Opinion
Civil Action 4:23-cv-3457-DCC-TER
04-15-2024
GREGORY VAUGHN, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN WHEELER SWEAT, III; ANTHONY DENNIS; AMBER FLOYD; and TORY GREGG-WRIGHT, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III, United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motion could result in the motion being granted and his claims dismissed. Plaintiff has failed to file a response. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
All mail sent to Plaintiff at the Sumter County Detention Center since October 2, 2023, has been returned as undeliverable with a notion that Plaintiff was not at that address. See ECF Nos. 31, 40, 41. In his complaint, Plaintiff stated that he would be released from the Sumter County Detention Center and asked that the court send mail to both the detention center address and another address so that he would still receive mail from the court following his release. See Compl. p. 10 (ECF No. 1). However, in an Order dated July 25, 2023, ECF No. 5, Plaintiff was advised to notify the court if he has a change of address while the action is pending. The court further instructed that “[t]he address to mail [documents to Plaintiff] shall remain where Plaintiff is detained/the Detention Center and duplicates will not be mailed to addresses where the Plaintiff is not currently residing. When Plaintiff's location changes, Plaintiff is ordered to then update Plaintiff's address as discussed above.” This Order was not returned as undeliverable. It appears from the returned mail that Plaintiff is no longer detained at the Sumter County Detention Center. He has not filed a notice of change of address as ordered. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Clerk is directed to mail this Report and Recommendation to both the current address on file (as it has not been updated by Plaintiff as ordered) and to the alternate address provided in his complaint.
II. FACTS
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2023, Captain Sweat threatened to take him to lock up for no reason and then grabbed his wrist and arm and assaulted him as he tried to return to his room. When Plaintiff tried to get loose from Captain Sweat's grip, Captain Sweat tased him with tasing gloves and Plaintiff fell to the ground hard and hit his head and injured the right side of his body. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Floyd knew Plaintiff had not done anything wrong but did not correct Captain Sweat or make him stop. Rather than taking him to be seen by medical personnel, Captain Sweat placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and left him in the shower for a period of time. When Captain Sweat returned to remove the handcuffs, he was still wearing the tasing gloves and tased Plaintff again while removing the handcuffs. Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly requested medical attention, but Defendant Gregg-Wright told him to stop whining and did not “take heed that [Plaintiff] was in serious pain.” Plaintiff was then placed in lock-up. He remained in lock-up with no medical help, no shower, and no opportunity to file a grievance. Plaintiff asserts that he still had his tablet in lock-up and he made numerous calls to Sheriff Anthony Dennis informing him of his treatment. Thereafter, on February 19, 2023, Plaintiff was seen by a nurse but she only asked him general questions about his health and did not address his injuries from the incident. He was released from lock-up on February 22, 2023. Plaintiff also appears to allege that Captain Sweat retaliated against him for calling Sheriff Dennis by not allowing him to participate in the work release program after he was released from lock-up. See generally Pl. Compl. (ECF No. 1).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 87475 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4thCir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that dismissal is appropriate in part because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this case. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a prisoner exhaust the available administrative remedies before filing a 1983 action concerning conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C.1997e(a). In enacting the PLRA, Congress carved out an exception to the general rule that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to filing a civil rights suit. The PLRA amended section 1997e so that it now provides, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. § 1997e(a). Accordingly, before Plaintiff may proceed with his claims in this Court, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies. The United States Supreme Court has held that “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); Jones v. Smith, 266 F.3d 399 (6th Cir.2001) (exhaustion required even though Plaintiff claimed futility); Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3 d 718 (7th Cir.2001) (exhaustion required even though Plaintiff claimed he was afraid); see also Claybrooks v. Newsome, 2001 WL 1089548 (4th Cir., September 18, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (applying Booth v. Churner to affirm district court's denial of relief to Plaintiff). A failure to exhaust all levels of administrative review is not “proper exhaustion” and will bar actions filed by inmates under any federal law, including § 1983. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006).
Failure to exhaust the facility's administrative remedies “is an affirmative defense, and defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Porter v. Sturm, 781 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 919). However, if a defendant makes “a threshold showing of failure to exhaust, the burden of showing that administrative remedies were unavailable falls to the plaintiff.” Creel v. Hudson, 2017 WL 4004579, at 4 (S.D. W.Va. 2017) (citing Washington v. Rounds, 223 F.Supp.3d 452, 459 (D. Md. 2016); Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed.Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011)).
Dr. Chanae Lumpkin is a Deputy Major with the Sumter County Sheriff's Department and the Assistant Direction of the Sumter County Detention Center (SCDC). Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 34-6). Dr. Lumpkin assists in responding to complaints and grievances. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 2. To exhaust administrative remedies at the SCDC, the detainee must first file a grievance through the kiosk system available in the recreation areas at the detention center. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 11. A department-manager reviews that grievance. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 12. Should the department-manager's decision not satisfy the detainee, a grievance committee will convene to resolve the issue. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 13. The detainee may appear before the grievance committee, if he so chooses, to present his case. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 14. The grievance committee will review all facts discovered in the investigation and any additional information provided by the detainee and make a decision within fifteen days. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 15. A detainee dissatisfied with the committee's decision can appeal it to the Director. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 16. The Director then has ten working days to make a decision. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 16. The Director's decision as to inmate grievances is final. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 16.
Dr. Lumpkin avers that Plaintiff failed to file an administrative grievance related to the allegations raised in this action. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 4. Plaintiff's Resident Request Report for January 25, 2023, through January 8, 2024, filed by Defendants further shows that Plaintiff filed no grievances regarding the issues raised herein. Resident Request Report (ECF No. 34-7).
The report includes both general requests as well as grievances.
The PLRA provides only one exception to the exhaustion requirement-that inmates need not exhaust “unavailable” remedies. Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). An exhaustion remedy is unavailable when, inter alia, prison administrators “thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1860. Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that he was not allowed to file a grievance while he was in lock-up. Defendants Sweat and Gregg-Wright both aver that they did not prevent Plaintiff from filing a grievance because inmates have direct access to the kiosk system to file grievances and there is no way to remove a grievance from the system once it is submitted by an inmate. Sweat Aff. ¶¶ 18-19 (ECF No. 34-3); Gregg-Wright Aff. ¶¶ 5-6. Lumpkin likewise avers that Defendants have no way of preventing inmates from filing grievances because the kiosks where they file the grievances are directly accessible by inmates in the inmate recreation areas. Lumpkin Aff. ¶¶ 5-8. Though not explicitly stated in the record, presumably Plaintiff was not allowed access to the inmate recreation areas while he was in lock-up from February 3, 2023, through February 22, 2023. Thus, he would not have been able to access the kiosks during that time. However, the record reveals that Plaintiff filed a request on February 23, 2023, asking if he could “go to the annex since I am eligible for work release or can I do my work release in delta since we are on quarantine.” Resident Request Report p. 1. Thus, as of the day after his release from lock-up, Plaintiff had access the kiosk to file a request. Further, nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff would have been time-barred from filing a grievance about the events giving rise to this action once he was released from lock-up. At that point, as stated by Lumpkin, Plaintiff had access to the grievance filing system and chose not to file a grievance for this incident. Lumpkin Aff. ¶ 7.
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that because he could not file a grievance, he made several calls to Sheriff Anthony Dennis informing him of his treatment. To the extent Plaintiff argues that he satisfied the exhaustion requirement by making these phone calls, his argument fails. Successful exhaustion of administrative remedies “means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Plaintiff cannot choose the manner in which he exhausts his administrative remdies. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is a robust one. See Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1856-58. Prisoners must therefore diligently and properly follow the administrative procedures that are available. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Because Plaintiff failed to do so with respect to the issues raised herein, dismissal of this action is appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34) be granted and this case be dismissed in its entirety.