Vaughn v. Phila. Trans. Co.

23 Citing cases

  1. Ayoub v. Spencer

    550 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1977)   Cited 63 times
    Finding statements at closing prejudicial in part because jury was not "instructed at least to disregard counsel's reference . . . ."

    What the jury ultimately found, of course, is beyond our knowledge. In determining whether erroneous instructions require the grant of a new trial, whether such instructions did or did not bring about the verdict is not crucial. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 86 S.Ct. 1030, 16 L.Ed.2d 102 (1966); Vaughn v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 417 Pa. 464, 468, 209 A.2d 279 (1965). If it appears that such instructions might have been responsible for the verdict, a new trial is mandatory. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S. 19, 82 S.Ct. 1130, 8 L.Ed.2d 305 (1962); Riesberg v. Pittsburgh Lake Erie R.R., 407 Pa. 434, 180 A.2d 572 (1962). Moreover, the court failed to explain adequately to the jury the application of principles of the law of contributory negligence to various possible factual conclusions at which they might arrive.

  2. Jones v. Montefiore Hospital

    494 Pa. 410 (Pa. 1981)   Cited 141 times
    Holding that proximate cause may be established when a defendant's negligent act was a substantial factor in bringing about a plaintiff's harm, and that the substantial factor need not be the only cause which produces the harm.

    We conclude that the instruction on causation given by the trial judge was clearly erroneous, and that appellants were entitled to a Section 323(a) instruction. As we said in Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 417 Pa. 464, 468, 209 A.2d 279, 282 (1965): In determining whether fundamentally erroneous instructions require the grant of a new trial, whether such instructions did or did not bring about the complained of verdict is not the question. If it appears that such instructions might have been responsible for the verdict, a new trial is mandatory: Reisberg v. Pittsburgh Lake Erie R.R., 407 Pa. 434, 180 A.2d 575 (1962).

  3. Mccay et Ux. v. Phila. Elec. Co.

    447 Pa. 490 (Pa. 1972)   Cited 57 times
    In McCay v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 447 Pa. 490, 291 A.2d 759 (1972), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the correct charge in connection with contributory negligence is that "a plaintiff cannot recover if his own negligence, however slight, contributes to the happening of the accident in a proximate way," 447 Pa. at 495, 291 A.2d at 762 (1972).

    The record reveals that in every instance the law was adequately stated and both counsel were given sufficient opportunity to request further instructions or to take exceptions if they so desired. Counsel for appellants neglected to ask for any additional instructions on burden of proof when he had the opportunity to do so, and in the absence of a specific request for further clarification of the duties involved we believe the instructions given were sufficient. In their support appellants cite Kralik v. Cromwell, 435 Pa. 613, 258 A.2d 654 (1969); Richmond v. A. F. of L. Medical Service Plan of Philadelphia, 421 Pa. 269, 218 A.2d 303 (1966); and Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 417 Pa. 464, 209 A.2d 279 (1965). Apparently, appellants have overlooked the fact that in each of the three cases relied upon we were not faced with the question of whether, as here, additional clarification was required on a given point of law, but rather with the problem of correcting erroneous instructions which had been given.

  4. Abbott v. Steel City Piping Co.

    437 Pa. 412 (Pa. 1970)   Cited 38 times
    In Abbott v. Steel City Piping Co., 437 Pa. 412, 263 A.2d 881 (1970), the appellant assigned error in a general instruction concerning negligence, arguing that the jury should have been instructed as to the varying legal duties of a contractor, a subcontractor, an independent contractor, and an architect.

    We are convinced that the trial court's charge to the jury, when read in its entirety, clearly and correctly delineated the issues which were to be left to the jury, with respect to Steel City's liability. See Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 417 Pa. 464, 209 A.2d 279 (1965); Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963); James v. Ferguson, 401 Pa. 92, 162 A.2d 690 (1960). The second issue raised by the appellant is whether the trial judge wrongfully excluded testimony, based on post-accident inspection, that the wall showed no indication of a pipe chase having been cut.

