Vaughn v. Workhouse

Full title: KENNETH VAUGHN, Plaintiff, v. WORKHOUSE, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

Date published: Dec 9, 2008

No. 4:08-CV-1756-JCH (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2008)

Opinion

No. 4:08-CV-1756-JCH.

December 9, 2008

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JEAN HAMILTON, District Judge

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Kenneth Vaughn (registration no. N/A), for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee [Doc. #2].

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly deposit of $99.83, and an average monthly balance of $16.55. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $19.97, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

The Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants are "Workhouse," "CO's," "Captain," and the State of Missouri. The complaint seeks monetary relief. Plaintiff alleges that in "the later part of July 2002 . . . [he] was attacked and beaten by the Goon Squad." In addition, plaintiff summarily claims that he "has not been properly treated or cared for."

Discussion

Having carefully reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes that this action is legally frivolous. The excessive force allegations concern events that occurred in 2002, and thus, are barred by the statute of limitations. See Drake v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 553 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying Missouri five-year statute of limitations to a cause of action under § 1981); Lohman v. Kempker, 34 Fed. Appx. 514, 2002 WL 992330 (8th Cir. 2002) (same; § 1983).

Moreover, the State of Missouri and the "Workhouse" are not suable entities under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989) (state is not a "person" under § 1983); Lair v. Norris, 32 Fed. Appx. 175, 2002 WL 496779 (8th Cir. 2002) (jails are not suable entities).

In addition, "[l]iability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat superior theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits). Plaintiff, however, has failed to sufficiently identify the individual "CO" defendants, and he does not set forth any facts indicating that any of the named defendants were directly involved in or personally responsible for the violation of his constitutional rights.

Last, the complaint is silent as to whether the individual defendants are being sued in their official or individual capacities. Where a "complaint is silent about the capacity in which [plaintiff] is suing defendant, [a district court must] interpret the complaint as including only official-capacity claims." Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Official-capacity suits are tantamount to suits directly against the public entity of which the official is an agent.Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). To state a claim against a public entity or a government official in his or her official capacity, plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the public entity was responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 473 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Because plaintiff does not claim that a public entity's policy or custom was responsible for the alleged constitutional violations, the complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $19.97 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his former prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.¹ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint, because the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

1 The Court notes that plaintiff is no longer incarcerated; however, because he was incarcerated when he filed this action, he is still obligated to pay the initial partial filing fee assessed against him. See Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 1997).

An appropriate order of dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.