"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

When direct evidence is absent, the Fifth Circuit requires that courts analyze a plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims pursuant to a “modified, ” rather than traditional, McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 984-85 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the “modified McDonnell Douglas” burden-shifting framework); Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 784 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2010) (same); Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (same). See also Hammond v. Jacobs Field Servs., 499 Fed.Appx. 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The district court appears to have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in ruling on Hammond's Title VII racial discrimination claim.

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the job she held, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was replaced by someone outside of her protected class, other similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably, or she was otherwise discharged because of her race. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff belongs to a protected class, i.e., she is African-American; she was qualified for her position as RSR; she suffered an adverse employment action in the form of discharge; and was replaced by someone outside of her protected class, i.e., Suzanne Rowe, a white woman.

Under the circumstances alleged, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Walcott must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified to do his job, (3) he was fired, and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class. SeeVaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Assuming without deciding that Walcott established a prima facia case of national origin discrimination, the burden shifted to TSU to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Walcott.

the onus shifts back to the plaintiff to prove either that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for race discrimination (the pretext alternative), or that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its decision, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (the mixed-motives alternative).Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011)). A Title VII plaintiff can demonstrate pretext in two ways.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the job he held or sought to hold, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) he was treated less favorably than other similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff belongs to a protected class, i.e., that he is African-American, but does dispute that plaintiff can show he was qualified either to receive a seniority date prior to his eligibility for the rank at issue or to take the Senior Captain promotional exam, that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, or that plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated firefighters outside his protected class.

“This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds byGross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169–70, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)); accordVaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir.2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. “The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, ‘ if believed by the trier offact,’ would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.”

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

The Court applies a modified version of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in Title VII discrimination cases. Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). "To survive summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first present evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination."

And a failure to document complaints and discuss workplace problems may also support an inference of pretext. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2011); Lloyd v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 961 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[W]hen an employer's stated motivation for an adverse employment decision involves the employee's performance, but there is no supporting documentation, a jury can reasonably infer pretext."); see also Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 580-82 (5th Cir. 2003). Finally, although the presumption of discrimination disappears once the defendant meets its burden of production, it is still proper to consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and inferences properly drawn therefrom on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.