As noted above, once the defendant provides a nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff “bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that [the employer] intentionally discriminated against her because of her protected status.” Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted); accord Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012); Turner, 675 F.3d at 892 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Reed, 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black, 646 F.3d at 259); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). If the employer meets its burden, "'the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens'—disappear[s], . . . and the sole remaining issue [is] 'discrimination vel non.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); Turner, 675 F.3d at 901; Black, 646 F.3d at 271; Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2007).

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Reed, 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black, 646 F.3d at 259); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'"

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

When direct evidence is absent, the Fifth Circuit requires that courts analyze a plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims pursuant to a “modified, ” rather than traditional, McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 984-85 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the “modified McDonnell Douglas” burden-shifting framework); Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 784 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2010) (same); Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (same). See also Hammond v. Jacobs Field Servs., 499 Fed.Appx. 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The district court appears to have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in ruling on Hammond's Title VII racial discrimination claim.

"This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. "The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, 'if believed by the trier of fact,' would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."

If Aurora satisfies its burden, “the presumption of discrimination disappears.” Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing David v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 838 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2004)).

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the job she held, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was replaced by someone outside of her protected class, other similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably, or she was otherwise discharged because of her race. See Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff belongs to a protected class, i.e., she is African-American; she was qualified for her position as RSR; she suffered an adverse employment action in the form of discharge; and was replaced by someone outside of her protected class, i.e., Suzanne Rowe, a white woman.

Under the circumstances alleged, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Walcott must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified to do his job, (3) he was fired, and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class. SeeVaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011). Assuming without deciding that Walcott established a prima facia case of national origin discrimination, the burden shifted to TSU to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Walcott.

It is "unlawful for an employer to fire an employee because of the employee's race." Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). This court applies "the modified McDonnell Douglas approach in racial discrimination cases under Title VII."