  5. Richmond v. A.F. of L. Med. S. Plan

    218 A.2d 303 (Pa. 1966)   Cited 12 times

    Reference thereto was unnecessary in this case and only tended to confuse an already difficult issue. Cf. Paul v. Dwyer, 410 Pa. 229, 188 A.2d 753 (1963). If erroneous fundamental instructions may have been responsible for the complained of verdict, a new trial is mandatory: Vaughn v. Phila. Trans. Co., 417 Pa. 464, 209 A.2d 279 (1965), and Pedretti v. Pgh. Railways Co., 417 Pa. 581, 209 A.2d 289 (1965). The defendants requested the charge complained of and attempt to sustain it on the authority of De Rose v. Hirst, 282 Pa. 292, 127 A. 776 (1925), and Nixon v. Pfahler, 279 Pa. 377, 124 A. 130 (1924).

  6. Commonwealth v. Young

    211 A.2d 440 (Pa. 1965)   Cited 11 times
    In Young, the evidence in question was introduced through the testimony of the clerk of courts who produced a transcript, indictment, and guilty plea thereto of one 'Thomas Young,' a black man, nineteen years of age.

    Whether the instruction under discussion influenced the jury's verdict is, of course, problematical. However, if it appears that an erroneous instruction might have been responsible for the verdict, a new trial is mandatory: Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 417 Pa. 464, 209 A.2d 279 (1965). Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.

  7. Juliano v. Johns-Manville Corp.

    416 Pa. Super. 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)   Cited 10 times
    Stating that “[i]n the absence of sufficient evidence demonstrating that plaintiff worked with or near the asbestos materials of a particular defendant, a jury cannot find, except by speculation, that it was a defendant's product which caused plaintiff's injury. Speculation, however, is an inadequate basis for recovery.”

    In instructing a jury, the primary duty of the trial judge is to clarify the issues and apprise the jury of the legal principles needed to decide the case. Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 417 Pa. 464, 468, 209 A.2d 279, 282 (1965); Graham v. Sky Haven Coal,Inc., 386 Pa. Super. 598, 609, 563 A.2d 891, 896 (1989), allocatur granted, 525 Pa. 603, 575 A.2d 568 (1990). The trial court has wide latitude in formulating its charge so long as it clearly and adequately covers the law pertaining to the issues raised by the evidence.

  8. Havasy v. Resnick

    415 Pa. Super. 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    Upholding "mistake of judgment" instruction and explaining that "instruction was appropriate because of expert testimony that compartment syndrome is often difficult to diagnose early"

    The primary duty of the trial judge is to clarify the issues and apprise the jury of the legal principles needed to decide the case. Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 417 Pa. 464, 468, 209 A.2d 279, 282 (1965); Graham v. Sky Haven Coal, Inc., 386 Pa. Super. 598, 609, 563 A.2d 891, 896 (1989), allocaturgranted, 525 Pa. 603, 575 A.2d 568 (1990). The trial court has wide latitude in formulating its charge so long as it clearly and adequately covers the law pertaining to the issues raised by the evidence.

  9. Com. v. Wilcox

    400 Pa. Super. 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)   Cited 3 times

    The relief for an erroneous jury instruction, however, is the award of a new trial. See: Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 494 Pa. 410, 420, 431 A.2d 920, 925 (1981); Vaughn v. PhiladelphiaTransportation Co., 417 Pa. 464, 468, 209 A.2d 279, 282 (1965); Commonwealth v. Myers, 376 Pa. Super. 41, 54, 545 A.2d 309, 315 (1988); Hoffman v. Memorial Osteopathic Hospital, 342 Pa. Super. 375, 382, 492 A.2d 1382, 1386 (1985). An erroneous jury instruction, even if adequately preserved by timely objection, does not warrant an arrest of judgment.

  10. Niles v. Fall Creek Hunting Club, Inc.

    376 Pa. Super. 260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that a survey line had become binding, consentable boundary line between two adjoining landowners

    Therefore, we must examine the trial court's jury instructions with respect to all possible theories on which the jury was permitted to find in favor of Niles. "If the jury charge [was] fundamentally erroneous or ha[d] a tendency to mislead or confuse . . . a new trial will be required so long as that portion of the charge in question might have been responsible for the verdict." Hoffmanv. Memorial Osteopathic Hospital, 342 Pa. Super. 375, 382, 492 A.2d 1382, 1386 (1985) (emphasis added), citing Jones v.Montefiore Hospital, 494 Pa. 410, 431 A.2d 920 (1981) and Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 417 Pa. 464, 209 A.2d 279 (1965). With respect to Niles's claim of title by adverse possession, the trial court not only refused to take this issue from the jury, but it also refused several instructions requested by Fall Creek to the effect that adverse possession of woodland cannot be established by a mere showing of occasional or sporadic use of the land such as for hunting or partial timbering.