Opinion
A157940
10-21-2019
V.H., a Minor, etc., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY, Respondent; SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT et al., Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. DEP-5671-01)
Following termination of mother's parental rights, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) initiated a plan to remove the minor, V.H., from her then-current foster home and place her with her maternal uncle, R.G. V.H. objected to the out-of-state placement. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which the Department, the foster parents, R.G., and V.H. presented evidence and argument. The juvenile court ruled the Department did not abuse its discretion in deciding to place V.H. with R.G., and such a placement was in V.H.'s best interest.
V.H. subsequently filed a petition for extraordinary writ, alleging the juvenile court erred in refusing to designate the foster parents as prospective adoptive parents and in applying an abuse of discretion standard to the Department's decision to remove V.H. from the foster parents. While we agree the juvenile court applied the wrong standard in assessing removal, we conclude the error was harmless. Accordingly, we deny both the petition and V.H.'s stay request.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Dependency Proceedings
As described in more detail in a prior opinion of this court (K.D. v. Superior Court (May 14, 2019, A156460) [nonpub. opn.]), in October 2018, the Department placed three-month-old V.H. in an emergency foster home after K.D. (mother) relapsed on methamphetamine and absconded with V.H.
We take judicial notice of our prior decision. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
Shortly after V.H. was placed in the emergency foster home, the Department identified mother's half brother, R.G., as a possible placement option. The November 2018 jurisdiction/disposition report stated R.G. "is extremely interested in being a placement option for [V.H.]." It noted R.G. and his family resided in Oregon and had arranged to visit V.H. over the Thanksgiving holiday. The report further noted, "The challenge with Mr. and Mrs. [R.G.'s] interest in placement, is them being able to support reunification services seeing as they live in another state." In the section of the report discussing alternatives for permanence if reunification is bypassed, it states, "[V.H.'s] current emergency foster placement has expressed interest, as well as maternal uncle [R.G.] and alleged paternal grandmother, . . . in providing [V.H.] with a forever home."
After initially recommending reunification services for mother, the Department filed an addendum report in December 2018 recommending the court deny mother such services. The addendum report restated the above options for placement. It also discussed the recent visits between R.G. and his family and V.H., noting they "went well." The report further stated R.G. has "remained in contact with the Department through the investigation expressing great interest in placement of [V.H.] should she not reunify with [mother]."
The juvenile court ordered mother bypassed for reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother subsequently filed a writ petition, which we denied in our prior opinion. (K.D. v. Superior Court, supra, A156460.)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
In May 2019, the foster mother filed a caregiver information form. That form detailed V.H.'s development while in foster care and the strength of V.H.'s emotional bond to her foster family. It also stated, "We would love to adopt [V.H.]. At her young age, she has bonded with our family completely and is comfortable in our home. We are also very attached to her as well."
Shortly thereafter, the Department filed a section 366.26 report. That report summarized V.H.'s placement history as follows: "[V.H.] was placed in an Emergency Foster Home on October 30, 2018. This is [V.H.'s] first placement. Once the ICPC has been approved, [V.H.] will move to Oregon with her maternal aunt and uncle [(R.G. and his wife)]." The report further stated, "The potential adoptive parents are [R.G. and his wife] who live in Oregon. [R.G. and his wife] have maintained regular contact with the Department and have requested placement since [V.H.'s] removal. . . . [¶] [R.G. and his wife] have been provided information about adoption and guardianship, are very committed to the child, and have expressed a desire to adopt. The preliminary assessment indicates this family appears suitable for adoption of [V.H.] and they are close to completing their ICPC so that they can move forward with transitioning [V.H.] into their home. [¶] If for any reason the ICPC was not favorable or the family was unable to adopt [V.H.], the current caregiver has expressed a willingness, and desire, to adopt [V.H.]." It noted the ICPC was expected to be completed by the next month.
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) is a formal agreement among states, the purpose of which " ' "is to facilitate cooperation between participating states in the placement and monitoring of dependent children." ' " (In re C.B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031-1032.) The ICPC imposes various requirements, including having the outside state conduct a home study and prepare a report for the requesting state. (Fam. Code, § 7901.1.)
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court terminated parental rights and accepted the permanent plan of adoption. Mother's counsel stated mother would submit based on the Department's report, which indicated her brother, R.G., would likely adopt V.H. The court explained, "Now when it comes to adoption being the option, I know right now you have—you would like family to adopt. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . But if they fall out of the picture, it doesn't reset the case. We just look for another person to adopt." The court further stated that adoption by R.G. "is our hope" and, "If your brother checks out, if your brother does everything and says, yes, then that's the plan." However, the court stated, "Who adopts your child isn't my concern today."
The ICPC was completed and, in mid-June 2019, the Department created a plan for transitioning V.H. from the foster parents to R.G. The Department provided that transition plan to all parties involved in the transition, including the foster parents and V.H.'s counsel. The transition process began in late June 2019. B. V.H.'s Objection to Out-of-state Placement
On July 1, 2019, V.H.'s counsel sought a hearing based on V.H.'s "opposition to out of state relative placement." V.H.'s counsel argued the length of time provided by the Department for transitioning V.H. to R.G.'s family was insufficient, the Department failed to give notice of the removal to V.H.'s then-current foster parents, and the Department never assessed whether permanent placement with the foster parents or R.G. would be in V.H.'s best interests.
On July 8, 2019, the court held a hearing on the issue. The foster parents appeared with counsel. V.H.'s counsel requested the court prohibit the Department from removing V.H. from her then-current foster home without first requiring the Department to provide written notice to the foster parents and having a hearing on the issue. V.H.'s counsel argued the foster parents qualified as a prospective adoptive family and, based on the time V.H. had resided with them and their desire to adopt V.H., it would be detrimental to sever that bond. In response, the Department argued the foster parents were only an emergency foster placement, did not qualify as a prospective adoptive family, and thus were not entitled to notice or a hearing prior to removal of V.H. from their care. The Department argued R.G. had sought adoption from the beginning, the delay in placement was merely due to the ICPC, and the foster parents never took active steps to pursue adoption.
The record reflects V.H. had been residing exclusively with R.G. since July 3, 2019, as part of the ongoing transition plan.
Following counsel's argument, the court granted the foster parents de facto parent status but deferred ruling on whether they should receive prospective adoptive parent status. The court also temporarily placed V.H. with R.G. until the next hearing, based on the foster parents' failure to take steps to designate themselves as prospective adoptive parents after becoming aware parental rights were going to be terminated. The court set a date for "a full evidentiary hearing" on "the best interest of the child." It also stated it would address whether the foster parents should be granted prospective adoptive parent status.
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the Department filed an informational memorandum summarizing a home visit conducted by the Department at R.G.'s home in Oregon. The memorandum notes V.H. was "adjusting well and in an age appropriate manner." She appeared at ease and affectionate with the adults in the residence, including R.G., and she and her cousins were affectionate and "appropriate in their play." C. Removal Hearing
On July 19, 2019, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Opening statements were made by counsel for the minor, the foster parents, R.G., and the Department.
1. The Department's Initial Presentation
Although the court indicated at the beginning of the hearing that V.H. would carry the burden of proof, the Department was first to present evidence. The social worker testified she had specific training in child welfare, worked with over a hundred families and considered herself an adoption specialist although not a bonding expert. She stated this dependency matter transitioned to her in January, at which time R.G. had been identified as the concurrent plan and the ICPC paperwork had been started. The social worker stated she discussed the concurrent plan with the foster parents at each of their monthly visits. The social worker acknowledged the foster parents and V.H. love each other, and V.H. looked to the foster mother "for all of her needs." However, the social worker had supervised some of the transition visits, as well as home visits after V.H. was placed with R.G., and she testified V.H. "appeared to be doing very well" and did not believe it would be "seriously detrimental" to V.H.'s emotional well-being to remove her from the foster home and place her with R.G. The social worker stated V.H. had some difficulty when the foster parents would leave after visits, but noted those transitions became easier over the course of multiple visits. She also spoke with a social worker in Oregon, who had visited R.G's home multiple times, to confirm the appropriateness of that placement for V.H. The social worker opined, based on her experience and observations of V.H.'s conduct during multiple interactions, that V.H. "will be able to successfully transition her attachment," and she had not observed any concerning behavior from V.H.
2. V.H.'s Presentation
Counsel for V.H. offered rebuttal testimony from the foster mother and an infant mental health specialist, Jennifer Silverstein. The foster mother testified she consistently informed the social worker of her desire to adopt V.H. if V.H. could not be reunited with mother. The foster mother testified she believed they were designated as a foster-to-adopt family and would be assessed for placement along with any relatives. She acknowledged being informed of the transition plan in June and participating in preparing the transition schedule. The foster mother said V.H. would stay next to her and follow her around during transition visits, and V.H. would cry and reach for her when she left V.H. with R.G.
