As noted above, once the defendant provides a nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff “bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that [the employer] intentionally discriminated against her because of her protected status.” Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001)).

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

the onus shifts back to the plaintiff to prove either that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for race discrimination (the pretext alternative), or that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its decision, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (the mixed-motives alternative).Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011)). A Title VII plaintiff can demonstrate pretext in two ways.

McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007). In adjudicating Title VII claims of race or sex discrimination where there is "[no] direct evidence of discrimination based on race," Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 2000), we apply the modified burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); see, e.g., Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 2003); Risher v. Aldridge, 889 F.2d 592, 596 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1989). Under this framework, a plaintiff first must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of a prima facie case.

Next, under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Washington must counter this evidence regarding the Second Mandate and Edwards's inability to secure further work with “substantial evidence” for the termination as pretextual. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 82527; see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011). For pretext in the discrimination context, the Fifth Circuit has explained:

Next, under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Edrich must counter Dallas College's evidence-of hiring the most qualified candidate and thereby not hiring Edrich- with “substantial evidence” that this reason was pretextual. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 825; see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussing pretext). “Simply disputing the underlying facts of an employer's decision is not sufficient to create an issue of pretext.

Next, under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Normore must counter the Painting Incident and Punching Incident reasons with "substantial evidence" for her respective AAC removal and termination as pretextual. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 825; see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011). For pretext in the discrimination context, the Fifth Circuit has explained:

For disparate treatment to amount to pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant treated him more harshly than other similarly situated employees, referred to as comparators, for nearly identical conduct. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011).

Under the modified McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiff has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of discrimination. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The elements of a prima facie showing are that the plaintiff: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class or, in the case of disparate treatment, was treated more harshly than others who were similarly situated.

To establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff generally must demonstrate that he: "(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for [his] position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class . . . ." Okoye, 245 F.3d at 512-13 (citations omitted); accord Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is applied and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Okoye, 245 F.3d at 512.