As noted above, once the defendant provides a nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff “bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that [the employer] intentionally discriminated against her because of her protected status.” Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001)).

If the employer meets its burden, the prima facie case dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a factual dispute material to determining either: (1) that the employer's proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)). "Once a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination."

the onus shifts back to the plaintiff to prove either that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for race discrimination (the pretext alternative), or that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its decision, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (the mixed-motives alternative).Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011)). A Title VII plaintiff can demonstrate pretext in two ways.

In Title VII and retaliation cases, “if the defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that either (1) the employer's reason is a pretext or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic. Burrell, 482 F.3d at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir.2011) (stating that if the employer sustains its burden, the prima facie case dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish either: (1) that the employer's proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another “motivating factor” is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir.2004))). A plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that the employer's “proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of credence.’ ”

And a failure to document complaints and discuss workplace problems may also support an inference of pretext. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2011); Lloyd v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 961 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[W]hen an employer's stated motivation for an adverse employment decision involves the employee's performance, but there is no supporting documentation, a jury can reasonably infer pretext."); see also Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 580-82 (5th Cir. 2003). Finally, although the presumption of discrimination disappears once the defendant meets its burden of production, it is still proper to consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and inferences properly drawn therefrom on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.

McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007). In adjudicating Title VII claims of race or sex discrimination where there is "[no] direct evidence of discrimination based on race," Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 2000), we apply the modified burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); see, e.g., Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 2003); Risher v. Aldridge, 889 F.2d 592, 596 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1989). Under this framework, a plaintiff first must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of a prima facie case.

Next, under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Washington must counter this evidence regarding the Second Mandate and Edwards's inability to secure further work with “substantial evidence” for the termination as pretextual. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 82527; see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011). For pretext in the discrimination context, the Fifth Circuit has explained:

Next, under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Edrich must counter Dallas College's evidence-of hiring the most qualified candidate and thereby not hiring Edrich- with “substantial evidence” that this reason was pretextual. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 825; see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussing pretext). “Simply disputing the underlying facts of an employer's decision is not sufficient to create an issue of pretext.

Next, under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Normore must counter the Painting Incident and Punching Incident reasons with "substantial evidence" for her respective AAC removal and termination as pretextual. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 825; see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011). For pretext in the discrimination context, the Fifth Circuit has explained:

For disparate treatment to amount to pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant treated him more harshly than other similarly situated employees, referred to as comparators, for nearly identical conduct. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011).