Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1833-G
February 6, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant, The Methodist Hospital ("Methodist"), to dismiss the claims against it for improper venue. For the reasons discussed below, Methodist's motion to dismiss is denied. However, the court — on its own motion — finds that, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, this case should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Abraham Varghese ("Varghese"), was an employee of Methodist, a medical facility located in Houston, Texas. Original Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint") at 2; Original Answer and Affirmative Defenses Subject to Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue ("Answer") at 6. Methodist is a covered employer under both the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA") and the Texas Labor Code, Section 21.002(8). Complaint at 2; Answer at 7. Varghese avers that he has multiple sclerosis and has had this disability at all times relevant to this suit. Complaint at 2. In September 1999, Varghese was employed by Methodist as a full-time MRI technician. Complaint at 2; Answer at 7. Varghese contends that he was qualified for the position by education, certification, and prior work experience in the same profession, and that he was qualified to perform the essential job duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. Complaint at 3. Methodist denies these assertions. Answer at 7.
On or about October 14, 1999, Varghese claims that he was given an MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) brain scan by his employer. Complaint at 3; but see Answer at 7. Varghese asserts that an MRI is one method of imaging the brain to detect the presence of plaques or scarring caused by multiple sclerosis. Complaint at 3; but see Answer at 7. On or about October 15, 1999, Varghese claims he was discharged by Methodist and he was replaced by, or his job duties were assigned to, one or more non-disabled employees. Complaint at 3; but see Answer at 7. Varghese asserts that the adverse discriminatory employment actions taken by Methodist were intentional and based upon Varghese's disability, his record of disability, or Methodist's perception that he was disabled. Complaint at 3; but see Answer at 7. As a result of Methodist's actions, Varghese contends he has sustained a loss of employment, loss of wages, loss of benefits and other compensation, loss of future wages and benefits, and other damages, including emotional distress and mental anguish. Complaint at 3; but see Answer at 8. Finally, Varghese claims that all actions taken by Methodist against him were done intentionally, willfully, maliciously, or in reckless disregard for his rights. Complaint at 3; but see Answer at 8.
Varghese brings causes of action against Methodist under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("the TCHRA"), TEX. LABOR CODE §§ 21.001 et seq. (Vernon 1996). Complaint at 3-4.
II. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue
In his complaint, Varghese relied upon 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") to support both jurisdiction and venue in this court. Complaint at 1. The ADA specifically incorporates Title 42 § 2000e-5, the provision of Title VII relating to jurisdiction and venue. Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides that venue is proper in (1) any district in the state in which the unlawful employment practice occurred, (2) in the district in which the employment records relevant to the employment practices are maintained or administered, (3) in the district in which the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, or (4) if the defendant cannot be found in any of these districts, the case may be brought in the district in which the defendant has its principal office. Id. Contrary to Methodist's assertion, "venue is not limited to the judicial district in which the unlawful employment practices occurred if the state is a multi-district state; but venue is appropriate in any district in the state in which the unlawful employment practices occurred." Adams v. Cal-Ark International, Inc., 159 F. Supp.2d 402, 409 (E.D.Tex. 2001); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mustang Mobile Homes, Inc., 88 F. Supp.2d 722, 724 (W.D.Tex. 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Because Methodist and Varghese agree that the employment practices at issue occurred in Texas (Complaint at 1-3, Answer at 6-7), the court finds that venue is proper in this district. Hence, the court must deny Methodist's motion to dismiss for improper venue.
(a) Powers, remedies, and procedures
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in section . . . 2000e-5 . . . of this title [Title 42] shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to . . . any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter . . . concerning employment.42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
B. Transfer of Venue
A district court may transfer any civil case "[f] or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, . . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Under this statute, the court may transfer a case upon motion or sua sponte. Caldwell v. Palmetto State Savings Bank of South Carolina, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989); Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1988).
The purpose of Section 1404(a) "is to prevent the waste `of time, energy, and money' and `to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense . . .'". Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quoting Continental Grain Company v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26, 27 (1960)). The decision to transfer a pending case is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Jarvis, 845 F.2d at 528. The plaintiff's choice of forum, however, is given substantial weight and should not be disturbed without giving full consideration to the equities of the particular case. See Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
In deciding whether to transfer a case, the court should consider (1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of material witnesses, (3) the availability of process to compel the presence of unwilling witnesses, (4) the cost of obtaining the presence of witnesses, (5) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (6) calendar congestion, (7) where the events in issue took place, and (8) the interests of justice in general. Gundle Lining Construction Corporation v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 844 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D.Tex. 1994). An analysis of these factors demonstrates that this matter should be transferred to the Southern District of Texas.
1. Factor (1): The Convenience of the Parties
Although Varghese is a citizen and resident of Oklahoma, that state would not be a proper venue for this action. Therefore, the court must look to the legal residence of the only other party to this action — the defendant, Methodist. Methodist is an undisputed legal "resident" of Houston, Texas, as it is a medical facility that only operates at that location. Complaint at 1; Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue ("Motion") at 4; Answer at 7. Houston, located in the Southern District of Texas, is approximately 240 miles from this court. Thus, the court finds that the convenience of the parties would be best served if this case were transferred to the Southern District of Texas.
2. Factors (2), (3), and (4): The Convenience of Material Witnesses, Availability of Process, and Cost of Obtaining Witnesses
The convenience of the witnesses is often regarded as the most important factor to be considered in deciding whether to transfer venue. Gundle, 844 F. Supp. at 1166; Fletcher v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 648 F. Supp. 1400, 1401-02 (E.D.Tex. 1986). All of the material witnesses to this action, other than the plaintiff, are presumably located in Houston, Texas, because that is where Methodist and all of its employees are located. Complaint at 1-2; Motion at 4; Answer at 7. Accordingly, the "convenience of the witnesses" factor favors transfer of venue in this case.
3. Factors (5) and (7): Sources of Proof and Where the Events in Issue Occurred
It is undisputed that the events at issue took place at Methodist in Houston, Texas. Complaint at 1-2; Motion at 4; Answer at 7. Hence, the court assumes that most, if not all, sources of proof are also located in Houston, Texas. Thus, factors (5) and (7) both weigh in favor of transferring this case to the Southern District of Texas.
4. Factor (6): Calendar Congestion
The court has before it no information on this factor and will therefore grant it neutral weight in the analysis.
5. Factor (8): The Interest of Justice
Although a court considering transfer of venue under section 1404(a) does not necessarily exercise a strong presumption in favor of plaintiffs choice of forum, it is certainly a factor to be considered. See Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 (S.D.Tex. 1992) (comparing the standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) with the standard of forum non conveniens); Mohamed v. Mazda Motor Corporation, 90 F. Supp.2d 757, 771-74 (E.D.Tex. 2000). The plaintiff's choice of forum is given less weight, however, where none of the operative facts occurred within the forum of plaintiff's selection. Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. at 1404.
In this case, each factor considered is either neutral or weighs heavily in favor of transferring this case to the Southern District of Texas, where all of the events took place, where the defendant is located and operates, and where most, if not all, of the evidence and material witnesses are located. For these reasons, this case is transferred to the Southern District of Texas.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Methodist's motion to dismiss for improper venue is DENIED. On the court's own motion, however, this case is TRANSFERRED, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
SO ORDERED.
February 6, 2002.