Opinion
No. CV 08 5021342 S
September 16, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#126)
Facts and Procedural History
This action arises from injuries sustained by Anthony Vendrella, Jr., a minor, who was allegedly bitten on the cheek by a horse while visiting Glendale Farms in Milford, Connecticut. The plaintiffs, Vendrella and his parents, Marylou and Anthony Vendrella, Sr., filed suit against the defendants, Glendale Farm's owners, Astriab Family Limited Partnership and Timothy Astriab on June 26, 2008. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 2, 2009. The plaintiffs filed their memorandum in opposition on March 15, 2010. Oral argument was originally scheduled for July 6, 2010. The court rescheduled oral argument for August 9, 2010 to allow the plaintiffs further discovery to determine the identity of the horse that allegedly bit the minor plaintiff. The plaintiffs thereafter requested additional time which the court granted and rescheduled oral argument for August 30, 2010. Several reply briefs were filed by both parties prior to oral argument at short calendar on August 30, 2010.
Both of the depositions of Timothy Astriab, taken on December 30, 2009 and August 4, 2010, indicate that the horse that allegedly bit Anthony Jr. was owned by Laura Pendleton, who is not a named defendant in this suit.
Discussion
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91, 936 A.2d 625 (2007). "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact . . . The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).
In their initial memorandum in support of summary judgment, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' complaint fails as a matter of law because they did not identify the horse that bit Anthony, Jr. Subsequent discovery, however, has revealed that the horse is named "Scuppy." In light of this, the court will proceed to examine the defendants' primary argument in support of summary judgment. The defendants argue that, as the owners of a domestic animal, they are only liable if they had actual or constructive knowledge of Scuppy's "vicious propensities." Further, the defendants argue that they presented evidence showing there is no genuine issue of material fact that they had no knowledge of Scuppy's "vicious propensities."
As a result, the defendants contend that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs and are entitled to judgment on the plaintiffs' negligence claims. The defendants also argue that the attractive nuisance doctrine is inapplicable to the present case and additionally, that the plaintiffs' claims of recklessness similarly fail. The plaintiffs counter that their presentation of evidence that "a horse, by its very nature, is capable of biting someone without provocation or predisposition and that this was known by the plaintiffs" raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the defendant's motion.
In Allen v. Cox, 285 Conn. 603, 605, 942 A.2d 296 (2008), the plaintiff alleged that she was injured by the defendants' cat after the defendants negligently allowed the cat to roam free. The trial court rendered summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had notice of their cat's vicious or mischievous propensities giving rise to a duty of care to prevent the cat from injuring the plaintiff. See id. Specifically, the trial court granted the defendants' motion on the ground that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendants' cat had displayed any vicious or mischievous tendencies toward people. See id., 607-08.
The trial court concluded that because the defendants' cat previously had not attacked a person, the plaintiff's injuries were not foreseeable, and the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. See id., 608. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon case law from other jurisdictions and Section 509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id., 615-16.
Section 509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "(1) A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm. (2) This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know."
"There is a split in authority among other jurisdictions that have considered the issue of whether a plaintiff must present evidence that the cat had a history of aggression toward other people to establish the existence of a duty of care to prevent personal injuries from a cat attack." Id., 613. "Although our sibling states appear to disagree as to the specific behavior that is sufficient to establish the foreseeability of an attack by a cat on a person, they all agree that the foreseeability of such an attack is a fact-bound question involving a determination of the cat's previous behavior, the owner's knowledge of that behavior, the circumstances that gave rise to the harm, and the actual harm inflicted. This methodology is consistent with that adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Id., 615. Section 509 "focuses on whether the harm was likely to result from a known behavior or propensity of the animal, and not on whether the particular type of harm previously had occurred. Although the Restatement (Second) states that knowledge of a tendency to attack other animals does not necessarily imply knowledge of a likelihood of harm to persons, it does not rule out such a conclusion if the harm to the person foreseeably results from a known behavior." Id., 617.
