To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the job she held, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was replaced by someone outside of her protected class, other similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably, or she was otherwise discharged because of her race. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff belongs to a protected class, i.e., she is African-American; she was qualified for her position as RSR; she suffered an adverse employment action in the form of discharge; and was replaced by someone outside of her protected class, i.e., Suzanne Rowe, a white woman.

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

Under the modified McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiff has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of discrimination. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The elements of a prima facie showing are that the plaintiff: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class or, in the case of disparate treatment, was treated more harshly than others who were similarly situated.

One method Plaintiff may use to establish pretext is to show that Defendants' "proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence." Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff testified that other professors routinely engaged in more than ten hours per week of outside employment.

Under this burden-shifting framework, a Title VII plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To state a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class or, in the case of disparate treatment, show that others similarly situated were treated more favorably.

But the fact that other employees engaged in similar misconduct and were not fired is not evidence of disparate treatment if some "difference between the plaintiff's conduct and that of those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in treatment received from the employer." Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (rejecting evidence of disparate treatment because other employees had "different job responsibilities" and "dissimilar violation histories"). Ng-A-Mann's declaration notes that certain employees who violated the coupon policy were "commissioned salespeople like [him]," but says nothing about the severity or frequency of their violations aside from alleging that such coupon misuse was "common practice."

Further, even if Gibbons had made a prima facie case of discrimination, which he has not, there is evidence, by Gibbons' own admission, of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his demotion and later termination. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case, and then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action). Gibbons had at least two professional counseling sessions with Brookside administration for workplace misconduct, and several recorded conversations with Holliman (attached to Gibbons' Complaint) about his poor work performance.

In doing so, the Court must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Vaughnv.Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2011).

"[A] ‘judge's function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Cotton , 134 S.Ct. at 1866 (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ); seeStewart v. Guzman , 555 Fed.Appx. 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank , 665 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2011) (In ruling on a summary judgment motion, "[w]e neither engage in credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence.")). With the foregoing standard in mind, the Court turns to the motions before it.

"[A] 'judge's function' at summary judgment is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Cotton, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505); see Stewart v. Guzman, 555 F. App'x 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2011) (In ruling on a summary judgment motion, "[w]e neither engage in credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence.")).