Opinion
Case No. C-1-05-552.
February 13, 2006
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon a complaint filed by Vending Machine Serviceman's Union, c/o Gary Switzer, President ("Union") against Cincinnati Coco-Cola Bottling Company ("Company") seeking to vacate an Arbitration Award. Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. A hearing on the matter was held on February 7, 2006.
I. Introduction
The Union filed a grievance on behalf of Jason Lefker (grievant"), a member of the Union and an employee of the Company, contesting his termination for failure to obtain a Commercial Driver's License ("CDL") as lacking just cause and constituting a violation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the grievance was presented to Arbitrator David W. Stanton, Esq. for resolution. Following a hearing, the Arbitrator issued a decision in which he phrased the question to be resolved, as stipulated by the parties, as follows: "Was the Grievant discharged for just cause and if not what shall be the appropriate remedy?"
II. The undisputed facts
Plaintiff filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which defendant has highlighted as true, false, or irrelevant. Defendant filed a counter-statement, which plaintiff has not highlighted. The facts that are not in dispute are as follows:
1. The Union and the Company were at all relevant times parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement"). Grievant is covered by the Agreement.
2. Article 3 of the Agreement, the "Management Clause," provides, in pertinent part, that management shall have the exclusive right "for proper cause, to suspend, discharge, lay off, or otherwise discipline employees . . ."
3. Article 9 of the Agreement, captioned "Discipline Procedure," provides, in pertinent part, that "Any violation of [the Company's] work rules may result in progressive disciplinary action which may include termination of employment . . . Progressive disciplinary action is defined as: Step 1 — verbal warning; Step 2 — written reprimand; Step 3 — three (3) day suspension."
4. Article 7 of the Agreement contains a grievance and arbitration provision for resolving disputes concerning grievances between the parties to the Agreement. Section 2 of Article
7 provides as follows:
The arbitrator shall have jurisdiction and authority to determine only the application of the written provisions of this Agreement as they relate to the issues raised by the original grievance as stated therein. He or she shall have no jurisdiction or authority whatsoever to add to or subtract from or alter any of the provisions of this Agreement or to decide any question or issue between the parties arising out of the negotiation of any provision of a collective bargaining agreement or to substitute his or her discretion or judgment for that of the Company or for the Union.
5. On February 9, 2004, the Company terminated grievant.
6. On February 16, 2004, grievant timely filed a grievance with the Company alleging that he was unjustly terminated in violation of the Agreement. The grievant stated on the Grievance Form that he had been "unjustly terminated by the Company for not getting my CDL."
7. The Union invoked arbitration of the grievance in a timely manner.
8. Arbitrator Stanton was selected by agreement of the parties' counsel to decide the grievance.
9. The Arbitrator conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 12, 2004.
10. The Arbitrator issued his decision on the grievance on May 27, 2005, sustaining it in part and denying it in part.
11. Pursuant to the Arbitrator's directive, the Company reinstated grievant to his previous position without loss of seniority and converted his termination to a disciplinary suspension without pay.
12. Arbitrator Stanton determined that the suspension should be an "unpaid suspension," which amounted to a disciplinary suspension of approximately 480 days duration.
III. The Arbitrator's decision
The Arbitrator set forth the facts at length in his decision. To briefly summarize, the Company terminated grievant for failure to obtain a Class B CDL within 60 work days as was required for his position. The Arbitrator determined that although the Company had this time requirement for employees to obtain their Class B CDL upon bidding into certain jobs, the 60-day requirement was rarely, if ever, strictly enforced. The Arbitrator stated that the Company could not take a more stringent stance on this work rule in the grievant's case without giving the grievant notice that strict compliance with the 60-day requirement was necessary, which the Company had failed to do. The Arbitrator also determined that the Company had failed to provide the grievant a meaningful opportunity to obtain his Class B CDL. The Arbitrator therefore determined that reinstatement of the grievant to the position into which he had bid "based on his obtaining his CDL license" was appropriate. The Arbitrator further found, however, that because the grievant had misrepresented to the Company that he had successfully obtained his Class B CDL and had the paperwork to document same, the grievant was not entitled to recover any back-pay "or any other type of financial award relative to his reinstatement." The Arbitrator formulated the following remedy:
[T]he Grievant shall, within ten (10) calendar days, be reinstated to his previous position without loss of seniority, but the Grievant's termination shall be reduced to an unpaid suspension for which he shall not receive any other contractually afforded or recognized, monetary compensation. The Grievant shall not lose any seniority as a result of the Employer's action and the termination shall be reduced to a suspension without pay.
IV. The parties' positions
Plaintiff seeks to vacate only that portion of the Arbitrator's Award dealing with the remedy ordered on the ground that the Arbitrator clearly exceeded his authority under the Agreement. Plaintiff alleges that the Arbitrator's "excessive penalty," i.e., a disciplinary suspension of 480 days without pay, directly contravenes the Agreement. Plaintiff argues that the Agreement "expressly defines progressive discipline which, applied here, requires a three (3) day suspension, not a suspension of well over a year." In essence, plaintiff argues that the language of the Agreement clearly restricts the Arbitrator to issuing only a three-day suspension and in imposing a greater penalty, the Arbitrator ignored the plain language of the Agreement, specifically Articles 7 and 9. Plaintiff argues that because the Arbitrator's Award goes beyond the requirements expressly provided for in the Agreement, the Award is not rationally supported by or derived from the Agreement.The Company argues that the Agreement does not require the use of a progressive disciplinary system but authorizes an employee to be punished by discipline up to and including termination as long as the "just cause" standard is met. The Company also argues that the parties stipulated to the Arbitrator's ability to fashion a remedy so that plaintiff cannot now seek to limit the Arbitrator's authority in this regard. Finally, the Company argues that the discipline cannot be reduced from a termination to a three-day suspension because the grievant already received a three-day suspension, so that under the Union's theory the next step in the process would be termination.
In its reply brief, the Union states that it is not opposed to dismissal of Count Two of the two-count complaint alleging that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction and authority by failing to issue his decision in a timely fashion, resulting in a financial windfall to the Company. The Union goes on to argue that because the Arbitrator took an unconscionable amount of time to issue his decision, the grievant suffered an extreme and vindictive penalty. The Union also argues that none of the defendant's work rules supporting the suspension were placed before the Arbitrator and that those rules are not in issue because the grievant was not terminated for violation of a work rule but was instead terminated for not fulfilling a work requirement.
V. Standard of review
The scope of review of an arbitration award is "very narrow; one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "As long as the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely [the arbitrator's] own brand of industrial justice, the award is legitimate." International Union v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364 (1987) (internal quotations omitted)).
The Sixth Circuit has set forth the circumstances under which an arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement: "(1) [the award] conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is not rationally supported by or derived from the agreement; or (4) it is based on general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the exact terms of the Agreement." Id. (citing MidMichigan Reg'l Med. Ctr.-Clare v. Prof'l Employees Div. of Local 79, 183 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted)).
VI. Opinion
There is no valid basis for vacating the Arbitrator's Award. Plaintiff is correct in asserting that the fact that the parties stipulated to the Arbitrator's authority to fashion a remedy does not mean that the parties intended to grant the Arbitrator license to craft a remedy that violates the terms of the Agreement. Plaintiff has not shown, however, that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority in formulating the remedy in this matter. As explained below, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Award conflicts with the express terms of the Agreement; that it imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the Agreement; that it is not rationally supported by or derived from the Agreement; or that it is based on anything other than the exact terms of the Agreement.First, Article 9 of the Agreement does not, by its terms, mandate that "progressive disciplinary action" be imposed in each case and that no suspension may exceed three days. To the contrary, Article 9 is couched in permissive language, providing that "Any violation of these work rules may result in progressive disciplinary action which may include termination of employment." (emphasis added). Plaintiff's argument that the grievant was not disciplined for violation of a work rule so that this permissive language has no bearing on his case, but that the definition of progressive discipline contained in Article 9 does apply and mandates the imposition of a three-day suspension, is unavailing. To separate out the provisions of Article 9 in this manner and hold that only certain provisions apply in a given case while others may be ignored would violate the principle of contract interpretation that holds every provision in a contract must be given meaning. See Detroit Typographical Union v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 283 F.3d 779, 788 (6th Cir. 2002). Article 9 either applies in a particular case or it does not. If it does apply, then the permissive language stating that progressive disciplinary action may be imposed likewise applies. If Article 9 does not apply, then the progressive disciplinary action provision does not apply and plaintiff cannot rely on it to argue that the disciplinary action must be limited to the action specified in the provision.
Second, Article 3 of the Agreement, the "Management Clause," vests management with the right "for proper cause" to suspend, discharge, or "otherwise discipline employees." This Article in no manner limits the length of the suspension that may be imposed.
Third, the fact that the remedy imposed by the Arbitrator may strike some as harsh is not a valid basis for vacating the Award. Because the Agreement allows for the imposition of a suspension for "proper cause," in this case the grievant's numerous misrepresentations that he had obtained a Class B CDL and had the paperwork to verify that fact, the Award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" and is not the Arbitrator's "own brand of industrial justice." See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358 (1960). For these reasons, the Arbitrator's decision must stand.
VII. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiff's request to vacate the Arbitration Award is DENIED. The Award is hereby AFFIRMED. This case is TERMINATED on the docket of the Court at plaintiff's cost.
IT IS SO ORDERED.