As a result of this analysis, the court concluded that: "[W]hen a cat has a propensity to attack other cats, knowledge of that propensity may render the owner liable for injuries to people that foreseeably result from such behavior . . . We further conclude that it is reasonably foreseeable that a person would attempt to protect his own cat from an attack by an abnormally aggressive cat and that the person could be injured by the abnormally aggressive cat, thereby giving rise to a duty of care to prevent such injuries." Id., 617. Because the plaintiff in this case presented evidence that the defendants' cat previously had attacked cats and that she was injured while trying to protect her cat from an attack by the defendants' cat, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's injuries were foreseeable. See id.
Specifically, on a number of occasions in the year prior to the plaintiff's attack, the plaintiff saw the defendants' cat in her backyard and on her porch. In her deposition testimony, the plaintiff described the defendants' cat as dirty, scruffy looking, ragged and in apparent pain. Additionally, a neighbor of both the plaintiff and the defendants, submitted an affidavit in which she stated that the defendant had told her that she "could not control [her cat] because he would `destroy' her kitchen curtains and house to get outside [and] she would let him out and leave the problem cat for everyone else to deal with." This neighbor also stated that the defendant had told her that the defendants' neighbors kept their cats inside to avoid fights with the defendants' cat and that the defendants' cat was covered with scars from fights and that she could not "even give you a figure on how many times I broke up fights, because [the defendants' cat] fought with . . . any cat that . . . came in the yard." Finally, the plaintiff's cat had previously fought with the defendants' cat. See id., 605-06.
Prior to Allen v. Cox, the Appellate Court addressed whether a landlord owed a duty of care to the plaintiff who was attacked by a pit bull owned by tenants as she walked along a public sidewalk. See Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn.App. 252, 253, 815 A.2d 263 (2003). In Stokes, the plaintiff filed suit against the landlord of the property where the pit bull resided, rather than against the tenants/owners of the dog, even though the attack did not occur on any portion or common area of the leased property. See id., 254. Essentially, the plaintiff requested the court to extend liability for a dog bite to non-owners and non-keepers of dogs. See id., 258. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the landlords because they owed no duty to the victim, as she admitted that the attack occurred away from the leased property, on a public sidewalk, and did not occur within any common area under the landlords' control. See id., 279. The court was not persuaded that the common-law duty should be extended to landlords who were not owners, keepers, or harborers of the dog. See id.
In reaching its decision, the court explained: "At common law, only an owner or keeper of a domestic animal owed a duty of reasonable care to others . . . Simply stated, to be liable, one must have control of the animal. Under the common law of this state, it has been held that liability for injuries committed by a vicious animal is grounded in negligence . . . It is the duty of the owner of such an animal, having knowledge of its vicious propensities, to give notice of the propensities or to restrain the animal, and that failure to do so is negligence that makes the owner liable for its consequences . . . Our dog bite statute, § 22-357 . . . flows directly from Connecticut common law. . . . The principal purpose and effect [of the statute] was to abrogate the common-law doctrine of scienter as applied to damage by dogs to persons and property, so that liability of the owner or keeper became no longer dependent upon his knowledge of the dog's ferocity or mischievous propensity; literally construed, the statute would impose an obligation on him to pay for any and all damage the dog may do of its own volition. It extends the liability of the owner of a dog beyond that existing at common law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 265-66.
Section 22-357 states: "If any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, or, if the owner or keeper is a minor, the parent or guardian of such minor, shall be liable for such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. If a minor, on whose behalf an action under this section is brought, was under seven years of age at the time the damage was done, it shall be presumed that such minor was not committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog, and the burden of proof thereof shall be upon the defendant in such action."
In Murphy v. Eddinger, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 98 0086973 (November 30, 1999, Robaina, J.) ( 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 8), a decision of the Superior Court articulated its granting of summary judgments in favor of the defendants, the owners of the property where a horse named Phoenix was boarded. The plaintiff, a farmer, sued the defendants under a theory of common-law negligence, alleging that while shoeing Phoenix, it kicked him, then reared up and landed on his ankle, breaking it. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants, as the landowners, knew or should have known of Phoenix's "violent propensities" and, therefore, should be held responsible for their negligent failure to warn him of the horse's temperament. The court disagreed, concluding that the defendants owed no legal duty to the plaintiff. See id.
The court explained: "The rules (knowledge and control), governing real property, also generally apply to liability for injuries caused by animals. Therefore, and not surprisingly, at common law only an owner, keeper or harborer of a domestic animal owed a duty of reasonable care to others. Moreover, that obligation arises only when the individual exercising control over the animal knew or had reason to know (i.e., scienter) of the animal's `vicious propensities' and, even then, the vicious propensity had to be of the same kind that gave rise to plaintiff's claim . . . For domestic animals, other than dogs (for whom owners or keepers are held strictly liable under General Statutes § 22-357), Connecticut still adheres to the requirement that the owner or keeper know or have notice of at least one other incident of vicious conduct before he has a duty to warn or safeguard others from the injurious actions of his domestic animal. See, e.g., Pallman v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., 117 Conn. 667, 668, 167 A.2d 733 (1933). To date no appellate authority exists to support the proposition that someone other than one who has control over the animal (i.e., an owner, keeper or harborer) can be held liable for the damage caused by the animal." (Citations omitted.) Id., 10.
Finally, in Hansen v. Maniatty, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 320386 (March 26, 1997, Thim, J.) ( 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 306), the plaintiff alleged that she was kicked in the forehead by a horse owned by the defendant's daughter, but kept on a farm owned by the defendant. The plaintiff also alleged that the horse was known to have vicious propensities. The defendant moved to strike the second and third counts of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged recklessness and absolute liability, respectively. See id.
In addressing the second count, the court stated: "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . [R]eckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 306-07.
The court denied the defendant's motion to strike this count. "The plaintiff alleges in the first count that the defendant knew or should have known of the horse's dangerous propensities. In the second count, the plaintiff further alleges that the defendant's daughter . . . was not on the farm when the plaintiff was injured; that [she] did not have anyone supervising the plaintiff, that [she] had previously been injured by the horse; and that two other individuals had previously been injured by the horse. These allegations sufficiently allege conduct from which recklessness may be inferred." Id., 307. The court, however, granted the defendant's motion to strike the third count finding that Connecticut courts have determined a horse to be a domestic animal and that an owner is liable in negligence only if the animal has vicious propensities.
"A horse is a domesticated animal. Thus, it is presumed not to be vicious or dangerous and it is not a dangerous instrumentality . . . Other jurisdictions also consider the horse a domestic animal. The word `domestic,' when used as a descriptive of the word `animals,' means, in its general usage, a tamed animal as distinguished from a wild animal. Tame animals are those which are naturally tame and gentle, or which, by long association with man, have been thoroughly domesticated and are reduced to a state of subjection to man's will. Included within this definition of `domestic animals' are such animals as horses, sheep, goats, cows, pigs, poultry, and all other animals which live in association with man . . . Liability of the owner or keeper for injuries from animals are governed by two general rules, one for an animal classified as a `wild and savage beast' and a different rule for a domestic animal; a horse is included in the latter classification . . . The distinction between the liability of the owner of domestic animals which are naturally tame, such as horse, mules, cattle, goats, sheep, dogs and the like, and the owner or keeper of animals that are naturally wild and savage is well understood and needs little discussion . . . Originally all the animals which are now used by man were wild. One after another they have become domesticated, and subject to his control, ownership, and use. As time progressed they gradually lost their character of wildness, and became more and more subject to mankind, and more and more regarded as ordinary property. At this day no one would contend that a horse was not the subject of absolute property because his ancestors were originally wild; and the same may be said of other animals now thoroughly recognized as domestic." Id., 307. Thus, the court concluded: "The owner of a horse is frequently held liable for personal injuries caused by the animal's biting, kicking, trampling, or the like, when it is shown that he knew or had cause to know, of its vicious propensities." Id.
Therefore, under Connecticut law, the owner of a horse, classified as a domesticated animal, is only liable to an injured plaintiff if the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the horse's propensity to attack other animals or people, given that knowledge of this propensity renders the owner liable for injuries to people that foreseeably result from such behavior. With this legal principle in mind, the court must now consider the parties' evidence.
The defendants submitted to the court the affidavit of Timothy Astriab, dated September 28, 2009, in which he attests: "To the best of my knowledge and belief, during the twenty eight years that Glendale Farms has kept horses, we have never had an episode where any of the horses we kept has bitten or otherwise injured any person." The defendants also submitted to the court excerpts from Timothy Astriab's deposition, which will be fully discussed below.
Finally, the defendants submitted the plaintiffs' response to their request for admissions dated December 28, 2009. The plaintiffs admitted that: "The plaintiffs and/or their representatives . . . have no knowledge that anyone, other than Anthony John Vendrella, was ever bitten by a horse on the property of the defendants." The plaintiffs stated: "It is admitted that the plaintiff is unaware of any person other than Anthony John Vendrella being bitten by a horse on said property." Further, the plaintiffs admitted: "The plaintiffs and/or their representatives have no evidence that anyone, other than Anthony John Vendrella, was ever bitten by a horse on the property of the defendants."
The plaintiffs submitted to the court the depositions of Timothy Astriab, Crystal Cobb, Richard George and Captain Bernard L. Begley, Jr. In his deposition, taken on December 30, 2009, Astriab was asked: "Did either of [the] horses have a tendency to fight with any of the other horses?" To which he responded: "Not that I could remember, no." Astriab also stated that he did not take children to the horses on the farm, did not walk families over to the horses and told families to stay away from the horses "to protect the people from the horses and the horses from the people."
When further questioned about this statement, Astriab responded that he was concerned about the horses being fed something that would make them sick, such as apples. Astriab expressed concerns about people feeding the horses grass because their fingers would get too close to the horses which might think that a person's fingers are food. Astriab was also questioned about, but did not respond definitively to, whether a horse's vision becomes blurred when objects are brought close to it. Astriab was asked: "[Y]ou advise people not to pet the horses or feed the horses because it's your understanding that horses, by their own very nature, could harm you if you do that, correct?" To which he responded: "Yes, a horse could bite you and cause great physical damage." He answered the following questions in the affirmative: "Even though a horse doesn't show propensity to bite another person, your understanding is horses, by their very nature, could bite you?" "And that's why you want people to keep a distance from these horses; is that correct?" Finally, Astriab was asked about signs on his property, which said "please do not pet or feed the horses," he responded affirmatively when prompted: "And that's why you put various signs on the property?"
Astriab was deposed for a second time on August 4, 2010. In this deposition, Astriab was asked more specific questions about Scuppy. In regard to the signs posted along the fence where Scuppy was held, Astriab was asked: "Was there a concern that if someone tried to pet or feed Scuppy, for example, that they could get bit?" to which he responded: "Not just Scuppy . . . Not just Scuppy but any horse." He was further asked: "Was Scuppy different than any other horses in that Scuppy would not bite if a finger was put in front of it?" and answered: "No." He then answered affirmatively, "So . . . Scuppy was a typical horse, correct? . . . And a typical horse, if you put a hand out, would typically inquire as to what was being put in front of it, correct?" Astriab also admitted that he had concerns with horses nipping or biting a person if they put something in front of it. He was repeatedly asked and affirmatively answered questions regarding whether a "typical reaction" from a "typical horse" would be to nip or bite something that is put in front of their face.
Additionally, Astriab was asked about horse grooming and about Scuppy's interaction with other horses. "How do they play with each other?" Astriab responded: "Just by swinging their heads back and forth. I haven't seen any aggression from Scuppy or any other horse that I have there." Astriab stated that Scuppy boarded at his facility for five to six years before the incident, which occurred in May 2006. He stated that in this time period, he had an opportunity to observe Scuppy's tendencies. He answered "No" to the following three questions: "Was it in any way typical of Scuppy to bite people before May of 2006? Had you ever seen Scuppy bite anyone before May of 2006?; and Had anyone ever told you before May of 2006 that Scuppy had bitten anyone?"
In her deposition, taken on January 29, 2010, Cobb, an employee of Glendale Farm present on the date of the incident, was asked: "Was [it] unusual for people . . . to ask to go look at the horses?" To which she responded: "No, it was not . . . [W]hen they have little kids, they see the horse, they want to take a look. Most people don't let their children near the horses, though." Cobb stated that she did not tell Anthony's father that he shouldn't let his child near the horses and didn't know whether anybody else working in the farm that day said anything to him about getting close to the horses.
George, an animal control officer who investigated this incident, was deposed on January 11, 2010. In his deposition, he answered several general questions about horses without any specific references to the horses on Glendale Farm, including Scuppy. George was asked: "Would you agree with me that a horse doesn't have to have a tendency to bite in order to bite?" he responded: "Correct, I would say so." George then went on to say that he himself had been bitten by horses.
