"To establish pretext, [a plaintiff] must show that [the defendant's] proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence." Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with the district court, for the reasons it gave, that Yates failed to prove prima facie cases of discrimination based on race under Title VII or disability under the ADA.

Further, even if Gibbons had made a prima facie case of discrimination, which he has not, there is evidence, by Gibbons' own admission, of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his demotion and later termination. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case, and then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action). Gibbons had at least two professional counseling sessions with Brookside administration for workplace misconduct, and several recorded conversations with Holliman (attached to Gibbons' Complaint) about his poor work performance.

Next, under the third step of the framework(s), Burns must counter the no call, no show reason with “substantial evidence” for his discharge as pretextual. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 825; see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011).

Lee v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009) Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing same in the context of a Title VII race discrimination case). 1. Adverse Employment Action - Constructive Discharge

Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth. Bd. of Comm'rs, 810 F.3d 940, 948 (5th Cir. 2015); Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2005). This framework applies both at trial, McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802, and at summary judgment, Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 635-36 (5th Cir. 2011).

If Mills establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the City to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse actions against her. See Lee, 574 F.3d at 259. If the City satisfies this burden of production, the burden shifts back to Mills, who must "offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact "either (1) that the City's reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the City's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is [Mills'] protected characteristic (mixed-motive[s] alternative)." Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing same in the context of a Title VII race discrimination case). In this case, Mills seeks to show that she has met her prima facie burden and that the City's purported reasons for placing her on paid suspension, requiring her to take additional EMS classes (the remediation plan), and to serve a probationary period are pretext for race and sex discrimination.

"Disparate treatment occurs where an employer treats one employee more harshly than other similarly situated employees for nearly identical conduct." Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). Of relevance here, "[t]he conduct at issue is not nearly identical when the difference between the plaintiff's conduct and that of those alleged to be similarly situated account for the difference in treatment received from the employer."

"[A] 'judge's function' at summary judgment is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Cotton, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505); see Stewart v. Guzman, 555 F. App'x 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2011) (In ruling on a summary judgment motion, "[w]e neither engage in credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence.")).

Under the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach applied in Title VII cases, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2004)); see alsoMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). If Plaintiff does so, Defendant must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment. Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 636. If the employer sustains its burden of production, the prima facie case is dissolved, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to "offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that either (1) the employer's reason is a pretext or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another 'motivating factor' is the plaintiff's protected characteristic."

Pretext can be established by showing disparate treatment or that the legitimate explanation is false or unworthy of credence. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff "must substantiate her claim of pretext through evidence demonstrating that discrimination lay at the heart of the employer's decision."