Opinion
Record No. 1877-93-4
Decided: January 3, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY, James M. Lumpkin, Judge Designate
Mark E. Winn (Daniel J. Travostino, on briefs), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Koontz and Fitzpatrick
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
John Varga appeals his conviction for driving in violation of his status as an habitual offender. Varga asserts that the order adjudicating him an habitual offender was void on its face because it was vague, did not specify the length of time for which his privilege to drive would be revoked, and did not specifically direct him not to drive. For the following reasons, we affirm Varga's conviction.
Deputy Laurie O'Brien (O'Brien) of the Loudoun County Sheriff's Department testified that on January 18, 1993 she observed Varga's truck drive through a red light while travelling southbound on Route 28 at Sterling Boulevard. O'Brien stopped the vehicle and asked to see Varga's license and registration. O'Brien testified that Varga stated he did not have either document on his person. O'Brien then asked for Varga's name. After hesitating in giving his name, Varga stated that his license had been suspended. O'Brien further testified that when asked for his social security number and date of birth, Varga replied, "Let me level with you. I'm a[n] habitual offender."
The Commonwealth introduced the 1984 order declaring Varga to be an habitual offender. Varga made a motion to strike on the ground that the order stated no duration for the suspension of his driving privileges. Varga further asserted that because the order did not recite the penalty for violating the order and that Varga did not have counsel at the habitual offender hearing, the order was void on its face. The trial court ruled that the order was proper and admitted it into evidence.
Varga asserts that Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 246, 248, 402 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1991), requires the order declaring him to be an habitual offender to state the term for which his driving privileges are to be revoked. We disagree. In Davis, we held that where an habitual offender order did not state that driving privileges would remain revoked after the expiration of the ten-year statutory period until restored by court order, a conviction for driving after the expiration of that ten-year period was invalid. Here, the mandatory ten-year period had not yet expired. Nothing in Davis or the applicable statutes requires that the order recite the mandatory period. Rather, the statute in force at the time Varga was adjudicated an habitual offender required that the trial judge "by appropriate order direct [a person adjudged to be an habitual offender] not to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth of Virginia and to surrender to the court all licenses or permits to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State for disposal in the manner provided in Code Sec. 46.1-425." Code Sec. 46.1-387.6 (superseded 1989) (emphasis added). The order adjudicating Varga as an habitual offender was issued on a standardized form and clearly indicates that Varga had been adjudicated an habitual offender and that his "privilege to operate a motor vehicle . . . [was THEREBY] REVOKED." The order further directed the clerk of the court to dispose of "said license" (i.e. the license granting Varga the privilege to operate a motor vehicle) in accordance with the statute. Accordingly, we hold that the order satisfied the requirements of Code Sec. 46.1-387.6 and effectively subjected Varga to habitual offender status for the mandatory ten-year period.
Code § 46.2-355, the superseding statute, contains identical language.
Varga further asserts that as the order did not specifically direct him not to drive, he lacked sufficient notice of his status as an habitual offender and the import of that status. Reed v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 467, 471, 424 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1992). Although Varga did not raise this specific objection at trial, we will assume that the issue was preserved by the general argument that the order was void on its face because of vagueness. We hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987), supports a finding that Varga had knowledge of his status and the accompanying prohibition to drive under that status.
As noted above, the order issued by the trial court revoked Varga's "privilege to operate a motor vehicle." The clear and unambiguous meaning of that language is that Varga was not to drive. Moreover, the record shows that Varga was present at the hearing at which he was declared to be an habitual offender and that on the date of his arrest he knew of his status and that a DMV check would reveal this fact. Thus, the trial judge's reasonable inference that Varga was aware that his driving privileges had been revoked is not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. See id.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Varga's conviction.
Affirmed.