Fire Captain Begley was deposed on January 11, 2010. He, like George, answered several general questions about horses without any specific references to the horses on Glendale Farm, including Scuppy. He was asked: "You agree with me that any horse can bite you at any time?" and responded: "They have been doing it all since the beginning of time, biting and kicking." He was then asked: "It's not that they're vicious, it's just the nature of the horses?" and responded: "Cows do it, too."
Finally, the plaintiffs attach the affidavit of Dr. Bradley Amery, an equine veterinarian, dated May 12, 2010. In his affidavit, Amery attests that: "Biting is a natural part of horses' lives and horses can bite for many reasons." Amery goes on to explain a horse's anatomy. Specifically, Amery explains that the location of a horse's eye creates a blind spot, which causes a horse to rely upon sensory input from its mouth alone as it cannot see what it is eating.
In light of all of the evidence presented, the court is satisfied that the defendants have met their burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact that they had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of Scuppy's alleged "vicious propensities." Astriab testified that neither he nor anyone else had ever seen Scuppy bite anyone before May of 2006. He attested that in twenty-eight years, Glendale Farms never had an episode where any of the horses bit or injured anyone. Additionally, the plaintiffs admitted that they had no knowledge or evidence that anyone, other than Anthony Jr., had ever been bitten by a horse at Glendale Farms.
As the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiffs, they have failed to present any evidence to dispute this. The plaintiffs' evidence, including the testimony of Astriab, George and Captain Begley, and Dr. Amery's affidavit, simply indicates that horses have an anatomical and behavioral tendency to bite or nip at objects that are brought close to their mouths. Cats have a tendency to scratch and horses have a tendency to bite, but the plaintiffs have failed to show, as they must, that the defendants were on notice that Scuppy specifically, and not horses generally, had a tendency to bite people or other horses. Therefore, the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs and are entitled to judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claims as a matter of law.
Next, the court will briefly address the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to this case. The attractive nuisance doctrine requires "that one who maintains or permits upon his premises a condition, instrumentality, machine, or other agency which is dangerous to children of tender years by reason of their inability to appreciate the peril therein, and which may reasonably be expected to attract children of tender years to the premises, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the dangers of the attraction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Booty v. Stoll, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 5000413 (July 6, 2006, Hurley, J.T.R.).
Connecticut has never adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine and instead, "adhere[s] to the principles of common-law negligence within its recognition that children require special consideration." Neal v. Shiels, Inc., 166 Conn. 3, 12, 347 A.2d 102 (1974). "Our cases have attempted to safeguard children of tender years from their propensity to disregard dangerous conditions. It definitely has been established by frequent repetition of the statement that the degree of care required of children is such care as may reasonably be expected of children of similar age, judgment and experience . . . As to the care required of others in relation to children, the same propensity of children has been taken into consideration in evaluating the negligence of these others . . . Although the attractive nuisance doctrine has never been adopted in this state . . . the rule stated in Restatement, 2 Torts § 339, concerning trespassing children injured by a dangerous condition on an owner's land has been approved . . . This approval has been extended, at least in part, to the revised version of this rule in Restatement (Second), 2 Torts § 339." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 11.
Significantly, the Neal court noted: "Where there is no legal duty, there can be no actionable negligence. Unless some relationship exists between the person injured and the defendant, by which the latter owes a duty to the former, there can be no liability for negligence . . . In other words, there is a distinction between liability arising from one's fault and the absence of liability for injury arising from another's misfortune. Restatement (Second), 2 Torts § 302 states: `A negligent act or omission may be one which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through . . . (b) the foreseeable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature.' Section 303 states: `An act is negligent if the actor intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the conduct of another, a third person, or an animal in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other.' Connecticut law has paralleled the Restatement view in applying the broad rule that the duty to exercise reasonable care arises whenever the activities of two persons come so in conjunction that the failure by one to exercise that care is likely to cause injury to the other." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 12. As previously discussed, the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs because there is no genuine issue of material fact that they had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of Scuppy's vicious propensities.
Finally, the defendants are also entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the plaintiffs' recklessness counts against them. As previously discussed: "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . [R]eckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hansen v. Maniatty, supra, 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 306-07. Given that the plaintiffs' negligence claims fail, their recklessness claims must also fail as a matter of law.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.