Opinion
Case No. 4:02-CV-419
February 27, 2003
Douglas R. Larson, of Mesquite, TX, Attorneys For Plaintiffs.
Paul King Pearce, Jr. of Matthews, Carlton, Stein, Shiels, Pearce Knott, Dallas, Clarkson Frederick Brown, Bexar County DA's Office, San Antonio, TX, Attorneys For Defendants Greg Ruskin and City of Plano, TX Ralph Lopez and Bexar County, TX.
ORDER
Defendant Greg Rushin ("Rushin") has filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 3). Having considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion should be GRANTED.
It is well settled that a judgment against a public servant "in his official capacity" imposes liability on the entity that he represents. See Monnell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 5 (1978) (indicating that "official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"). The Supreme Court discussed this proposition in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), stating that "[a]s long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Id. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims against Rushin in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Plano are simply a reformulation of his claims against the City. Given that Plaintiff has named the City as a defendant in this action, his claims for relief as to Rushin are redundant. See, e.g., Clark v. La Marque I.S.D., 184 F. Supp.2d 606, 612 (S.D.Tex. 2002). Consequently, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED as to Plaintiff's official capacity claims brought against Defendant Rushin.