Opinion
No. CV-02-0518141-S
November 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On November 13, 2002, the plaintiff commenced this present action to recover damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 12, 2000. The plaintiff alleged that her damages were caused by the negligence of the defendant. The matter was tried to a jury and it found in favor of the plaintiff awarding her past medical expenses of $1628 and future medical expenses of $5690. On July 15, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for remittitur of the jury's award of future medical expenses on the ground that the plaintiff did not present any evidence regarding the cost of future medical expenses. A review of the trial exhibits show that the plaintiff had submitted her medical records from her treating physicians and her own testimony as evidence of her injuries and losses.
DISCUSSION
In considering a motion for remittitur, "[t]he size of the verdict alone does not determine whether it is excessive. The only practical test to apply to [a] verdict is whether the award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption . . . Thus, [i]n ruling on the motion for remittitur, the trial court [is] obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in determining whether the verdict returned was reasonably supported thereby . . . A conclusion that the jury exercised merely poor judgment is an insufficient basis for ordering a remittitur . . . The plaintiff need not prove damages with mathematical exactitude; rather, the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for the trier to make a fair and reasonable estimate . . . The fact that the jury returns a verdict in excess of what the trial judge would have awarded does not alone establish that the verdict was excessive . . . [T]he court should not act as the seventh juror with absolute veto power. Whether the court would have reached a different [result] is not in itself decisive . . . The court's proper function is to determine whether the evidence, reviewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict." (Citations omitted; internal quotations omitted.) Johnson v. Chaves, 78 Conn.App. 342, 346-47, 826 A.2d 1286, cert denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003); see also Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 745 A.2d 789 (2000).
"[A]s to future medical expenses, the jury's determination must be based upon an estimate of reasonable probabilities, not possibilities . . . The obvious purpose of this requirement is to prevent the jury from awarding damages for future medical expenses based merely on speculation or conjecture. Because, however, [f]uture medical expenses do not require the same degree of certainty as past medical expenses . . . [i]t is not speculation or conjecture to calculate future medical expenses based upon the history of medical expenses that have accrued as of the trial date . . . when there is also a degree of medical certainty that future medical expenses will be necessary." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchetti v. Ramirez, 240 Conn. 49, 55, 688 A.2d 1325 (1997) "[I]t must be shown to be reasonably probable that the plaintiff will require such treatment in the future as a result of the defendant's conduct." Madsen v. Gates, 85 Conn.App. 383, 396, 857 A.2d 412 (2004). "[T]estimony by a medical expert that the plaintiff might need future treatment, coupled with the plaintiff's assertion that he still suffers pain, [does not] necessarily remove the issue of future medical expenses from the realm of conjecture." Marchetti v. Ramirez, supra, 240 Conn. 55; see also, Brennan v. Burger King Corp., 46 Conn.App. 76, 689 A.2d 364 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 204, 707 A.2d 30 (1998).
With one exception, the medical reports the plaintiff submitted into evidence do not discuss her possible need for future medical treatment. The only potential reference to the issue was in plaintiff's exhibit 4, the February 27, 2003 report by Dr. Beck. On page 2 of that report, under the section entitled "Recommendations," Dr. Beck states, "Ms. Veloccia continues at times to have flare-ups with increased myofascial pain for which she has benefitted in the past from therapeutic injection and she may continue to benefit should an additional flare-up occur."
This evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that it is reasonably probable that the plaintiff will require future medical treatment. As such, the jury's award of damages for future medical expenses was apparently based on speculation or conjecture.
It is so ordered that the defendant's motion for remittitur be granted.
Richard E. Burke, J.