Opinion
No. 05-15-00792-CV
11-18-2016
VENKY VENKATRAMAN, Appellant v. JYOTI MASUREKAR, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-05811-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Lang
This appeal follows a bench trial on Venky Venkatraman's breach of contract claim against his ex-wife, Jyoti Masurekar. The trial court concluded it was legally impossible for Masurekar to perform on the contract due to "an intervening judicial act" and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Venkatraman. In a single issue, Venkatraman asserts the trial court erred in concluding the defense of impossibility excused Masurekar's failure to perform because her actions led to the "intervening judicial act." We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The bench trial was a trial de novo on Masurekar's appeal from the justice court where Venkatraman filed suit. The justice court found for Venkatraman and awarded $3100 in damages. An appeal from a justice court to county court for a trial de novo vacates and annuls the judgment of the justice court. Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 69-70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
I. BACKGROUND
The dispositive facts are undisputed. In May 2013, Masurekar agreed to allow Venkatraman to take their then fourteen-year-old and eleven-year-old daughters to visit Venkatraman's ailing mother in India for a two-week period that August. Relying on the agreement, Venkatraman purchased airline tickets for the children and renewed an expired travel visa for his younger daughter. However, the children did not travel with him. Approximately one month before the trip, Masurekar filed in family court an emergency motion to suspend Venkatraman's possession and access to the children, alleging in a supporting affidavit that Venkatraman had committed abusive and intimidating acts toward their older daughter in May and June of 2013. Following the children's interview with staff from "Family Court Services," the trial court granted the motion and signed temporary orders prohibiting Venkatraman from exercising possession of the children. Unable to obtain a refund for the airline tickets, Venkatraman sued Masurekar.
At Venkatraman's request, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Relevant to its conclusion that Masurekar's failure to perform was excused by an "intervening judicial act," the trial court found
•in June 2013, there was an incident between Venkatraman and his older daughter in which he allegedly "struck his daughter and called her a b****;
•ultimately, a restraining order and modification order were signed by the family court;
•Masurekar was unable to deliver the children to Venkatraman "for travel to India due to the orders" of the family court; and,
•surrendering the children "would have violated a Court order and subjected [Masurekar] to a possible contempt finding."
II. DEFENSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY
Venkatraman does not challenge the trial court's findings, but complains solely of the trial court's conclusion that it was legally impossible for Masurekar to perform on the contract due to "an intervening judicial act." Venkatraman asserts that, because Masurekar filed the motion to suspend possession and access to the children, she "had a hand in causing the Supervening Impossibility" and "cannot use Supervening Impossibility as an excuse for non-performance of her agreement" to allow him to travel to India with their daughters.
A. Standard of Review
In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo to determine whether the trial court correctly drew the legal conclusions from the facts. R.J. Suarez Enter. Inc. v. PNYX L.P., 380 S.W.3d 238, 245 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). When performing a de novo review, the appellate court conducts an independent analysis of the record to arrive at its own legal conclusion. Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). Even if the appellate court determines a conclusion of law is erroneous, no reversal is required if a proper judgment was rendered. R.J. Suarez, 380 S.W.3d at 245.
B. Applicable Law
Impossibility is a defense to a breach of contract claim. Internacional Realty, Inc. v. 2005 RP West, Ltd., 449 S.W.3d 512, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). It excuses performance on a contract when supervening circumstances, such as a governmental regulation or order, make performance impracticable or impossible. See Centex Corp. v. Dalton, 840 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. 1992); Walden v. Affiliated Comput. Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 303, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). However, a party may not avail itself of this defense if, by its voluntary act, it created the impossibility. See Stafford v. S. Vanity Magazine, 231 S.W.3d 530, 537 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
C. Application of Law to Facts
Venkatraman asks us to conclude that Masurekar cannot avail herself of the defense of impossibility because her "voluntary act" of filing the motion to suspend possession led to the orders that made performance "impossible." We decline to do so. Venkatraman cites no authority for his proposition that a parent who seeks court orders for the safety and well-being of his or her children has engaged in the type of "voluntary act" contemplated by the law, and we have been unable to find any. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001(a)(2) (West 2014) (parent has duty to care for and protect his child). Moreover, no dispute exists the orders restricting Venkatraman's possession were signed after the children's interview with Family Court Services staff and not on the allegations in the motion itself. Reviewing the trial court's conclusion de novo, we conclude no error occurred. We decide Venkatraman's sole issue against him.
We note Venkatraman also asserts that Masurekar "subjectively decided it was impossible for her to let the children go to India with [him]." Subjective impossibility refers to "the inability of the individual promisor" and does not excuse performance. See Janak v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 586 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ). Objective impossibility refers to "the nature of the performance" and serves as an excuse. See id. Venkatraman does not provide any record references in support of his assertion, and, as we have stated, the trial court's conclusion that Masurekar's performance was excused by an "intervening judicial act" is not erroneous. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). That act, the trial court's orders, is an objective impossibility. See Janak, 586 S.W.2d at 906; Walden, 97 S.W.3d at 325. --------
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment. 150792F.P05
/Douglas S. Lang/
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-05811-D.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices Myers and Evans participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, we AFFIRM the trial court's judgment. Judgment entered this 18th day of November 2016.