-01333-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 7355301, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2017) (finding summary dismissal proper where “the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by th[e] Defendant”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 690060 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2018). Where “there are no allegations of any wrongdoing” by a specific defendant, the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted as to [that d]efendant.” Greene v. Stirling, No. 5:16-cv-00587-JMC-KDW, 2016 WL 11201007, at *2 (D.S.C. June 17, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1420238 (D.S.C. Apr. 21, 2017). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the complaint of personal involvement against any defendant, they are all entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Cir. Ct. of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Further, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient information regarding the identity of the two John Doe defendants, other than noting their respective jobs at ACDC, such that the court may authorize service on them. Although a litigant may bring a lawsuit against an unknown person, the United States Marshal cannot serve an inadequately-identified defendant. See Odom v. Smalls, No. 3:09-cv-0629-PMD, 2009 WL 3805594, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 12, 2009). Further, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed as follows regarding unknown defendants:
The designation of a John Doe defendant is generally not favored in the federal courts; it is appropriate only when the identity of the alleged defendant is not known at the time the complaint is filed and the plaintiff is likely to be able to identify the defendant after further discovery.Chidi Njoku v. Unknown Special Unit Staff, No. 99-7684, 2000 WL 903896, at *1 (4th Cir. July 7, 2000). The Fourth Circuit has further explained “If it does not appear that the true identity of an unnamed party can be discovered through discovery or through intervention by the court, the court could dismiss the action without prejudice. Schiff v. Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
Additionally, Defendants are entitled to dismissal, as Plaintiff appears to name them on the basis of supervisory liability. However, the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the complaint contains no plausible allegations against any of the named Defendants to make such a showing.
c. Claims Subject to Dismissal on Merits
Further, the complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible. Liberally construed, the complaint appears to assert a variety of claims regarding conditions of confinement, denial of access to the courts, and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The court will address these claims in turn below.
To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert any other claim, his allegations fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation sufficient to support a claim for relief. For example, Plaintiff alleges “[t]here is no IRC counsel for addressing facility issues and those specific grievances are not being responded to or given a ‘timed out' response.” [ECF No. 1 at 10]. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for denial of access to the grievance process, any such claim fails because it is well settled that “prisoners do not have a constitutional right of access to the grievance process.” Daye v. Rubenstein, 417 Fed.Appx. 317, 319 (4th Cir. 2011).
1. Conditions of Confinement
The crux of this action appears to be a claim regarding the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement. A pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement claim is evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Unlike convicted inmates, pretrial detainees have not been adjudicated guilty of a crime and may not be subjected to any form of “punishment.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir.1988). In any event, “[t]he due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Id. at 870. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Under the Eighth Amendment, protection against cruel and unusual punishment includes protection against inhumane conditions of imprisonment. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff is a prisoner in a county detention center, not a guest in a hotel, and it should be expected that conditions in such a setting are often less than ideal. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (“[T]he fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.'”); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir.1988) (“Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.”).
As to Plaintiff's claim regarding three prisoners assigned to one cell with less than 70 square feet [ECF No. 1 at 8], the Fourth Circuit has noted that confinement in a 7 by 9 cell of three total prisoners, while unpleasant, did not reach a constitutional magnitude of cruel and unusual punishment, Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740, 741-42 (4th Cir. 1976). Instead, to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the overcrowding combined with other substandard conditions of confinement had “a mutually enforcing effect that produce[d] the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise,” or that the overcrowding created an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health, and that the defendants deliberately disregarded that risk. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993).
Here, Plaintiff has made only conclusory allegations regarding overcrowding and has failed to allege facts showing that any conditions of overcrowding have created an unreasonable risk of harm to his own health or that Defendants deliberately disregarded that risk. See Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251, 1986 WL 18030, at *3 (4th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision) (noting that it is “well settled” that overcrowding of prisons, including double or triple celling, does not necessarily violate the Constitution); Jenkins v. Cannon, No. 0:09-cv-283-TLW-PJG, 2009 WL 3233484, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2009) (finding the plaintiff failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim where “seven men are in a cell made for four men, which is not quite double capacity” because “[t]he complaint does not allege any deprivations of food, medical care, or sanitation due to the overcrowding”). In sum, Plaintiff “has failed to show that the overcrowding or cramped cell conditions resulted from prison rules that can be characterized as ‘vindictive, cruel, or inhuman' or that the overcrowding resulted from an ‘arbitrary or capricious' exercise of judgment by prison officials.” Ross v. Russell, No. 7:20-cv-000774, 2022 WL 767093, at *16 (W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting Crowe, 540 F.2d at 742).
