Opinion
04-22-00573-CV
07-05-2023
Jacob VENABLE and Pamela Carr, Appellants v. Jeff JUDKINS and Alison Judkins, Appellees
From the County Court at Law, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. 22375C, Honorable Susan Harris, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice, Beth Watkins, Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BETH WATKINS, JUSTICE.
Appellants Jacob Venable and Pamela Carr (collectively, the Venable parties) appeal the trial court's forcible detainer judgment in favor of appellees Jeff Judkins and Alison Judkins (collectively, the Judkins parties). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Pamela Carr and Alison Judkins are sisters. Jacob Venable is Pamela's boyfriend, and Jeff Judkins is Alison's husband.
Pamela and Alison's grandfather, Harold H. Kunz, Jr., was the trustee of the Harold H. Kunz, Jr. Revocable Trust. During Harold's lifetime, the Harold H. Kunz, Jr. Revocable Trust owned a tract of land in Kerr County that the parties refer to as the Kunz Ranch. The Kunz Ranch is home to a residential property the parties refer to as "the main house" and a smaller structure the parties call "the hunting cabin." This dispute turns on the parties' competing claims to possession of the hunting cabin.
The evidence in this case shows that on July 31, 2018, the Harold H. Kunz, Jr. Revocable Trust leased the main house and some portion of the Kunz Ranch land to the Judkins parties. The lease agreement provided that the Judkins parties leased:
In their appellate brief, the Venable parties contend the validity of the July 31, 2018 lease is currently at issue in a separate lawsuit. In this case, however, the Venable parties did not challenge the lease's validity below; instead, they argued only that the lease did not apply to the entire Kunz Ranch. As a result, the validity of the lease is not properly before us, and we do not consider it.
The house and surround [sic] land and access ways as depicted on Exhibit A attached hereto. The parties acknowledge that they are familiar with the land and house and that the failure to provide an adequate legal description shall not affect this lease.
The Premises shall be used solely and exclusively for private residence and ranching purposes, and shall be occupied only by Lessee and their family and guests.
The Judkins parties contend the lease gave them exclusive rights to the entire Kunz Ranch. The Venable parties argue, however, that the Judkins parties did not show "the alleged Exhibit containing the property description . . . was part of said lease" when the Judkins parties and Harold signed it and, as a result, did not establish they have exclusive rights to anything other than the main house and the immediately surrounding land.
After they signed the July 31, 2018 lease, the Judkins parties moved into the main house with their children, and they lived there at all times relevant to this appeal. In August of 2018, the Judkins parties purchased an unimproved 21.66-acre tract of the Kunz Ranch outright. The Harold H. Kunz, Jr. Revocable Trust continued to own the rest of the ranch, including the land on which both the main house and the hunting cabin sit.
Harold died shortly after the sale of the 21.66-acre tract. Harold's daughter, Judith Kunz Cooney (who is also Pamela and Alison's mother), subsequently became the trustee of both the Harold Kunz, Jr. Revocable Trust and the Lois Kunz Marital Trust. On May 1, 2019, Cooney, in her capacity as trustee of both trusts, transferred the Kunz Ranch to the Lois Kunz Marital Trust. It is undisputed that the Lois Kunz Marital Trust owns the portions of the Kunz Ranch that are relevant to this dispute.
Lois Kunz was Harold's surviving widow.
On October 25, 2019, Cooney, again acting in her capacity as trustee of both trusts, assigned the July 31, 2018 lease to the Lois Kunz Marital Trust. The written Assignment and Assumption of Lease specified that "the Real Property is subject to a lease dated as of July 31, 2018." It also defined "the Real Property" as the property "described in that Correction Special Warranty Deed dated March 26, 2009, and recorded at Volume 1732, Page 0316, Deed Records of Kerr County, Texas; SAVE AND EXCEPT" the 21.66-acre tract the Judkins parties purchased in August of 2018. It appears to be undisputed that the March 26, 2009 Correction Special Warranty Deed described the entire Kunz Ranch.
The Judkins parties contend that in January of 2021, they entered into an oral sublease with the Venable parties that permitted the Venable parties to stay on the Kunz Ranch in a recreational vehicle. At some point, the Venable parties moved into the hunting cabin, and they remained there at the time of trial. The relationship between the Venable parties and the Judkins parties deteriorated, and the Judkins parties asked the Venable parties to leave the property. The Venable parties refused, contending they had leased the hunting cabin directly from the Lois Kunz Marital Trust and had trustee Cooney's permission to remain on the property. Like the Judkins parties, the Venable parties lived on the Kunz Ranch at all times relevant to this appeal.
