Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted); accord Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012); Turner, 675 F.3d at 892 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Reed, 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black, 646 F.3d at 259); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). If the employer meets its burden, "'the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens'—disappear[s], . . . and the sole remaining issue [is] 'discrimination vel non.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); Turner, 675 F.3d at 901; Black, 646 F.3d at 271; Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2007).

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Reed, 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black, 646 F.3d at 259); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'"

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

Under the circumstances alleged, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Walcott must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified to do his job, (3) he was fired, and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class. SeeVaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Assuming without deciding that Walcott established a prima facia case of national origin discrimination, the burden shifted to TSU to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Walcott.

the onus shifts back to the plaintiff to prove either that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for race discrimination (the pretext alternative), or that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its decision, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (the mixed-motives alternative).Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011)). A Title VII plaintiff can demonstrate pretext in two ways.

The Court applies a modified version of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in Title VII discrimination cases. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). "To survive summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first present evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination."

For disparate treatment to amount to pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant treated him more harshly than other similarly situated employees, referred to as comparators, for nearly identical conduct. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011).

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Wesley v. Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 745, 660 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff makes the prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). If the defendant meets this burden of production, the plaintiff must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that [the employer's] reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that [the employer's] reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating favor is [the plaintiff's] protected characteristic (mixed-motives alternative).

Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011).