Further, Plaintiff's cursory allegations as to the other conditions of confinement are insufficient as pleaded to state a cognizable claim for relief. For example, Plaintiff alleges that only one roll of toilet paper is issued per person, per week. [ECF No. 1 at 9]. Although the complete denial of “providing an inmate with toilet paper denies ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'” Ash v. Greenwood, No. 2:17-cv-03022, 2018 WL 4201398, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 30, 2018), “[v]arious courts have held that denial of toilet paper for a brief period of time does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation,” id. (collecting cases). See also Salmons v. W. Reg'l Jail Auth., No. 3:18-cv-1447, 2019 WL 5616916, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 30, 2019) (“[C]ourts have broadly held that the temporary deprivation of toiletries does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”). Further, Plaintiff has not asserted that he suffered any actual physical injury as a result of this alleged deprivation and therefore fails to establish a plausible claim. Dunbar v. Aiken Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:08-cv-4115-PMD, 2009 WL 3417585, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2009).
2. Right of Access to the Courts
Next, the complaint appears to assert a claim for violations of Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment for denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff makes a number of vague allegations that the court construes as relating to his ability to access the courts. [See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 10 (alleging that legal mail is randomly being held for up to and over a month and that notary publics at the facility have been ordered not to notarize certain documents to be used in court)]. However, any claim concerning access to the courts is subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers . . .” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); see also United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing applicability of Bounds to pretrial detainees). A careful review of the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint shows that his contentions do not raise a plausible federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the complaint contains no allegations of any real injury and/or prejudice that Plaintiff suffered or is likely to suffer as a result of the alleged inadequate access to legal materials or delay in legal mail. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (explaining that, to state a constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must show that the alleged shortcomings “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim”). In the absence of an alleged actual injury and prejudice to a constitutional right resulting from Plaintiff's lack of access to legal materials or delay in legal mail, his complaint fails to state a claim on which this court may grant relief. See, e.g., Chase v. O'Malley, 466 Fed.Appx. 185, 187 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court's dismissal of a complaint where the prisoner “failed to allege any actual injury resulting from the alleged conduct of prison authorities with regard to his legal mail”); Pearson v. Simms, 345 F.Supp.2d 515, 520 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 88 Fed.Appx. 639 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[P]laintiff has advised of no actual injury or specific harm, sufficient to support a claim of denial of access to the court, which he has suffered as a result of the allegedly alleged delay or mishandling of his mail.”). Although Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied access to the courts, he fails to allege any specific facts as to how any legal matter has been adversely affected beyond making bald assertions and conclusory allegations. Further, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff has been able to bring the present action to vindicate alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim.
3. Deliberate Indifference
Finally, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. For example, Plaintiff contends he is being denied medical treatment and surgery for his leg, which “is constantly leaking blood and infection where hardware . . . was put in his knee after both legs were crushed in a car accident in 2001.” [ECF No. 1 at 11]. However, Plaintiff has failed to identify an individual responsible for the alleged constitutional violations.
To state a claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts showing prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (explaining that, to show inadequate medical treatment rises to the level of a constitutional violation, a plaintiff “must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”). “Thus, plaintiff must allege . . . a sufficiently serious medical need . . . [and] deliberate indifference to that serious medical need.” Quick v. Hercules, No. 1:12-cv-962-TSE-TCB, 2012 WL 4758679, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not identified any specific person responsible for the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs and therefore has failed to present facts showing that any particular individual violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff's claim “may proceed only if he identifies the individuals responsible for [the] alleged actions,” and he must “provide sufficient facts to show that each named defendant participated in the alleged violations that [Plaintiff] is asserting against that defendant.” Manners v. Fogan, No. TDC-21-cv-1444, 2022 WL 1501086, at *2 (D. Md. May 12, 2022); see also Ashworth v. S. Cent. Reg'l Jail, No. 2:20-cv-00041, 2022 WL 17365732, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 8, 2022) (“Plaintiff has not . . . identified any individual prison or medical staff who allegedly subjected him to these conditions. Thus, his allegations fail to give rise to any plausible claim for relief under § 1983.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 17365713 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 1, 2022). In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing any individual was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
In light of all the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute or, in the alternative, that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).