On April 5, 2022, the Judkins parties sent the Venable parties a written notice terminating the sublease. On May 10, 2022, the Judkins parties sent the Venable parties a written notice to vacate the property. When the Venable parties failed to vacate, the Judkins parties filed a forcible detainer action in the Justice Court of Kerr County. The justice court awarded possession of the Kunz Ranch to the Judkins parties, and the Venable parties appealed that ruling to the Kerr County Court at Law. After a trial de novo, the county court at law signed a final judgment awarding possession of the Kunz Ranch to the Judkins parties. The Venable parties then appealed to this court.
Analysis
The Venable parties challenge: (1) the trial court's admission of one of the Judkins parties' trial exhibits; (2) the Judkins parties' standing to file a forcible detainer action; and (3) the trial court's conclusion that the Judkins parties had a superior right to possession of the Kunz Ranch. The Judkins parties respond that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the property is not used solely for residential purposes.
Jurisdiction
Before turning to the merits of the Venable parties' issues, we must address the Judkins parties' contention that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See, e.g., Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517, 519 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, pet. denied). Our jurisdiction to review appeals from forcible detainer proceedings is statutorily limited by section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code, which provides, "A final judgment of a county court in an eviction suit may not be appealed on the issue of possession unless the premises in question are being used for residential purposes only." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007; see also Ugarte v. Eureka Holdings Acquisitions, LP, No. 03-20-00083-CV, 2021 WL 2064902, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin May 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
As support for their assertion that we lack jurisdiction, the Judkins parties first note that the July 31, 2018 lease provided the property "shall be used solely and exclusively for private residence and ranching purposes." They describe this provision of the lease as a written acknowledgment "that the Kunz Ranch was not for residential purposes only." The lease did not, however, define "ranching purposes," and we see no evidence that the parties used the land for "ranching purposes" that were inconsistent with a rural residential property. While the trial court heard evidence that the Judkins parties raised cattle and other animals on the property, we see no evidence that the livestock were sold or used for other commercial purposes. We decline to hold that the presence of livestock, without more, established the Kunz Ranch was not used solely for residential purposes. We note, moreover, that the Judkins parties presented no evidence that the oral sublease to the Venable parties permitted non-residential uses or that the Venable parties used the subleased portion of the property for non-residential purposes.
The Judkins parties next argue the evidence showed that both the Harold Kunz, Jr. Revocable Trust and the Lois Kunz Marital Trust historically leased the Kunz Ranch and the hunting cabin to hunters as "a side business venture[.]" They also point out that the most recent hunting lease, which was admitted into evidence, described the property as "primarily a cattle ranch." The Judkins parties contend this evidence "is a clear acknowledgment of commercial enterprise being conducted on the Kunz Ranch." As explained above, we do not believe the mere presence of livestock is inconsistent with a conclusion that the property was solely residential. Furthermore, the hunting lease admitted into evidence expired a year before the Judkins parties formally terminated the sublease, and there is no evidence that any other hunting leases were in effect during the relevant time. The Judkins parties have not cited any authority to support a conclusion that non-residential uses which ended before the origin of this dispute present a jurisdictional bar to this appeal.
Finally, the Judkins parties argue the evidence showed the Venable parties "provid[ed] services on the Kunz Ranch to maintain it" in lieu of paying rent to the Lois Kunz Marital Trust. However, the Judkins parties cite no authority holding that "a trade-for-services" arrangement renders a property non-residential. Nor do they identify any evidence showing the services the Venable parties provided are inconsistent with residential use of a rural property.
The evidence shows that both the Judkins parties and the Venable parties used the property as their residences, and we see no evidence showing the property was used for commercial or other non-residential purposes when the present dispute over the hunting cabin arose. See Hartwell v. Banyan Tree Apartments, No. 04-00-00556-CV, 2001 WL 1006716, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept. 5, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under these circumstances, we reject the Judkins parties' suggestion that we lack jurisdiction over the Venable parties' appeal.
Evidentiary Ruling
In their first issue, the Venable parties challenge the trial court's admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which is a copy of the July 31, 2018 lease agreement between the Judkins parties and the Harold H. Kunz Jr. Revocable Trust. The Venable parties do not challenge the authenticity of the first six pages of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which contained the lease terms, the signatures of the parties to the lease, and the notarization of the parties' signatures. However, the Venable parties argue the Judkins parties did not establish the authenticity of two attachments to the lease, Exhibits A and B, which consisted of legal descriptions of the property covered by the lease. They contend the Judkins parties did not show that Exhibits A and B were attached to the lease when the parties signed it. The Venable parties further argue that without Exhibits A and B, the Judkins parties cannot show they held a valid lease on the land on which the hunting cabin is located.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
"A piece of evidence's authenticity is a prerequisite to admissibility." United Rentals, Inc. v. Smith, 445 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2014, no pet.). To authenticate a piece of evidence, its proponent must present "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). This can be accomplished through, inter alia, the testimony of a witness who has personal knowledge "that an item is what it is claimed to be." TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). One of our sister courts has described the authenticity test as a "low bar." See Cain v. State, 621 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2021, pet. refd); Gardner v. State, No. 02-14-00459-CR, 2015 WL 4652718, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 716 (Tex. 2016). A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, or made without reference to guiding rules or principles. See E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ronald Holland's A-Plus Transmission &Auto., Inc., 358 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). "if there is a legitimate basis in the record to support the ruling, we must uphold it." Id.
