However, on appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter because genuine issues of material fact remained "regarding the scope of the time-is-of-the-essence provision and the reasonableness of the [four-day] delay in lowering the purchase price." Vanbuskirk v. Nakamura, Docket No. 67816 (Order of Reversal and Remand, May 20, 2016). The supreme court cited Mayfield v. Koroghli, which held that "[i]f time is not of the essence, the parties generally must perform under the contract within a reasonable time, which depends upon the nature of the contract and the particular circumstances involved."
If "[a] contract that includes a clause providing in general terms that time is of the essence," such as the RPA here, the clause "does not necessarily apply to pre-closing conditions that do not affect the specified closing date." Vanbuskirk v. Nakamura, No. 67816, 2016 WL 2985026, at *2 (Nev. May 20, 2016) (Order of Reversal and Remand). In such cases, courts must determine whether the time-is-of-the-essence clause applies to a particular condition precedent.