This argument has merit when the notice given in the indictment fairly but imperfectly apprises the accused of an offense for which he is to be tried. See Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1969); Kimbro v. Bomar, 333 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1964). Such cases, however, do not involve the very different situation present in Watson v. Jago, supra, when a constitutional violation occurs because an accused is not given proper notice in the indictment of an offense for which he is to be tried.

Relying on Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed.2d 387 (1970), decided after the district court opinion and order of May 22, 1970, relator contends that such district court order must be reversed because he had no counsel at the time of his preliminary hearing. It has been consistently held by the great majority of federal courts, as well as the Pennsylvania appellate courts, prior to the Coleman decision, that a preliminary hearing is not a critical stage in the criminal procedure in the state court, absent some special circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158, 160-161 (3d Cir. 1969); Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1969); Pagan Cancel v. Delgado, 408 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Budd v. Maroney, 398 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1968) (Pennsylvania); Carr v. Henderson, 385 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 956, 88 S.Ct. 1864, 20 L.Ed.2d 871 (1968); Rambo v. Peyton, 380 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1967); Thompson v. Pepersack, 270 F. Supp. 793 (D.Md. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Thompson v. Warden, 413 F.2d 454 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 972, 25 L.Ed.2d 131 (1970). We have concluded that Coleman should not be applied retroactively to the preliminary hearing on July 30, 1957, for the reasons clearly stated in Phillips v. North Carolina, 433 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1970), and Konvalin v. Sigler, 431 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1970).

Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. Even if the alleged statement was read at a preliminary hearing, this is not a critical stage of the proceeding under Ohio law. Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052, 1054 (6th Cir.); State v. Wilkinson, 17 Ohio St.2d 9, 244 N.E.2d 480, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946; State v. McClellan, 6 Ohio App.2d 155, 217 N.E.2d 230, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022, 87 S.Ct. 1380, 18 L.Ed.2d 462. After the preliminary hearing, appellant was indicted by the grand jury and entered a plea of guilty to the indictment.

In Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 446, 45 S.Ct. 522, 524, 69 L.Ed. 1036 the Court said, "* * * It has been uniformly held by this court that the sufficiency of an indictment cannot be reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings." See also Kimbro v. Bomar, 333 F.2d 755, 757 (C.A.6); Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052 (C.A.6); Love v. Perini, 418 F.2d 905 (C.A.6). Another claim argued by the appellant in his brief is that he was denied a fair and impartial trial.

Further, the sufficiency of an indictment does not normally present a cognizable issue in federal habeas corpus. Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052, 1054 (6th Cir. 1969). However, the method of the criminal charge must observe the procedural due process requirement of fair notice of the specific charge and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against it.

Moreover, "there is no constitutional requirement for a preliminary examination." Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052, 1054 (6th Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241, 248 (6th Cir. 1967) ("There is no constitutional requirement for such an examination."); Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir. 1965) ("We do not find that the Supreme Court has ever held that an accused has a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing.").

But as Petitioner recognizes, default judgment is unavailable in federal habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1969); Mahaday v. Cason, 222 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ("There is no way a § 2254 case can be decided on a petitioner's submission only, and a court should not put itself in a position of considering the petition without a response by the respondent."); Lemons v. O'Sullivan, 54 F.3d 357, 364-65 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[D]efault judgment is disfavored in habeas corpus cases."). Furthermore, as Petitioner recognizes (Doc. 22, 3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6 allows extensions after time has expired "if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect."

Sixth, petitioner alleges that his conviction is unconstitutional because he was tried for each offense at a different trial. It has been held that no federal habeas corpus grounds are presented where an attorney permitted all the charges against a single defendant to be tried in one trial. Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1969); Worts v. Dutton, 395 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1968). This court holds that where an individual is tried separately for each offense, no federal habeas corpus grounds are presented.

Moreover, questions concerning the sufficiency of the indictment may not be raised in habeas corpus. Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 446, 45 S.Ct. 522, 69 L.Ed. 1036 (1925); Love v. Perini, 418 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1970); Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Tangredi v. Wallack, 343 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1965); Kimbro v. Bomar, 333 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1965); see also, Larch v. Sacks, 290 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1961). III

In the federal courts, habeas corpus is available to challenge the validity or sufficiency of an indictment only in rare cases. Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 45 S.Ct. 522, 69 L.Ed. 1036 (1925); Roth v. United States, 295 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 1004, 82 S.Ct. 639, 7 L.Ed.2d 543; Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1969). The judgment must withstand a collateral attack if the indictment is sufficient to meet constitutional requirements.