In Vulcan Materials Co. v. Holst, 418 So.2d 152 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982), we held that uncontradicted evidence that employee's increased job duties made her nervous, mentally and physically ill, was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that employee voluntarily left her employment with good cause. We held similarly in Ventress v. Batey, 333 So.2d 584 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976), concluding that an employee, who claimed that she voluntarily quit her employment because her job was tedious and made her nervous and ill, quit her employment with good cause. In the case before us, Carter appealed the decision of the Board of Appeals to the circuit court, pursuant to section 25-4-95, Code 1975. An appeal from the Board of Appeals to the circuit court is for a trial de novo. Davis v. Department of Industrial Relations, 465 So.2d 1140 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984); § 25-4-95, Code 1975.
Polk v. State, Department of Industrial Relations, 398 So.2d 722 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981); Ventress v. Batey, 333 So.2d 584 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976); West Point Manufacturing Co. v. Keith, 35 Ala. App. 414, 47 So.2d 594 (1950). In proving that the employment caused or was connected with the claimant's illness, medical testimony is not necessary for the claimant to meet his burden of proof. State, Department of Industrial Relations v. Clark, 369 So.2d 561 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied, 369 So.2d 562 (Ala. 1979).
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court's judgment is supported by the evidence. See, Ventress v. Batey, 333 So.2d 584 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976). Claimant points out that the trial court's order, finding "plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of proof regarding his claim," does not indicate under which particular disqualifying provision he was denied benefits. From the nature of the case, the record before us and the arguments of the parties, it is evident the trial court found claimant totally disqualified under one of the following: § 25-4-78 (2) (voluntary departure from work without good cause), or § 25-4-78 (3)b (discharge for misconduct after previous warning). If there was evidence to support a finding of disqualification under either of the disqualifying statutes, it is sufficient. City of Montgomery v. Couturier, 373 So.2d 625 (Ala. 1979).
2A Ala. Digest Appeal Error 1008.1 (2), 1012 (3). See also, Ventress v. Batey, Ala.Civ.App., 333 So.2d 584 (1976). In this instance, we are not so convinced.
The view that claimant was terminated rather than voluntarily quitting is supported by the evidence. Such departure is certainly not "voluntary" within the meaning of Section 25-4-78 (2). Ventress v. Batey, 333 So.2d 584 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976); Department of Indus. Relations v. McLeod, 55 Ala. App. 152, 314 So.2d 72 (1975). The burden of proof is upon claimant to establish rights to benefits and the claimant assumes the risk of nonpersuasion.