Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3424-13T1
03-31-2015
DARWIN J. VARGAS, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
Darwin J. Vargas, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, New Jersey Department of Labor (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian M. Scott, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Waugh and Carroll. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 445,085. Darwin J. Vargas, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, New Jersey Department of Labor (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian M. Scott, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Appellant Darwin J. Vargas appeals the final administrative agency decision of respondent Board of Review (Board) in the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division), determining that he was ineligible for benefits following the termination of his employment by respondent Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania on August 26, 2013. We affirm.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal. Vargas was employed as an assistant branch manager by Citizens Bank from February 2007 until his termination in August 2013. On August 3, he was arrested for reasons not relevant to this appeal. Although he attempted to contact the bank to let his supervisor know he would not be able to report for work, he was unable to do so for several weeks. Vargas sent a letter to his supervisor on August 14, which his supervisor did not receive until August 24.
Pursuant to Citizens Bank's personnel policies, an employee who is absent from work for three days without notifying a supervisor is considered to have left voluntarily. Consequently, Vargas was terminated, and the bank began the process of hiring a replacement. Nevertheless, upon receipt of the letter from Vargas, the bank allowed him to collect his accrued paid leave time. However, because it was in the process of hiring a replacement, Citizens Bank was unwilling to rehire Vargas.
Vargas was released from incarceration on September 1, and promptly filed for unemployment benefits. On October 10, one of the Division's deputy directors determined that Vargas was unqualified for benefits, finding that he had left employment voluntarily on August 25 without "good cause attributable to the work." Vargas sought review by the Appeal Tribunal, which held a telephone hearing on December 17. Both Vargas and a representative of Citizens Bank participated in the hearing. On December 18, the Appeal Tribunal found that Vargas was disqualified.
Vargas appealed to the Board in March 2014. The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision on March 6. This appeal followed.
Our scope of review of an administrative agency's action is limited and highly deferential. It is restricted to the following inquiries:
(1) whether the agency's decision offends the State or Federal Constitution;So long as the Board's decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and was neither "arbitrary, capricious, [nor] unreasonable," it will be affirmed. Id. at 210 (citing In re Warren, 117 N.J. 295, 296 (1989)).
(2) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies;
(3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and
(4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 211 (1997) (quoting George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994)).]
We review factual findings made by an administrative agency deferentially. On appeal, "the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). So long as the "factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). The applicant has the burden to establish his right to receive unemployment benefits. Id. at 218.
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides that an individual who leaves work "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" will be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Although a prior version of the statute precluded benefits for someone who "left work voluntarily without good cause," the statute was amended in 1961 to require that the good cause be "attributable to such work." Id. at 213-14; Stauhs v. Bd. of Review, 93 N.J. Super. 451, 454-55 (App. Div. 1967).
Clearly, Vargas's incarceration was not voluntary. However, his inability to report to work was not related to his employment. We faced nearly identical facts in Fennell v. Board of Review, 297 N.J. Super. 319, 325 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 464 (1997), where we said the following:
Appellant lost his job because of incarceration in default of bail. No matter how sympathetic the facts, this bore no relationship to his work. The agency's decision to disqualify appellant from benefits because he voluntarily left his job without good cause attributable to work is supported by substantial credible evidence and is neither arbitrary nor capricious.Consequently, we are constrained to find that the Board's application of the statute to preclude Vargas's application for benefits was legally correct.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION