Opinion
No. CVN 0809-2152
December 9, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, Ventura Apartments, seeking money damages for an alleged breach of a residential lease of premises known as Apartment 14, 74 East Main Street, Forestville, CT. On October 14, 2008, the clerk entered a default against the defendants, Charles Abucewicz, John Doe and Jane Doe for failure to appear. The matter was claimed to a hearing in damages before the court which was heard on November 20, 2008.
The law firm of Jazlowiecki Jazlowiecki brought the action and appeared for the plaintiff as indicated on the summons. Edward Jaziowiecki appeared at the hearing and explained that although he is an attorney, he was present in court to prosecute the claim in his capacity as a "principal" of the plaintiff. When asked by the court to clarify the legal status of the plaintiff Ventura Apartments and the ownership of the subject premises, the court was given several different responses including that the premises were owned in trust or by an estate. In any case, Jazlowiecki ultimately advised the court that Ventura Apartments is a trade name which is used by the owner or owners as a matter of convenience.
"It is elemental that in order to confer jurisdiction on the court the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is he or it must be a person in law or a legal entity with legal capacity to sue . . . Although a corporation is a legal entity with legal capacity to sue, a fictitious or assumed business name, a trade name, is not a legal entity; rather, it is merely a description of the person or corporation doing business under that name . . . Because the trade name of a legal entity does not have a separate legal existence, a plaintiff bringing an action solely in a trade name cannot confer jurisdiction on the court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) America's Wholesale Lender v. Pagano, 87 Conn.App. 474, 477, 866 A.2d 698 (2005).
Since the claimant declared that Ventura Apartments is merely a trade name, it follows that Ventura Apartments cannot be recognized as a legal entity with standing to maintain the present action since "[s]tanding is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion." In re Shawn S., 262 Conn. 155, 164, 810 A.2d 799 (2002). Moreover, because "[s]tanding goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction;" Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); "in the absence of standing, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case." Sadloski v. Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 83, 634 A.2d 888 (1993). "[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction . . . addresses the basic competency of the court . . . [and] can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time." Daley v. Hartford, 215 Conn. 14, 27-28, 574 A.2d 194 (1990).
The action is dismissed as the court is without subject matter jurisdiction.