Opinion
C/A No.: 4:01-4266-22, Cr. No.: 4:99-0760
May 28, 2002
ORDER
Petitioner, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This Petition was filed on November 2, 2001. On February 8, 2002, the Government filed a Response and Motion for Summary Judgment, to which Petitioner responded in opposition on April 22, 2002.
The court has reviewed the complete record in this case. For the reasons set forth in detail below, the court grants the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Petitioner's claims for relief.
I. Background
On October 20, 1999, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute hydromorphone and methadone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On March 27, 2000, after a contested sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Petitioner to 75 months incarceration and three years supervised release. Petitioner appealed his sentence to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 21, 2000, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Petitioner's sentence. United States v. Vause, 238 F.3d 418 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished decision).
II. Analysis
The court construes the § 2255 Petition as raising the following claims:
1. Petitioner's guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because Petitioner was mentally incompetent at the time of the plea;
2. Petitioner's attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move for departure based upon Petitioner's diminished capacity at sentencing; and
3. Petitioner's attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately prepare a defense to the gun enhancement at sentencing.See Petition, Nov. 7, 2001, at 5, 8-14.
(A) Competency
Petitioner claims his guilty plea "was not made voluntarily or with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." Petition, at 5. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the "uncontested evidence [during the guilty plea hearing] . . . was that [he] had a history of mental illness, that [he] had received treatment for mental illness, that [his] treatment included the administration of stelazine or desyrel, that stelazine is anti-psychotic medication given to people who [have] schizophrenia or some other major illness." Id. at 9. Petitioner states that during the guilty plea hearing there was a "'committee meeting' in his head." Id. at 11. Petitioner avers that he "repeatedly read and re-read his Plea Agreement immediately before the hearing so he would have in his mind . . . some 'official' version of what he was supposed to have done . . . [and] avoid having to rely on his own mixed up and competing mental versions of the facts." Id. Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that he "repeatedly did not know or was not sure of the answer to the questions he was asked in th[is] hearing." Id.
Petitioner further claims that the court, the prosecutor, and his defense counsel knew of his mental illness but did not stop the proceedings to obtain a current psychiatric evaluation of him. Id. The court relied only on his "psychological . . . self-assessments" to determine whether Petitioner was competent to plead guilty. Id. at 10.
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects defendants from being convicted while mentally incompetent. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966). The test for determining competency is whether "[a defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). "Competency claims can raise issues of both procedural and substantive due process." Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 417 (2001).
Petitioner appears to raise both a procedural and substantive due process competency claim. For example, Petitioner alleges that the court, knowing of his mental illness, did not stop the proceedings to obtain a psychiatric evaluation of him in violation of his procedural due process rights. See id. (holding that "a petitioner may make a procedural competency claim by alleging that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing after the petitioner's mental competency was put in issue"). Petitioner also alleges, however, that he pled guilty while legally incompetent in violation of his substantive due process rights. See id. at 387-88 (holding that substantive competency claim made out by alleging that petitioner was "in fact, tried and convicted while mentally incompetent").
To prevail on a procedural competency claim, a petitioner must establish that "the trial court ignored facts raising a 'bona fide doubt' regarding the petitioner's competency to [plead guilty]." Id. at 387 (quoting Pate, 383 U.S. at 384-86). Factors relevant to determining a petitioner's mental fitness include a petitioner's "irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence." Id. (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975)),
A petitioner raising a substantive competency claim, however, "is entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence." The record must indicate that the petitioner had no ability to assist counsel or understand the charges against him. [T]he fact that a petitioner has been treated with anti-psychotic drugs does not per se render him incompetent to stand trial." Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000).
After a careful review of the record, the court cannot find any cause to doubt Petitioner's mental competency during the guilty plea hearing. First, during the Rule 11 proceedings, the court extensively questioned Petitioner and his lawyer regarding Petitioner's competency. See Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing Proceedings, Oct. 20, 1999, at 3-9. The record shows that Petitioner clearly understood all the court's questions, answering each question with detail and clarity. Petitioner continually stated that there was nothing that would interfere with his ability to plead guilty that day. See, e.g., id. at 6 ¶¶ 11-18, 7 ¶¶ 2-9. Petitioner acknowledged that he understood the terms of the plea agreement and the nature of the charges against him, that he was ready to plead guilty because he was in fact guilty, that he was waiving certain constitutional rights, and that he understood the possible sentences he could received as a result of pleading guilty. See generally id.
