Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted); accord Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012); Turner, 675 F.3d at 892 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Reed, 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black, 646 F.3d at 259); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). If the employer meets its burden, "'the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens'—disappear[s], . . . and the sole remaining issue [is] 'discrimination vel non.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); Turner, 675 F.3d at 901; Black, 646 F.3d at 271; Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2007).

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Reed, 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black, 646 F.3d at 259); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'"

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

When direct evidence is absent, the Fifth Circuit requires that courts analyze a plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims pursuant to a “modified, ” rather than traditional, McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 984-85 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the “modified McDonnell Douglas” burden-shifting framework); Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 784 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2010) (same); Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (same). See also Hammond v. Jacobs Field Servs., 499 Fed.Appx. 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The district court appears to have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in ruling on Hammond's Title VII racial discrimination claim.

If Aurora satisfies its burden, “the presumption of discrimination disappears.” Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing David v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 838 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Under the circumstances alleged, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Walcott must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified to do his job, (3) he was fired, and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class. SeeVaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Assuming without deciding that Walcott established a prima facia case of national origin discrimination, the burden shifted to TSU to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Walcott.

It is "unlawful for an employer to fire an employee because of the employee's race." Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). This court applies "the modified McDonnell Douglas approach in racial discrimination cases under Title VII."

If the employer meets its burden, the prima facie case dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a factual dispute material to determining either: (1) that the employer's proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)). "Once a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination."

the onus shifts back to the plaintiff to prove either that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for race discrimination (the pretext alternative), or that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its decision, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (the mixed-motives alternative).Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011)). A Title VII plaintiff can demonstrate pretext in two ways.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the job he held or sought to hold, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) he was treated less favorably than other similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff belongs to a protected class, i.e., that he is African-American, but does dispute that plaintiff can show he was qualified either to receive a seniority date prior to his eligibility for the rank at issue or to take the Senior Captain promotional exam, that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, or that plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated firefighters outside his protected class.