If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Reed, 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black, 646 F.3d at 259); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'"

If the employer meets its burden, the prima facie case dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a factual dispute material to determining either: (1) that the employer's proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)). "Once a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination."

This Court applies a modified version of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in Title VII discrimination cases. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). "To survive summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first present evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination."

If such a showing is made, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to create a genuine dispute that the articulated "reason is not true, but instead a pretext for discrimination," or that the defendant's "reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and that another 'motivating factor' is [the Plaintiff's] protected characteristic." Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). After a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the question for summary judgment is whether a rational factfinder could find that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race or gender.

It does not, however, compel such a conclusion in every case: There are cases in which, despite such evidence, "no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory."Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)).Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting EEOC v. La. Off. of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1995)).

However, the district court held that Odubela failed to meet the fourth element because he provided no evidence that he was replaced by someone outside of the protected class or that he was treated differently than peers with similar performance rankings. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). On appeal, Odubela does not argue that the district court erred in this regard, nor does he articulate why he believes that he presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Hunter v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2013 WL 3229910, *4 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2013) (Rosenthal, J.). In cases involving the termination of employment, the elements of a prima facie case are: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by someone outside the protected class or, in the case of disparate treatment, was treated more harshly than others who were similarly situated.

The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the articulated reason is either pretextual, or that, even if true, the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). For purposes of this motion, Defendant TVA concedes that Best has met her burden in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.