Silverstein testified she is a licensed clinical social worker and has worked as an infant therapist for approximately five years. Silverstein testified how disrupted attachments can negatively impact an infant. She noted while "every human being is different and there's a ton of complicating and mitigating factors," the impact of disrupted attachments can manifest in either external "acting out" behaviors or internal "dissociative response" where the child "doesn't ask for much." Silverstein testified subsequent removals from a primary caretaker generally would reinforce prior removals and impact whether the minor would be able to trust relationships to last. Silverstein acknowledged, however, she had not observed V.H. or V.H.'s interactions with either the foster parents or R.G. She also agreed an infant can learn to accept and trust a new caregiver, can form new attachments, and can succeed in creating a secured attachment. Silverstein testified there are numerous mitigating and complicating factors impacting a child's ability to attach in the future, and she could not predict what any child's attachment status—let alone V.H.'s—would be in the future.
3. R.G.'s Presentation
R.G. testified in support of the Department's decision to place V.H. with his family. He testified V.H. has transitioned "[e]xtremely well" to his home. He noted V.H. is eating, sleeping through the night, playing and laughing with his children, and generally is only agitated when R.G. walks into the room and she wants to be held by him.
4. The Department's Rebuttal Evidence
The Department recalled the social worker to address Silverstein's testimony. The social worker stated she generally agreed with Silverstein's comments and is familiar with assessing both externalized and internalized negative behaviors arising from transition. The social worker testified she had not seen any such behavior from V.H., and she believed V.H. would be able to develop a healthy attachment to R.G.
5. The Juvenile Court's Ruling
The court acknowledged the strong bond between V.H. and the foster parents. It then addressed the Department's argument that relative preference applied, stating: "I'm also going to make a finding that even though the relative preference disappears or falls out after the finding of a termination of parental rights, it still gives great benefit to a child to be placed with their blood relatives, not just because of the blood relative relationship and kinship that exists between [R.G.] and his children and his potential adoptive child, [V.H.], but because . . . he has said that he is open and willing to maintain regular contact with the department and to facilitate other kinship relationships . . . ." The court again acknowledged the bond between V.H. and the foster parents, but concluded, "I believe it is in the best interest of the child that she be placed with her uncle, who was always identified as the potential adoptive placement parent; that that plan has been implemented by social services in the best way that they could." The court concluded the plan implemented by the Department was "not an abuse of their discretion" and held, "it is in the best interest, based on all the evidence I have, including the plan that was put in effect, including the testimony from [the social worker], as well as Ms. Silverstein, that talked about other transitions, that it's the best interest of the child to remain at this time in the home of [R.G.]"
II. DISCUSSION
V.H.'s petition raises two main arguments. First, the petition contends the foster parents qualified as prospective adoptive parents and thus were entitled to written notice and other rights afforded prospective adoptive parents. Second, the petition asserts the juvenile court erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard rather than focusing on the minor's best interests. A. Standard of Review
"A juvenile court's decision to authorize a change in the minor's placement is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] But we must also review the juvenile court's finding that the change is in the minor's best interests to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support it." (In re M.M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 54, 64.) "Under the substantial evidence standard of review, an appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. [Citation.] ' " ' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' " ' [Citation.] We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence." (In re L.M. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 898, 913-914.) B. Whether the Foster Parents Were Prospective Adoptive Parents
V.H. contends her former foster parents qualified as prospective adoptive parents under section 366.26, subdivision (n) because V.H. had lived in their care for over six months, they expressed a commitment to adopt her, and they took necessary steps to facilitate adoption by completing a home study and requesting de facto parent status. V.H. asserts their request for designation was timely, not precluded by the Department's designation of R.G. as a prospective adoptive parent, and not waived by their failure to object to the Department assessing R.G. for placement. V.H. thus contends the juvenile court erred in denying her former foster parents such status.
"Prospective adoptive parent" is a defined term in section 366.26, subdivision (n)(1). That statute allows a juvenile court to "designate a current caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent if the child has lived with the caretaker for at least six months, the caretaker currently expresses a commitment to adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step to facilitate the adoption process." But section 366.26, subdivision (n) is written in permissive rather than mandatory terms. The court "may" designate a current caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent based on certain criteria. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(1), italics added.) The statute further states, "In determining whether to make that designation, the court may take into consideration whether the caretaker is listed in the preliminary assessment . . . as an appropriate person to be considered as an adoptive parent for the child and the recommendation of the State Department of Social Services, county adoption agency, or licensed adoption agency." (Ibid., italics added.) Therefore, according to the express language of section 366.26, subdivision (n), whether to designate a current caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent is a matter within the juvenile court's discretion.
Here, the juvenile court denied the foster parents' request on two grounds. First, the court noted mother waived her rights at the section 366.26 hearing based on the belief her brother, R.G., would be the potential adopter for V.H. Second, the court stated the foster parents had not proactively taken steps to pursue adoption apart from expressing their interest. The court noted their home study was not specific as to V.H. and they had not asked to be identified as prospective adoptive parents prior to July 8, 2019.
The foster parents assert their request for prospective adoptive parent status was timely and should not be impacted by any actions or inactions by the Department. Undoubtedly, the express language of section 366.26, subdivision (n)(1) does not require the caregivers to pursue the prospective adoptive parent designation at the section 366.26 hearing. But the foster parents do not dispute they were aware, throughout the dependency proceedings, of the Department's intent to place V.H. with R.G. And, unlike R.G., who was completing an intensive ICPC process, which included a detailed home study, the foster parents do not identify any steps they took to pursue adoption apart from informing the Department that they were interested in adopting V.H. Most notably, the foster parents did not seek de facto parent status until the July 5, 2019 hearing—after the Department removed V.H. from their care. And the record indicates the foster parents never even filed a petition to be granted prospective adoptive parent status. Instead, it was raised by V.H.'s counsel as part of her objection to the out-of-state placement, for which the foster parents then filed a memorandum in support. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the foster parents prospective adoptive parent status.
V.H. relies on In re M.M., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 54, to assert the foster parents should have been granted prospective adoptive parent status. However, that case does not support V.H.'s position. In that case, the minor's caregiver and a paternal aunt both sought to adopt the minor. (Id. at pp. 57-58.) The caregiver argued she qualified as a prospective adoptive parent and thus was entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the minor's removal. (Id. at pp. 59-60.) The Court of Appeal agreed, emphasizing the caregiver only must be qualified to receive prospective adoptive parent status to be entitled to notice and a hearing. (Id. at p. 61.) The agency's failure to provide such notice was not harmless because the caregiver had no notice "or even reason to suspect" the social services agency would pursue its request to remove the minor, and the caregiver was not represented by counsel or allowed to participate at the hearing. (Id. at p. 63.)
In re M.M. does not require juvenile courts to grant caregivers prospective adoptive parent status, but merely requires social service agencies to provide the statutorily required notice to "the current caretaker, if that caretaker would have met the threshold criteria to be designated as a prospective adoptive parent . . . on the date of service of this notice . . . ." (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3), italics added; In re M.M., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) The statute also allows the caretaker to object to the proposed removal, request a hearing, and seek prospective adoptive parent designations. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(A).)
While parties dispute whether the Department was obligated to provide notice to the foster parents, any such error was harmless because the purpose of such notice is to allow the caregivers an opportunity to object. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(A).) Here, an objection was raised, and the court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of removal prior to making any final placement decision. "For example, designated prospective adoptive parents have the right to 'offer evidence, examine witnesses, provide the court with legal authorities and make arguments to the court.' " (In re L.M., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 909.) The foster parents exercised these rights, through counsel, by presenting an opening and closing statement, examining witnesses, and offering evidence including the testimony of the foster mother. Accordingly, V.H. has not identified any rights generally afforded to prospective adoptive parents that were denied to the foster parents. C. Whether Removal Was in V.H.'s Best Interests
The foster parents contend the Department should have provided written notice because they met the requirements of section 366.26, subdivision (n)(1). However, we note at the time the Department provided notice of removal, the foster parents had not requested de facto parent status. Nor does the record reflect whether the Department was aware of their prior home study.
The petition does not appear to challenge the initial removal of V.H. prior to the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, such argument is waived. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 ["When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived."].) In any event, such a challenge would likely be moot as there is no remedy we could provide to reverse V.H.'s temporary placement with R.G.
V.H. next argues the juvenile court applied the incorrect standard at the removal hearing. She argues the court erroneously applied an abuse of discretion standard rather than an assessment of the minor's best interests.
Once parental rights are terminated and the child is referred for adoptive placement, the social services agency is responsible for the child and is normally entitled to the "exclusive care and control of the child at all times" until an adoption petition is granted. (§ 366.26, subd. (j).) The social services agency is responsible for placement decisions, although the juvenile court may review those decisions for abuse of discretion. (In re Harry N. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1381-1382.) However, the California Rules of Court explicitly state that if a court conducts a hearing on an agency's intent to remove a child, "the agency intending to remove the child must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed removal is in the best interest of the child." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.727(g).) This rule applies not only to removal of a minor from a prospective adoptive parent, but also "from a caregiver who may meet the criteria for designation as a prospective adoptive parent." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.727(a); see In re L.M., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 909 [juvenile court required agency to prove removal from foster home was in minor's best interest].)
The juvenile court erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard at the removal hearing. Because the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of removal, the Department was obligated to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that removal was in V.H.'s best interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.727(g).) The juvenile court's application of the incorrect standard is subject to harmless error analysis. (See In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 625 [applying harmless error standard].) Under this analysis, we cannot reverse the court's judgment unless the error was prejudicial. We must determine whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error. (In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463.)
Here, it is not reasonably probable the juvenile court would have reversed the Department's placement decision had it applied the correct standard of review. The court received evidence about, and considered, V.H.'s best interests. The court held, as part of its ruling, there is a "great benefit to a child to be placed with their blood relatives, not just because of the blood relative relationship and kinship that exists between [R.G.] and his children and [V.H.], but because . . . he is open and willing to maintain regular contact with the department and to facilitate other kinship relationships . . . ." The Department and R.G. presented substantial evidence at the hearing to support placement with R.G., particularly as to V.H.'s ability to develop other important kinship relationships. Both the Department's reports and the social worker's testimony at the hearing demonstrated a placement with R.G. would allow V.H. to grow up with her cousins. And based on the visits and transition that had occurred, that evidence indicated V.H. and her cousins were already developing positive relationships with each other. R.G. also testified that V.H. had spent time with her great-grandfather and great-aunt. These positive kinship relationships will provide V.H. with long-term support, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest V.H. would have the opportunity to build such relationships if she resided with the foster parents. The social worker also testified how there is a third adult in R.G.'s household—his wife's mother—who is able to lend additional support to ensure they have the ability to care for all of V.H.'s needs. Finally, while the foster parents indisputably provided wonderful care for V.H., the social worker testified V.H.'s bond could be successfully transferred to R.G. While Silverstein, the infant mental health specialist, asserted termination of V.H.'s bond with the foster parents would be traumatic, she was unable to opine on whether it would be especially traumatic for V.H. or whether V.H. would be able to successfully transfer her bond. To the contrary, the social worker testified she specifically looked for conduct suggesting heightened trauma and had not observed any concerning behavior from V.H.
The Department argues the relative placement preference applies to the court's decision to place V.H. with R.G. We need not resolve this issue because substantial evidence supports a finding that V.H.'s placement with R.G. is in her best interests.
Juvenile courts have reached varying conclusions in similar cases. In In re M.H. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1296, the juvenile court was asked to decide whether to leave a minor in a concurrent foster home where he had been placed since birth and was thriving, or remove the minor and place him with his maternal great-aunt, who also offered a loving home. (Id. at pp. 1300-1301.) The juvenile court concluded it was in the minor's best interests to remain in the concurrent foster home. (Id. at pp. 1305-1306.) Our colleagues in Division Three affirmed. In doing so, the appellate court recognized the juvenile court "was faced with two good options" and acknowledged they must give deference to the juvenile court's placement decision. (Ibid.) The Fourth Appellate District affirmed an opposite result in In re L.M., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 898. In that case, the court was asked to decide whether to remove the minor from her foster home, which had provided "excellent care for essentially her entire 10-month life," and place her in a home where her sister had previously been placed. (Id. at p. 900.) The juvenile court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing, at which contrasting evidence was presented regarding the detriment to the minor from severing a secure attachment with the foster parents versus the "absolute[]" benefit from being raised with her sibling. (Id. at pp. 904-908, 914.) Following the hearing, it concluded placing the minor in a home with her sister would be in the minor's best interest. (Id. at p. 908.) The Court of Appeal affirmed. It acknowledged while the outcome differed from that in In re M.H., the "same standard of review compels affirmance. We understand, as did the Court of Appeal in In re M.H., that the juvenile court was in the best position to make the difficult decision of which placement, between two excellent options, was in L.M.'s best interest. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that removal here was in L.M.'s best interest, and in so ruling the court did not abuse its discretion." (In re L.M., at pp. 915-916.)
V.H. also relies on In re M.M., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 54. That case is distinguishable because the juvenile court did not receive any evidence as to the minor's best interests. (Id. at p. 64.) As explained by the Court of Appeal, "There was absolutely no consideration of the impact of removal on the minor . . . ." (Ibid.) Here, the juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which extensive testimony was provided regarding the potential impacts on V.H. --------
Here, too, the juvenile court was faced with an incredibility difficult placement decision between two excellent homes. The juvenile court acknowledged as much, stating, "[T]his will be one of the hardest decisions I've ever had to make." While the record contains evidence that would have supported placing V.H. with the foster parents, substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court's decision to remove V.H. and place her with R.G. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in doing so.
III. DISPOSITION
V.H.'s petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) V.H.'s stay request also is denied. The decision is final in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
Margulies, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Banke, J. /s/_________
Sanchez, J.