Opinion
No. 15–P–1755.
01-03-2017
Angela B. VAUDRY v. DIRECTOR OF the DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The claimant, Angela B. Vaudry, appeals from a District Court judgment affirming the decision of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) denying her unemployment insurance benefits. We affirm.
Background. At all relevant times, Vaudry's former employer, Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. (Shaw's), opposed her application for benefits on the basis that she had left her job voluntarily and not for good cause attributable to her employer. See G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(1). After an investigation, a DUA adjuster approved Vaudry's application, a determination reversed by a review examiner on appeal. The DUA board of review (board) subsequently allowed Vaudry's application for review, and remanded the case twice to the review examiner to make subsidiary and consolidated findings of fact from the record. In affirming the review examiner's decision, the board adopted the consolidated findings, finding them supported by substantial evidence as well as adequate to sustain the review examiner's disqualification decision. Vaudry sought judicial review in the District Court as permitted by G.L. c. 151A, § 42. Ruling on Vaudry's motion for judgment on the pleadings, a judge affirmed the DUA's decision denying benefits. This appeal followed.
Discussion. Vaudry's sole contention on appeal is that the DUA's decision must be overturned because it was made on unlawful procedure and in violation of her due process rights. See G.L. c. 30A, §§ 14(7)(a ), (d ).
The review examiner's initial decision was problematic. It did not contain enough findings to permit the board to perform its statutory function of determining whether the "decision was founded on the evidence in the record and was free from any error of law affecting substantial rights." G.L. c. 151A, § 41(b ), as appearing in St.1976, c. 473, § 14. As the board noted, certain subsidiary findings seemed to compel a finding that Vaudry had been fired or at least led to believe by the hotline and Shaw's human resources office that she had been fired. In fact, the review examiner's decision showed that he made inconsistent findings on this point. The board's remand instructions properly asked the review examiner to review his findings and to make further explicit findings regarding Vaudry's actions and state of mind on November 2, 2012. Vaudry was not subjected to an unfair hearing process. The board could, in its discretion, have taken additional evidence at a hearing or required the review examiner to do so. Nothing in § 41(b) or our case law entitled Vaudry to such a hearing. See Reed Natl. Corp. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 721, 722 n. 3 (1985) (approving same procedure on remand as was followed in this case). Indeed, in her appeal to the board, Vaudry made no additional requests, and asked the board to reverse the decision of the review examiner and to assign benefits on the existing record.
As the board noted, on the matter of overall credibility the review examiner found in the employer's favor. Elsewhere in his decision, the review examiner had concluded based on the account of Craig Williams, the store manager, as corroborated by Vaudry's direct supervisor, that Vaudry had abandoned her position on November 2, 2012. The review examiner also stated that Shaw's did not discharge Vaudry, and that therefore G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2), did not apply. The employer has the burden of proof in § 25(e )(2) cases, while the claimant bears the burden in § 25(e )(1) cases. Compare Crane v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Employment & Training, 414 Mass. 658, 660–661 (1993), with Shriver Nursing Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 367, 370 (2012).
Moreover, Vaudry, who was represented by counsel, had already received a full opportunity to present evidence and to be heard on all relevant matters over the course of the two-day hearing. In the course of clarifying his findings, the same review examiner was able to review all the recorded testimony and the documentary evidence. He was warranted in considering evidence that he had not specifically discussed in his first decision. He again credited the store manager Williams's version of events, in part based on the corroborating statement of Vaudry's direct supervisor. After weighing all the evidence and making additional credibility assessments, the review examiner ultimately made findings favorable to Shaw's on the dispositive factual questions. No due process violation has been shown in the failure to provide another hearing.
As directed by the board, the review examiner made several additional findings and credibility assessments, including critical findings. He found that the comments allegedly made by Williams to Vaudry on November 2, 2012, never happened; that Vaudry quit because she no longer wanted to work with Williams; that she had no intention of having the hotline address her complaint and no intention to return to her employment after November 2, 2012; that she never returned to employment because she quit and not because of any instructions from the hotline; and that after filing for benefits, she told the adjuster she had quit. He reiterated his conclusion that Vaudry left work because of a personality conflict with Williams, reasoning adopted by the board.
During the two days of hearings, the review examiner heard very different versions of the facts from Vaudry on the one hand and Williams on the other. The credibility assessments favored the store manager. For example, Vaudry testified that on November 2, 2012, Williams stated to her, "Look who decided to show up [for work]," and that she needed to choose between her career and family. Williams denied making these statements, and indicated that their interchange was limited to "[H]ello." The examiner credited Williams's account of the conversation. The examiner also discredited Vaudry's testimony that she called the hotline to resolve her complaint about Williams. He credited Williams's testimony that he had never harassed or discriminated against Vaudry.
To the extent Vaudry complains that she never received notice of "the revised and contrary findings" of the review examiner until the District Court ordered the DUA to provide them, the record shows that the board set forth the review examiner's consolidated findings and credibility assessments in full in its May 2, 2014, decision after remand. The record appears to show that as required by § 41(b ), a copy of that decision was mailed to Vaudry at her last known address on or about May 5, 2014.
On July 8, 2013, the chairman of the board remanded the case to the director of the DUA hearings department for delivery with instructions to the original review examiner. After reexamining the record of the two-day hearing on December 9, 2013, the review examiner returned his consolidated findings to the board on or about April 15, 2014.
Judgment affirmed.