Vasquez v. Hernandez

22 Citing cases

  1. Casas v. Gilliam

    869 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App. 1994)   Cited 11 times
    Holding statement in affidavit was not denied probative value, even though affidavit, admitted without objection, contained inadmissible hearsay

    This required conclusive proof that he took his actions (1) in good faith, (2) within the course and scope of his authority, (3) while he was performing a discretionary function. See Campbell v. Jones, 153 Tex. 101, 264 S.W.2d 425, 427 (1954); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Eakle v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 815 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Tex.App. — Austin 1991, writ denied). Plaintiff concedes that Casas was acting within the course and scope of his employment.

  2. City of Lancaster v. Chambers

    883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994)   Cited 754 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding on-duty police officers did not act outside the scope of authority even when driving in a high speed chase without regard to others safety

    In other contexts, our courts have held that police officers are exercising discretion while performing their duties. See, e.g., Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding officer was performing discretionary act in deciding when and how to arrest suspect), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 99 L.Ed.2d 483 (1988); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (holding that officer's positioning himself next to his patrol car with gun drawn and then firing was a discretionary use of deadly force); Wyse, 733 S.W.2d at 227 (describing investigatory duties of peace officers as discretionary); Boozier v. Hambrick, 846 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) ("When a police officer reports the misconduct of another . . . the officer performs a discretionary act."). Although federal law does not determine whether an officer's actions are discretionary for purposes of state law, nonetheless an examination of federal immunity law is instructive.

  3. Nunez v. Jimenez

    No. 04-07-00403-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 12, 2007)   Cited 4 times
    Explaining that a false arrest/false imprisonment claim based on an allegedly improper warrantless arrest turns on whether there was probable cause for the arrest

    We have also held that an officer is acting within the scope of his authority when he responds to a dispatcher's call for police intervention and takes action upon arrival. Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The fact that a specific act that forms the basis of the civil suit may have been wrongly or negligently performed does not take it outside the scope of authority.

  4. Nunez v. Jimenez

    No. 04-07-00403-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 10, 2007)

    We have also held that an officer is acting within the scope of his authority when he responds to a dispatcher's call for police intervention and takes action upon arrival. Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The fact that a specific act that forms the basis of the civil suit may have been wrongly or negligently performed does not take it outside the scope of authority.

  5. Boston v. Harris Cnty.

    CIVIL ACTION H-11-1566 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Id. at 654. Among cases cited by the Texas Supreme Court in City of Lancaster, finding police officers exercising discretion in certain contexts, are Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W. 2d 114, 117 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(holding officer was performing discretionary act in deciding when and how to arrest suspect), cert. denied, 485 U..S. 977 (1988), and Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W. 2d 802, 804-05 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.)(holding officer's positioning himself next to his patrol car with gun drawn and then firing was a discretionary use of deadly force). 883 S.W. 2d at 654.

  6. Cavit v. Rychlik

    Civil Action No. H-09-1279 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2010)

    An officer is acting within the scope of his authority when he responds to a dispatcher's call for police intervention and takes action upon arrival. Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The fact that a specific act that forms the basis of the civil suit may have been wrongly or negligently performed does not take it outside the scope of authority.

  7. Gardner v. Hill

    195 F. Supp. 2d 832 (E.D. Tex. 2001)   Cited 3 times

    Police officers are entitled to official immunity when performing discretionary duties in good faith within the scope of their authority. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). To establish good faith as a matter of law, Havard assumed the burden to show that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his actions were justified. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57; Antu v. Eddy, 914 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).

  8. Casanova v. City of Brookshire

    119 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D. Tex. 2000)   Cited 33 times
    Stating that any situation in which the accused "agreed to do something in exchange for the government's dropping the charges" does not constitute a favorable termination

    Texas courts have long recognized that police officers are engaged in discretionary functions while performing their official duties. See, e.g., Tamez, 118 F.3d at 1097; Gallia v. Schreiber, 907 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Perez, 905 S.W.2d at 699-700; Boozier v. Hambrick, 846 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Wyse v. Department of Pub. Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex.App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 99 L.Ed.2d 483 (1988). "An official acts in `good faith' if any reasonably prudent officer could have believed that the conduct was consistent with the plaintiff's rights."

  9. Holland ex Rel. Holland v. City of Houston

    41 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 1999)   Cited 65 times
    Holding plaintiff's claims that fatal gunshot victim's injuries were caused by officer's negligent use of tangible personal property — his service revolver — were intentional tort claims, "regardless of the language used."

    Texas courts have long recognized that police officers are engaged in discretionary functions while performing their official duties. See, e.g., Tamez, 118 F.3d at 1097; Gallia v. Schreiber, 907 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Perez, 905 S.W.2d 695, 699-700 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Boozier v. Hambrick, 846 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Wyse, 733 S.W.2d at 227; Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 99 L.Ed.2d 483 (1988). "An official acts in `good faith' if any reasonably prudent officer could have believed that the conduct was consistent with the plaintiff's rights."

  10. Leghart ex rel. Leghart v. Hauk

    25 F. Supp. 2d 748 (W.D. Tex. 1998)   Cited 18 times
    Finding a question of fact regarding an officer's use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a suspect who was driving away

    Because official immunity is an affirmative defense, a defendant who moves for summary judgment on the basis of official immunity must conclusively prove all essential elements of that defense. See Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.App. 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (citing Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972)). In the instant case, it is undisputed that Hauk was a government officer acting within the scope of his authority and was performing discretionary duties on March 30, 1998.