Even if a trial court errs in admitting a particular piece of evidence, we may not reverse the judgment unless the error harmed the appellant. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. 2003). To establish harm, the appellant must show the evidence was "controlling on a material issue and not cumulative of other evidence." Wood v. Wiggins, 650 S.W.3d 533, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). Erroneously admitted evidence is harmless if it is cumulative of properly admitted evidence. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004).
Application
As noted above, the July 31, 2018 lease stated, "The parties acknowledge that they are familiar with the land and house and that the failure to provide an adequate legal description shall not affect this lease." Alison testified that she recognized Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, including Exhibits A and B, as "the documents that we signed, when we moved out here" and "our lease agreement that we signed with my grandfather to move out here to the ranch." She testified that she intended to lease the entire Kunz Ranch on July 31, 2018, and she identified Exhibits A and B as "the legal description or survey notes for the property, the entire property of the ranch that we are leasing." She described Exhibits A and B as "part of the lease in and of itself to show what we were actually leasing" and explained the purpose of those exhibits was "[t]o show clear defined terms of what the ranch parameters were." While Alison testified she was "not 100 percent certain" that Exhibits A and B "were there when I signed with the notary," she specifically "recall[ed] them being there at the title, when we closed a month later on the property that we were purchasing." On this record, we cannot say the trial court behaved arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to guiding rules or principles by concluding that Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, including Exhibits A and B, was what its proponent claimed it to be. TEX. R. EVID. 901(a); see Sanchez v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam rs, 229 S.W.3d 498, 508-09 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.); Ecofriendly Water Co., LLC v. Mercer, No. 05-18-00763-CV, 2019 WL 1950177, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court's admission of document where it "exactly matched [the witness's] testimony regarding content").
But even if we assume the trial court erred by admitting the entirety of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, the record shows that exhibit was cumulative of other evidence:
• Alison testified without objection that the Judkins parties "leased the entire Kunz Ranch, a little over 190 acres."
• Agreed Exhibit 2, which was admitted without objection, specified that "the Real Property" is subject to the July 31, 2018 lease. Agreed Exhibit 2 defined "the Real Property" as the property "described in that Correction Special Warranty Deed dated March 26, 2009, and recorded at Volume 1732, Page 0316, Deed Records of Kerr County, Texas," and it excepted only the 21.66-acre tract the Judkins parties purchased in August of 2018.
• Agreed Exhibit 3, which was also admitted without objection, was the March 26, 2009 deed referred to in Agreed Exhibit 2. It included two attachments labeled Exhibit A and Exhibit B that described the property as "Tract 1, being a 167.78 acre tract" and "Tract 2, being a 26.37 acre tract." The trial court heard evidence that these descriptions referred to the entirety of the Kunz Ranch. We note, moreover, that Exhibits A and B to the March 26, 2009 Correction Special Warranty Deed were identical to Exhibits A and B to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
When considered together, Alison's testimony and Agreed Exhibits 2 and 3 support a conclusion that the entirety of the Kunz Ranch was subject to the July 31, 2018 lease. Because the challenged details of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 "were also reflected in" evidence that was admitted without objection, the Venable parties cannot show they were harmed by the trial court's error, if any, in admitting Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. See Deluxe Barber Sch., LLC v. Nwakor, 609 S.W.3d 282, 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); see also Nissan Motor Co., 145 S.W.3d at 144.
We overrule the Venable parties' first issue.
The Judkins Parties' Standing to Bring a Forcible Detainer Action
In their second issue, the Venable parties argue the Judkins parties lacked standing to file a forcible detainer action because they did "not have a lease which extends to the land from which they sought to evict" the Venable parties.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
"A court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff without standing to assert it." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008). "The standing inquiry 'requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.'" Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 156 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). The merits of a plaintiff's claims do not determine whether he has standing to assert the claim; instead, the inquiry turns on whether the plaintiff's "claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford redress." DaimlerChrysler, 252 S.W.3d at 305.
To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege facts showing he is "personally aggrieved" and his alleged injury is "concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical." Id. at 304-05 (footnote omitted). The plaintiff must also allege facts showing his alleged injury is "'fairly traceable' to the defendant's conduct" and is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155-56 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
Application
The Judkins parties' forcible detainer petition alleged they were party to a valid lease that gave them the exclusive right to possession of the entire Kunz Ranch. Their petition also alleged that they subleased a portion of the property to the Venable parties, that they subsequently terminated the sublease, and that the Venable parties failed to vacate the property. Finally, the petition alleged the Judkins parties were entitled to a judgment awarding them possession of the property. These allegations were sufficient to satisfy the threshold inquiries of injury, traceability, and redressability. See id. at 159; see also Venzor v. AMG BT Note One LLC, No. 08-19-00007-CV, 2020 WL 4915590, at *3 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 21, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The Venable parties' contention that the lease did not cover the entire Kunz Ranch goes to the merits of the Judkins parties' claim, not their standing to assert it. See Lua v. Cap. Plus Fin., LLC, 646 S.W.3d 622, 629-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2022, pet. denied); see also DaimlerChrysler, 252 S.W.3d at 305.
We overrule the Venable parties' second issue.
Right to Possession of the Kunz Ranch
In their third issue, the Venable parties argue the trial court could not properly "determine the issue of immediate possession" because the Judkins parties "failed to establish a landlord tenant relationship." We construe this issue as a challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the Judkins parties had a right to immediate possession of the Kunz Ranch.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
"[T]he only issue in a forcible detainer action is which party has the right to immediate possession of the property." Dormady v. Dinero Land &Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e). "A person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand commits a forcible detainer if the person . . . is a tenant or a subtenant wilfully and without force holding over after the termination of the tenant's right of possession[.]" TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(1). Evidence showing the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties provides the trial court with a basis upon which to "determine the issue of immediate possession[.]" Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
When an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding on which he did not bear the burden of proof, he must demonstrate that no evidence supports the finding. See In re Marriage of Thrash, 605 S.W.3d 224, 230 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2020, pet. denied). We credit the evidence that supports the challenged finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See, e.g., Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). If more than a scintilla of evidence supports the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge will fail. Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex. 2019).
In a factual sufficiency review, we consider the entire record, including evidence that is contrary to the challenged finding. See, e.g., Vast Constr., LLC v. CTC Contractors, LLC, 526 S.W.3d 709, 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). To prevail on a claim of factual insufficiency, the appellant must show the challenged finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Abrams v. Salinas, 467 S.W.3d 606, 614 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2015, no pet.).
"In either a legal or factual sufficiency review, issues of credibility and reconciling conflicts within the evidence are for the [factfinder]." 4922 Holdings, LLC v. Rivera, 625 S.W.3d 316, 328 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied).
Application
As explained above, Alison testified that the Judkins parties leased the entirety of the Kunz Ranch. Other than the lease's provisions that the Judkins parties may use the property only for "private residence and ranching purposes" and must maintain the property "in good, clean and sanitary order and condition," we see no express limitation on the Judkins parties' use of or access to the ranch or their ability to exclude others from it. This is significant because absent "express language to the contrary," a lease of land carries an implied covenant that the lessee will "have the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the leased premises." L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 233 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. 1950); see also Four Bros. Boat Works, Inc. v. Tesoro Petroleum Cos., Inc., 217 S.W.3d 653, 665-66 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (describing this proposition as "well-settled"). Alison also testified that the Judkins parties, as lessees, orally subleased a portion of the Kunz Ranch to the Venable parties but later terminated that sublease and asked the Venable parties to vacate the property. Finally, it is undisputed that the Venable parties refused to vacate the property.
This evidence is more than a scintilla to support the trial court's implied findings that: (1) the Judkins parties leased the entire Kunz Ranch; (2) the Venable parties were the Judkins parties' subtenants; (3) the Judkins parties terminated the sublease; and (4) the Venable parties committed a forcible detainer by refusing to leave. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(a)(1); Tex. Outfitters, 572 S.W.3d at 653. As a result, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the Judkins parties had the right to immediate possession of the property. See Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 558.
The Venable parties presented evidence that they did not sublease the disputed portion of the Kunz Ranch from the Judkins parties, but instead leased the property directly from Cooney, the representative of the property's record title owner. The Venable parties also presented evidence that Cooney gave them permission to remain in the hunting cabin. The trial court had the sole authority to resolve the conflict between this evidence and the Judkins parties' contrary evidence. See, e.g., 4922 Holdings, 625 S.W.3d at 328. But even if we consider this conflicting evidence, the Venable parties have not shown the challenged findings are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to render the trial court's judgment clearly wrong and unjust. See Abrams, 467 S.W.3d at 614. Accordingly, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the judgment.
We overrule the Venable parties' third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.