For example, during the hearing Petitioner admitted having been treated for depression before his arrest. Petitioner could not remember all the medications he was on prior to his arrest but believed it was either desyrel or stelazine. See Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing Proceedings, Oct. 20, 1999, at 4. The court noted that stelazine is provided to people who have "schizophrenia or some other major illness." In response, Petitioner stated, "I don't have that, just depression. . . . [and] that [the medication] was desyrel." Id. ¶¶ 17-25. Petitioner then verified that whatever the drug was named, it was prescribed as an anti-depressant and that he had not taken it since his arrest, almost two months ago. Id. at 5 ¶¶ 2-9. The court further asked Petitioner if he was experiencing "any problems as a result of depression or as a result of not being on medication?" Petitioner answered, "No. Ma'am." The court asked if there was anything "affecting [his] ability to think or be clear about what we're doing here today?" Petitioner answered, "No, Ma'am." The court asked Petitioner, "So you feel completely able to go forward today?" Petitioner answered. "Yes, Ma'am, I do."
After going over Petitioner's mental history, the court asked again if Petitioner was taking any prescription medication that day. Petitioner admitted having taken a prescription drug for arthritis pain that day named ultran. Petitioner told the court that it was not a narcotic and did not sedate him at all. See id. at 8 ¶¶ 3-20. The court followed up, asking if everyone was thinking clearly. Petitioner answered, 4Tm clear headed." Id. at 9 ¶ 2. Petitioner's attorney, moreover, verified that he did not have any evidence that his client was not thinking clearly that day. Id. at 9 ¶¶ 9-10.
Second, the court questioned Petitioner's attorney about his observation of Petitioner's mental state. Petitioner's attorney stated that Petitioner "always appeared . . . to be quite lucid and understands everything that we talk about . . . [including] what's going on here or what his role is and what my role is and what the court's role is." Id. at 6 ¶¶ 21-25, 7 ¶ 1. Petitioner's attorney, moreover, states in his affidavit attached to Respondent's motion for summary judgment that he "was aware of the fact that petitioner had been and was presently undergoing mental health treatment on a monthly outpatient basis. . . . for depression . . . not due to any psychosis." See Affidavit of William F. Nettles, IV, attached to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, Feb. 8, 2002, at 1 (hereinafter "Nettles Affidavit"). Nevertheless, Petitioner's attorney states that Petitioner was intelligent and articulate . . . [and] gave detailed accountings of his activities in this case." Id. at 2. Petitioner's attorney avers that aside from initially denying guilt, Petitioner provided a consistent version of the facts pertaining to his case and provided the Government substantial assistance. See id. Petitioner's attorney attests that "nothing in petitioner's behavior or communications" indicated that Petitioner was mentally ill or had a "committee meeting" in his brain. See id.
Because the record clearly reflects Petitioner was competent during his guilty plea hearing, the court finds Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was unintelligent and involuntary without merit. Further, Petitioner's objection to Respondent's motion for summary judgment lacks merit. No genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Petitioner can establish a procedural or substantive due process claim to survive summary judgment simply because the statements made in Petitioner's affidavit allegedly conflict with his attorney's affidavit. To establish a procedural due process claim, Petitioner must show that the court ignored facts at the guilty plea hearing that raised a reasonable doubt as to Petitioner's competency. Petitioner's statements made after the fact that he allegedly experienced "auditory hallucinations" during the guilty plea hearing do not establish that the court ignored facts at the time of the guilty plea hearing that would raise a bona fide doubt about Petitioner's competence. Further, to establish a substantive due process claim Petitioner is required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent at the guilty plea hearing. The court finds that Petitioner's self-serving statements alone do not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner was incompetent at the time of the hearing. The court relies on Petitioner's behavior and responses during the court's thorough Rule 11 proceeding, as well as Petitioner's attorney's affidavit, to find that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Petitioner's plea was voluntary and intelligent.
(B) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must first show that his counsel's performance was "deficient". Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). If Petitioner shows deficiency, he must then show that it resulted in prejudice to him. Id. at 688.
As to the first prong of the Strickland test, a defense lawyer's conduct is deficient if his or her conduct fails to meet a standard of "reasonably effective assistance." Id. at 687. The question whether counsel's performance was deficient may only be answered by viewing counsel's actions or decisions in the light of all surrounding circumstances at the time the decision was made, not in the artificial light of hindsight. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1993). A reviewing court should not second-guess defense counsel's tactical decisions. See McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 518, 537-39 (4th Cir. 1990). In addition to showing ineffective representation, Petitioner must also show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In certain cases, the question of whether counsel's performance was deficient maybe bypassed if it is determined that the claimed deficiency in representation did not prejudice the defendant. Id. at 697.
(1) Failure to Move for Downward Departure for Diminished Capacity
Petitioner contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to argue for a downward departure based on diminished capacity. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 5K2.13 provides a narrow provision allowing for downward departure for "diminished capacity." The Fourth Circuit has held that "in order for a defendant's mental condition to be considered . . . significantly reduced within the meaning of § 5K2.13 . . . the defendant must have been unable to process information or to reason." United States v. Goosens, 84 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1996). As Respondent states in its motion for summary judgment, it is clear that Petitioner was able to "process information" and "reason". Petitioner's responses at his guilty plea hearing, his testimony at his and his co-defendant's sentencing hearing, his cooperation with the Government as explained in the Government's Motion for Downward Departure, and the affidavit from Petitioner's attorney all demonstrate that Petitioner was able to provide a consistent and detailed accounting of the facts of his case and clearly respond to all questions the court and the attorneys asked him. The evidence in j the record clearly belies Petitioner's allegation that his was suffering from "diminished capacity." As a result, the court finds that Petitioner's attorney was not ineffective for failing to move for a downward departure on this basis.
(2) Failure to Adequately Prepare for Objections to Gun Enhancement
Petitioner contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare a defense to the gun enhancement at his sentencing. Particularly, Petitioner states that his attorney never debriefed him about the facts and circumstances related to the gun enhancement. Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mar. 22, 2002, at 5. If Petitioner's attorney had debriefed him regarding the gun enhancement, Petitioner claims that his attorney would have known that his co-defendant sent letters to Petitioner asking him to claim ownership of the guns and used that information at the sentencing hearing. Id.
The court finds Petitioner's argument without merit. First, the evidence does not show that Petitioner's counsel was ineffective. Petitioner's counsel attests that he discussed with Petitioner the guns found in his bedroom and has notes reflecting that exchange. Particularly, Petitioner's attorney notes that Petitioner denied ever selling drugs out of his bedroom where the guns were located; Petitioner denied knowing that the handgun was in his room; Petitioner claimed the shotgun was located in the corner of the room and belonged to his co-defendant's father; and Petitioner denied ever keeping guns with him. See Nettles Affidavit, at 2. The sentencing hearing transcript moreover reveals that Petitioner's attorney thoroughly contested the imposition of the gun enhancement. Petitioner's attorney called Petitioner to testify on his own behalf, and solicited from Petitioner the information about the guns he discussed with Petitioner before the sentencing hearing. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, March 22, 2000, at 55-59, 61-64. Finally, Petitioner's attorney appealed this issue to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the enhancement of Petitioner's sentence. United States v. Vause, 238 F.3d 4418 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion). For all the reasons above, the court finds that Petitioner's attorney did not fail to meet a standard of "reasonably effective assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Even if the conduct of Petitioner's attorney somehow fell below the standard of reasonably effective assistance, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged error. The evidence to contest the gun enhancement Petitioner claims his attorney failed to present during the sentencing hearing would not establish a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Evidence that the handgun was own by Petitioner's co-defendant would not show that it was clearly improbable that the firearm located in Petitioner's bedroom was used in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. Therefore, the court finds Petitioner's argument that his attorney was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare a defense to the imposition of the gun enhancement at sentencing wholly without merit.
III. Conclusion
After reviewing all of Petitioner's claims separately and as a whole, the court concludes that Petitioner's allegations are without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, No. 8, is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED